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Wild Geese, by Mary Oliver 
 
 
You do not have to be good. 
You do not have to walk on your knees 
For a hundred miles through the desert, repenting. 
You only have to let the soft animal of your body 
love what it loves. 
Tell me about your despair, yours, and I will tell you mine. 
Meanwhile the world goes on. 
Meanwhile the sun and the clear pebbles of the rain 
are moving across the landscapes, 
over the prairies and the deep trees, 
the mountains and the rivers. 
Meanwhile the wild geese, high in the clean blue air, 
are heading home again. 
Whoever you are, no matter how lonely, 
the world offers itself to your imagination, 
calls to you like the wild geese, harsh and exciting -- 
over and over announcing your place 
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This thesis is about the perceptual nature of aesthetic experience and the importance of 
nature as a paradigmatic object of aesthetic perception and aesthetic experience more 
broadly conceived. For this reason, it merits serious attention by philosophers working 
in aesthetics, as has been argued since Ronald Hepburn’s seminal essay “Contemporary 
Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty”. If aesthetic experience is anything, it is 
at least perceptual. It is a mode of perceptual experience that is the result of having been 
attentive to and having discriminated between, the aesthetic and non-aesthetic, and 
invites room for reflection on, and connections to be made with, cognitive and emotive 
processes.  Rooting the aesthetic in perception allows us to recognize and understand 
that it has an impact on our daily activities, rather than being restricted either to a 
particular kind of object, to the knowledge we might have about it, or to intense, rarefied 
aesthetic experience. If an object is to be an aesthetic object it need not be an artwork, 
indeed, one might even argue that nature is more interesting an aesthetic object from the 
perspective that it is indeterminate, not the result of human intentionality, and from an 
existential point of view, one that acknowledges our dependence on it. In the course of 
the argument, I thus resist the idea that the aesthetic experience of art is necessarily prior 
to the aesthetic experience of nature. The perceptual account put forward is based on a 
realist account of aesthetic properties that considers aesthetic properties to be perceptual 
properties and that considers aesthetic experience to be perceptually rich. I link it to the 
idea of ‘whole formalism’, a perceptual, aesthetic account that is nestled in the wider 
thought that aesthetic perception relates, although not causally, to other features of 
experience, such as emotion, and knowledge. Perceptual, aesthetic experience is thus not 
reduced to an austere account of aesthetic formalism. The thesis begins by analysing 
historical accounts of aesthetic perception, beginning with Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. 
It builds on this analysis by reinterpreting crucial concepts to the discipline of aesthetics, 
such as disinterest and formalism that originated in the eighteenth century and are 
relevant to the idea of aesthetic perception. It then brings the idea of aesthetic perception 
up to date by addressing the current debate about cognitivism and non-cognitivism about 
aesthetic experience where nature is concerned. By tracing the idea of aesthetic 
perception historically, I will have also shown the role of nature as a paradigm of 
aesthetic experience through history and that nature is a repository for rich aesthetic 
experience and for rich experiential engagement with it. 
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General Introduction: What Could it Mean to Perceive Nature Aesthetically? 
 
I may want to find out whether or not Maman, 1999, a sculpture by Louise 
Bourgeois, is a beautiful sculpture. I may want to discover why it is that Jupiter Artland 
in Edinburgh is more or less aesthetically pleasing than Little Sparta, a garden designed 
by Ian Hamilton Finlay. I may want to discover why it is that the Highlands of Scotland 
are described as majestic or as pristine wilderness. A good friend has given me ample 
reason for believing that Maman is beautiful, and I have reconstructed the description 
she has given in my own imagination, the image thus constructed is of a beautiful, 
enormous, steel spider carrying, and caring for, her sack of eggs. Another friend, who is 
interested in art, and gardens, has offered convincing reasons for thinking that Little 
Sparta is more pleasing than Jupiter Artland, and therefore more engaging as a space 
that is describable in the most poetic of terms. The Visit Scotland brochure has given me 
good reason for believing that the Highlands are majestic and that the landscape in one 
of pristine wilderness, which it is not.  
If I were to visit the Tate Gallery in London to see Maman, or visit Little Sparta near 
the Pentland Hills and Jupiter Artland in Wilkieston to see which is preferable, or the 
Highlands themselves to see whether they are majestic, pristine and wild, I would be 
able to know for myself whether these objects are as they have been described. If, on the 
other hand, I were to rely on another’s testimony, or my own imagination, for 
confirmation that these objects are as they have been described, I would not be in the 
position to judge for myself. There is something importantly primary about aesthetic 
perception. Aesthetic knowledge is foundational and testimony about it is traceable back 
to aesthetic perception. By seeing or perceptually experiencing the objects concerned, I 
can assess whether the objects in question have been described matches the direct and 
immediate experience of them. I see beauty, majesty and the wild character for myself. 
The starting point for experiencing something aesthetically is experiencing it personally, 
using the appropriate senses.  
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My main aim in the dissertation will be to unpack the idea of aesthetic perception, 
that aesthetic properties are appearance properties, and precede what we might know 
about the object in important ways in a more loaded cognitive sense. That is, following 
Pettit, I support the view that a cognitive approach to aesthetic objects is not possible 
without perceptual access to it.1 In order for the experience of a non-abstract object to be 
thought of as distinctly aesthetic, it is first and foremost a perceptual experience on 
which complex cognitive processes depend. I defend an understanding of aesthetic 
experience, therefore, that is based on a continuum, that brings together an account of 
‘whole formalism’, based on that presented by Zuckert, that can integrate perceptual, 
aesthetic, phenomena with diverse, non-specifiable, intellectual approaches. The whole-
formalist approach differs from other formalist approaches, such as those put forward by 
Bell and Zangwill, for example, whose formalism might be described as austere and 
rule-governed in the sense that they require certain properties deemed to be formal 
properties rather than being attentive to the object for the features that are present to the 
subject in the subject’s experience of it.  
The change in emphasis from the formalist point of view to the whole-formalist is, 
therefore, subtle but nevertheless important. Whole formalism, unlike what formalism is 
ordinarily taken to be, takes it that the object as a whole, as it is present to the subject’s 
experience is important, including its formal properties and non-formal perceptual 
properties are one fold of the “three-fold disjunction”, as Zuckert characterizes the 
Kantian view, which we sensually experience (the second fold of the three-fold 
disjunction) interact with our concepts through the “free-play of the imagination and 
understanding” (this interaction being the third fold).  
The idea is that whole formalism, and this threefold disjunctive explanation of 
aesthetic experience, can help dissolve the dichotomy presented by advocates of 
formalist, non-cognitive, or perceptualist approaches to aesthetic experience and non-
formalist, cognitive, or intellectualist, approaches. This issue has become important in 
the aesthetics of nature because formalists take an overly-reductive approach to aesthetic 
                                                
1 Phillip Pettit, "The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism," in Pleasure, Preference and 
Value, ed. Eva Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1983). 
 9 
experience while cognitivists, or intellectualists, try to seek objectivity about aesthetic 
judgments of nature through what we might know about nature, how we categorise it 
scientifically, in order to ensure environmental justice. Whole formalism provides the 
resources both to scrutinise how aesthetic objects are present in perceptual experience 
and how these relate to imaginative, cognitive and emotive aspects of experience. That is 
to say, it is just as important to be clear about and scrutinise what we perceive 
aesthetically as it is about what we might know and feel about the object being perceived 
and scrutinised. Given that the knowledge we might have of an aesthetic object, or 
previous experiences of objects similar to it, might influence our in situ experience as 
well as our evaluative judgment of it, we can acknowledge that the contents of different 
peoples’ experiences might differ. What becomes important then is how we link 
cognitive and emotive elements to perceivable, aesthetic ones. This is where interesting 
work can be done to at least attempt to be clear on what we individually experience 
through perception and how these relate to those others features of experience, through 
aesthetic discourse as Sibley argued. 
There is a related debate about testimony, aesthetic experience, second hand aesthetic 
experience and disagreement about aesthetic judgments and aesthetic value.2 I will not 
fully address the issue of aesthetic testimony here, as I wish to focus on in situ, first-
personal aesthetic experience. It is worth noting, however, that the issue of aesthetic 
testimony might provide some insight into the possibility of reaching objectivity of 
aesthetic experience. Kant’s reflections on the peculiarities of the judgment of taste 
articulate a more general sense of unease where such judgments are concerned. On the 
one hand, objectivity about aesthetic judgment, in the sense an aesthetic property is of an 
                                                
2 Marlcolm Budd, "The Acquaintance Principle," British Journal of  Aesthetics 43, no. 4 
(2003), Keren Gorodeisky, "A New Look at Kant's View of Aesthetic Testimony," 
British Journal of  Aesthetics 50, no. 1 (2010), Rob Hopkins, "Beauty and Testimony," 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47, no. September 2000 (2000), ———, "How 
to Be a Pessimist About Aesthetic Testimony," Journal of Philosophy 108, no. 3 (2011), 
Aaron Meskin, "Aesthetic Testimony: Can We Learn from Others About Beauty and 
Art?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, no. 1 (2004). Pettit, "The 
Possibility of Aesthetic Realism.", Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (London: 
Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974), Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (Middlesex: Penguin 
Books Ltd, 1968). 
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object, leads one to the conclusion that universal assent would be required if it were true 
that aesthetic properties are of objects. On the other hand, subjectivity about aesthetic 
judgment, in the sense that aesthetic properties form part of a subject’s experience of an 
object rather than the object itself, would explain disagreement about such judgments. 
Where this latter claim is concerned, however, it would be difficult to assess what a 
disagreement would be about without knowing what the judgment is, or judgments are, 
about. If objectivity about aesthetic judgment is true, it would seem unproblematic that 
aesthetic testimony is straightforward, or at least less problematic than might otherwise 
be thought: we can easily transmit knowledge about our aesthetic experiences of objects 
because we have direct perceptual access to those objects. If subjectivity about aesthetic 
judgment as defined above is true, it is less clear that aesthetic experiences are 
transferable because direct access to the objects or phenomena of another’s experience is 
ordinarily thought to be exclusive to the person having, or having had, the experience. 
I am in agreement with Meskin when he writes that our aesthetic experiences of 
nature are not determined or intended by a creative mind and that we therefore don’t 
enter into the kinds of complications that art often offers up.3 The intuition here is that 
we need not appeal to an artist’s biography or to historical context, for example, to 
appreciate nature’s aesthetic offerings. It is for reasons to do with how nature is present 
in perception that we can appeal to it in order that we may argue against the kind of 
unpalatable relativism that often manifests itself in aesthetic circles. This does not mean 
that we have to be austere about the perceptual nature of aesthetic experience, or rigidly 
objectivist about it by appealing to complex forms of knowledge. It just means that we 
can, with care, both scrutinise what we in fact perceive aesthetically and how that relates 
to the kind of content that we associate with it. Where aesthetic testimony is concerned, 
then, I would argue for a partial-realist stance, that some aesthetic knowledge is 
transferable and other such knowledge is not. It is at least part of the richness of 
aesthetics as a discipline that we should not reduce aesthetic experience either to austere 
types of formalism or to overly-stipulative accounts of knowledge. This is because 
                                                
3 Meskin, "Aesthetic Testimony: Can We Learn from Others About Beauty and Art?." 
89. 
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accounts of aesthetic experiences that relate to external, extended, objects are based on 
those objects’ perceivable properties. 
 The link between the idea of aesthetic perception, that aesthetic properties are 
appearance properties perceivable by us and nature’s status as a subject matter for 
aesthetic experience is just as significant as art’s. For, even though interest in the 
aesthetics of nature has increased, particularly since Hepburn’s influential paper, 
"Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty"4, in keeping with the 
general trend in aesthetics to diversify into different branches (such as the ‘everyday’), 
nature is still thought of as being less important than art. Of course, it is no mystery to 
me, as it should not be to anyone, why art is a meaningful paradigm for aesthetic 
experience. It is the source of great imaginative, intellectual, creative, human endeavour, 
objects through which we may learn about ourselves, our culture, history as well as 
cultures with which we are not familiar, and modes of thinking we may not have 
otherwise contemplated. Indeed, it can be the source of rapturous aesthetic experience so 
often described, in particular by philosophers such as Hegel or Schopenhauer.  
What I mean to suggest is that nature, although often only cursorily acknowledged as 
an important subject matter of aesthetics, is often still not turned to as a paradigm of 
aesthetic experience or an important provider of aesthetic experience in the wider 
discipline. And, as Hepburn so eloquently wrote, nature is the source of an array of 
experiences that are distinct from art, but nonetheless moving and aesthetically 
engaging, without an artist mediating the process. The link between the idea of aesthetic 
perception and nature is premised on our capacity for experiencing objects in the world 
and is dependent on our existence and the existence of nature. We attend to external 
objects, sensually experience them and can articulate thoughts about them. These are 
necessary conditions for aesthetic experience, but not necessarily sufficient, depending 
on the object itself.  
                                                
4 Ronald Hepburn, "Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty," in 
'Wonder' and Other Essays, ed. Ronald Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1984). 
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Making nature at least as central an aesthetic object as art rests both on the claim that 
our physical bodies are part of the natural physical world and are naturally predisposed 
to sensual, and hence aesthetic, experience. We exist as natural beings who sensually 
experience objects in the world, and those experiences are of discernible objects with 
discernible features, giving us reason to apply concepts and terms to them. This is 
because those are the features of objects that we experience, describe and discuss and 
nature is a subject matter to which which we have historically and continue to apply 
aesthetic concepts. In short, the argument sees nature as both a seemingly purposeful 
creator of natural objects to which we belong, but also as the provider of a richness of 
aesthetic properties that gives us some understanding of the external, natural world, but 
also of our experience of it.  
Those experiences might be merely perceptual in some cases, but they might combine 
with what a subject knows or imagines about the object, creating a more particular 
aesthetic experience. To that end, I will be arguing for two inter-related strands of 
argument: one strand that takes account of perceiving aesthetically, which in the end will 
be formulated in terms of ‘whole formalism’, a distinction made by Zuckert5 that allows 
for the idea that an object’s aesthetic properties are non-causally related to its non-
aesthetic concepts; the second strand capturing what it is that is important about our 
experiences of nature. There will also be an historical dimension to the thesis in the 
hopes of ascertaining what has historically been thought about aesthetic perception and 
also of nature as a subject matter for aesthetic experience. To that end I address Plato’s 
skepticism about aesthetic properties, Aristotle’s teleology about them and Aquinas’ 
realism about aesthetic properties in chapter one. Chapter two will allow me to introduce 
concepts, such as immediacy, disinterest and aesthetic perception that are important to 
my own conclusions about perceptual, aesthetic, experience and the importance of 
nature as a subject matter for aesthetic experience. Chapter three will address the issue 
of priority being given to art or nature in the aesthetic realm, but will show that concerns 
about not allowing art conceptual priority in aesthetic realm, primarily linked to the idea 
                                                
5 Rachel Zuckert, "The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant's Aesthetic 
Formalism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 44, no. 4 (2006). 
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that nature is not intentionally created, are ill-founded and that nature is at least as 
important as art. This chapter will also introduce contemporary approaches to the 
aesthetics of nature. To provide further support for the importance of nature to 
aesthetics, despite its lack of intentionality, chapter four will confirm nature as a 
paradigm of aesthetic experience and concentrate on nature’s expressive properties in 
order to reveal the richness of nature as an object of aesthetic appreciation. Chapter five 
will lay out the respective arguments put forward by contemporary, non-cognitive 
formalists about the aesthetics of nature and their opposing scientific cognitivists. This is 
important because both sides of the debate beg the question against each other, with one 
side insisting on an austere formalism that dispenses with, or at least minimizes, other 
valuable aspects of aesthetic experience, and the other side insisting on the role of 
knowledge. I argue that neither has the upper hand, that claims and counter claims have 
left them at loggerheads with each other without advancing the discourse by way of 
resolution, which I think begins with a perceptual account of the aesthetic. One possible 
resolution is articulated in chapter six, where the idea of ‘whole formalism’ takes a 
different approach from many austere formalists and is arguably the best interpretation 
of Kant’s formalism. Here we discover a perceptually rich account of aesthetics that 
does not deny the possibility for non-formal, or non-perceptual elements of objects to 
figure in aesthetic experience and does not assume that the non-determinism, or lack of 
intentionality in nature means it should relate to an austere account of formalism. 
Before beginning with chapter one, some background is needed on the philosophy of 
perception that is being assumed in my discussion. Explicitly placing the aesthetic in the 
realm of perception raises the problem, as Sibley wrote, of how to distinguish between 
the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic.6 There is the thought that with talk of the aesthetic 
we engage in a potentially more complex set of issues than we do when writing about 
shape and colour, or non-aesthetic contents of perceptual experience. There are some 
aesthetic features that are not perceptual features, but others that are, as we will see, but 
it is the perceptual aesthetic features that I’m concerned with here. The account I give 
                                                
6 F. N. Sibley, "Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic," in Approach to Aesthetics, ed. Betty 
Redfern John Benson, Jeremy Roxbee Cox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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below is based on a position in the philosophy of perception for which the following 
concepts are building blocks: ‘openness’, ‘transparency’ and ‘immediacy’. It will be the 
starting point for my perceptual account of aesthetic experience.  
The argument being put forward in the dissertation is based on an account of 
perception that is related to the senses, that what we perceive is a result of what we see 
when we open our eyes, what we hear with our ears and feel with our fingers and skin. 
Its starting point is that the senses provide us with an “opening onto the world” that 
enables us to describe the world that we experience.7 By ‘experience’, I mean the 
phenomenal character of our perceptual engagement with the world, but I will elaborate 
on this below. Descriptions of these experiences are rich and are of objects that are 
prima facie distinct from the particular experience being had, that is to say, objects that 
exist independent of mind.8 We can describe our experiences of objects despite needing 
to commit ourselves to their status as experience- or mind-independent objects. 
However, this does not necessarily entail that the objects we experience should be 
“banished”.9 This is important because whether or not we can come to show that 
external objects exist independently of mind, we have experiences of external objects 
that we can describe and characterise. 
Following on from the idea of ‘openness onto the world’ comes the idea of 
‘transparency’, the idea that our perceptual experiences themselves are of objects on 
which we can reflect, mind-independent objects to which our experiences open us up.10 
                                                
7 Tim Crane, "The Problem of Perception," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
Spring 2011(2001), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/perception-
problem/, John McDowell, "The Content of Perceptual Experience," Philosophical 
Quarterly 44 (1994). 
8 PF Strawson, "Perception and Its Objects," in Perception and Identity: Essays 
Presented to A.J. Ayer with His Replies (London: Macmillan, 1979). 
9 Crane, "The Problem of Perception.", MGF Martin, "The Transparency of Experience," 
Mind and Language 17 (2002). 
10 Gilbert Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience," in The Nature of 
Consciousness 663 - 676, ed. Owen Flanagan and Guven Guzeldere Ned Block 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1997), Martin, "The Transparency of Experience.", P.F. 
Snowdon, "The Objects of Perceptual Experience," Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 64 (1990), Speaks, "Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual 
Content," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2009), Daniel Stoljar, "The 
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Reflection on what it is like to have a perceptual experience does not reveal a perceptual 
experience as such, but reveals the prima facie mind-, experience- independent object.  
In perceiving and reflecting on what it is like to perceive majestic Highlands, for 
example, I’m perceiving and reflecting on majestic Highlands, not the experience itself. 
  Another way of fleshing out the account of perception that underpins aesthetic 
perception is by suggesting that the contents of perception are like being “in a bucket” as 
opposed to mediated by the senses “like a newspaper”: 
When one speaks of the contents of a bucket, one is talking about what is spatially 
inside the bucket. An analogous use of “the contents of perception” would pick out 
what is ‘in the mind’ when one has a perceptual experience. In contrast, when one 
speaks of the contents of a newspaper, one is talking about what information the 
newspaper stories convey.11  
 
By this I mean that I am primarily interested in the resulting phenomena that are 
presented by our senses, rather than how our senses mediate perceptual events, “like a 
newspaper” mediates current events in the world.12  
Both ‘openness onto the world’ and ‘transparency’ are important presuppositions for 
the account of aesthetic perception that I’m going to develop below. Another important 
concept for this framework is ‘immediacy’. Where aesthetics is concerned, Shelley 
writes that ‘immediacy’ is “the thesis that judgments of beauty are not mediated by 
inferences from principles or applications of concepts, but rather have all the immediacy 
                                                                                                                                           
Argument from Diaphanousness"," Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 
Volume, no. New Essays in Language and Mind (2004), Michael Tye, Consciousness, 
Color and Content (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
11 Susanna Siegel, "The Contents of Perception," 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/perception-contents/. 
12 Ibid. I do not have the space to address the complications for this more direct account 
of perceptual experience that arise from the arguments from illusion or hallucination, 
although these [may be] alluded to, for this would develop into an argument about 
perception more widely conceived, rather than one that is more specifically concerned 
with aesthetic perception. 
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of straightforwardly sensory judgments; it is the idea, in other words, that we do not 
reason to the conclusion that things are beautiful, but rather ‘taste’ that they are”.13  
The opening examples are intended to show that immediate, direct, perceptual 
experience provides us with the aesthetic features that are the content of those 
experiences. They also show that experiences have content that represents the mind-
independent world as being a particular way. Part or all of that content, that is to say, the 
input provided by the senses, is aesthetic and is sometimes, but not necessarily, captured 
by concepts and terms such as ‘beautiful’. The input or content provided by our 
immediate experience of an artwork, a garden or a landscape, helps us to assess whether 
our, or indeed others’, experiences correspond to the world.  
This is important because it is sometimes true that our senses trick us into making 
mistakes, perceiving things that aren’t there, as in hallucinations or illusions, or when it 
comes to resolving differences about colour perception or disagreements about an 
object’s aesthetic properties. If one of us finds Maman ‘beautiful’ and the other finds the 
sculpture ‘eerie’ it would be an important starting point for each of us to see it for 
ourselves and then to discuss how we have been drawn to different conclusions about 
the same object.  
Perceptual experience more widely conceived is the experience of phenomena, 
features and qualities, as alluded above. It is, as Siegel writes, what is conveyed to the 
subject when she experiences something perceptually, using one or all or a combination 
of senses. In writing about a piano Siegel writes, for example, that “there is a way things 
look to you when you see them: they will look to have a certain shape, colour, texture, 
and arrangement relative to one another, among other things. Your visual experience 
conveys to you that the piano has these features.”14 The term ‘experience’ is here in 
keeping with an intentionalist position, whereby its phenomenology, or phenomenal 
character, is exhausted by the properties the experience represents the world as having.  
                                                
13 James Shelley, "The Concept of the Aesthetic," In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed Edward N. Zalta. (2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-
concept/#AesAtt. 
14 Siegel, "The Contents of Perception." 
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An aesthetic account of perceptual experience is one that focuses narrowly on how to 
locate the phenomenal, aesthetic features of such experience. ‘Perceiving aesthetically’ 
is the claim that our aesthetic experiences are essentially perceptual, reliant on 
perceptual experience more generally conceived. One of the issues that pertains to 
perceiving non-aesthetic perceptual properties, such as shape and colour, is whether or 
not the contents of our experiences meet accuracy conditions. These accuracy conditions 
are based on the object’s existence and my perceiving features that are attributable to it. 
Thus, that the content of my perceptual experience is of my dog lying curled up in his 
basket, is provided by my senses in such a way that they report to me that it is my dog 
who is lying curled up in his basket and not my cat. Part of the accuracy condition for 
looking at Maman is that I see a giant, eight-legged, spindly creature rather than 
something else, like, say, a horse.  
Not all philosophers of perception agree that accuracy conditions are required in 
ordinary perception, but let us see how this might play out for perceptual experiences 
that contain aesthetic elements or aesthetic, perceptual experiences. Aesthetic properties 
are considered appearance properties that are constituted by more intrinsic, qualitative 
properties of objects such as their shape, lines, texture and colour. They are 
configurations of shape, lines, texture and colour from which aesthetic gestalts emerge, 
gestalts being the essence or shape of an entity’s complete form, where the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts. They can be seen, heard and felt and structure both our 
descriptive aesthetic judgments and our evaluative, aesthetic judgments. On this account, 
accuracy conditions for whether the appearance corresponds to an external object is of 
secondary importance. The starting point is looking to the features of experience, 
scrutinising them, to be clear about how we can describe and come to characterise it 
before engaging with evaluative judgment.  
Now that we have an outline of the structure of the dissertation, and some 
background on perception, I proceed to consider discussions of aesthetic perception that 
are foundational to my argument, and that were beginning to be laid out by the Greeks. 
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This chapter is the first of three chapters that lay out the historical and philosophical 
foundations for arguing in support of the idea of aesthetic perception. The idea of 
aesthetic perception underpins the thought that the aesthetics of nature is at least as 
paradigmatic to the discipline of aesthetics as is art. The chapter traces the roots of the 
concept of the aesthetic back to ancient and medieval philosophy and analyses how it 
relates to nature and art in the metaphysical schemes offered by Plato, Aristotle and St. 
Thomas Aquinas in particular. The chapter analyses how these philosophers sought to 
characterise the relationship between perceptual aesthetic properties and what we know 
about them. The chapter also begins to lay the foundation for concepts that will play an 
important role in later chapters, such as the concept of disinterest, and perceptual 
transparency when it comes to the mediation of aesthetic properties. 
On the argument being put forward in the thesis, aesthetic experience is necessarily 
perceptual. Perception is what enables us to have experiences of the external, mind- or 
experience-independent world. This includes the way external objects look, sound, smell 
and feel: their shape, colour, timbre, volume, power, taste and texture. It also includes 
things that give a distinctive kind of pleasure or displeasure, things for which we have 
aesthetic concepts and terms. Whether or not we think something has an aesthetic 
quality is dependent on perceiving it as such, where perceiving involves one or more of 
our sense modalities - seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. Aesthetic 
experience is epistemic in that it yields knowledge of what is immediately and 
transparently perceived. Perceptual, aesthetic knowledge is derived from seeing, hearing, 
smelling and touching an object, in the immediacy of perceptual experience. We can 
simply perceive the beauty, ugliness or other aesthetic quality of an object without 
knowing much about it. This is especially true in the case of nature, which does not 
involve the expression or creativity of a human person and the complications that 
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involve understanding another human mind, emotion, expression or the pre-existing 
historical or cultural frameworks to which the object belongs. This does not mean that 
non-aesthetic knowledge is irrelevant to our understanding or overall experience of the 
object, but that talk of the aesthetic implies reference to what we perceive, which will be 
settled in the course of the argument being presented in the thesis.15 
How beauty relates to non-perceptual, non-aesthetic, knowledge is an issue addressed 
by Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas along differing metaphysical lines. All three 
philosophers took the aesthetic to equate to beauty, unlike today’s more varied 
understanding of the term, which can include both more varied positive and negative 
aesthetic qualities. They were also concerned with art’s mimetic properties, the extent to 
which it represented non-art objects. Mimesis as a concept has featured in more recent 
aesthetic discourse, and is still of import today. 
This is largely because of Kendall Walton’s seminal Mimesis as Make-Believe, which 
explores the nature of representations in platonic style and which for Walton serve as 
props for fictional truths, such as in the make-believe games that children engage in and 
the fictional fantasies that adults engage with in their experiences of art, nature, novels, 
films.16 Walton proposes that his view dissolves the problem of belief in fiction, fictional 
emotion and the paradox of tragedy. There are two types of fictional worlds, one 
according to the prop, where a set of functions is prescribed by the representation, and 
that of the consumer’s imagining. In addition to Hume’s ‘Of Tragedy’, and alongside 
philosophical works by Lamarque and Curie, this has generated an enormous literature 
                                                
15 This thought is similar to Sibley’s view that there are no criteria that determine 
aesthetic experience. This does not mean that aesthetic judgment is relative or 
completely subjective, but we’ll see an argument presented for this in the course of the 
overall argument presented here.Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," in Approach to 
Aesthetics: Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics, ed. Betty Redfern John Benson, Jeremy 
Roxbee Cox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
16 Kendall L. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the 
Representational Arts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), Noel Carroll, 
"Critical Study: Mimesis as Make-Believe," The Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 178 
(1995). 
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on the nature of fictions.17 How can, and do, we relate representational props to the 
things the representations are of? The role of the imagination is clearly important for 
generating representational props, and the stories we like to tell about the world, but the 
concern here is to relate those stories to how the natural world in particular is presented 
to the senses, not just how we erect those props on the perceptual presentation of 
nature’s aesthetics. 
One of Carroll’s concerns with Mimesis as Make-Believe is that it does not capture a 
distinction between fiction and non-fiction, “since all representations are, by definition, 
fictional for him” and that “there are no non-fictional representations simpliciter in his 
system”.18 With Plato, as we will see below, we face a similar problem. That is to say we 
face the problem that, especially where our experiences of nature are concerned, we do 
not know that of which we make both mental and artistic representations. Our 
experiences of nature, however, have an immediacy that does not necessarily require the 
complexities of human intentionality that come with make-believe or works of fiction. 
Nature manifests itself with a simplicity that need not require extensive cognitive 
machinery to make sense of. In this vein, I argue against Plato’s scepticism. 
Plato’s writings were primarily concerned with art and not nature. This 
notwithstanding, he was sceptical about the idea that aesthetic properties were 
instantiated in artworks, thinking them impure or inauthentic compared, on the one hand, 
with the objects they were supposed to represent and, on the other hand, the ‘forms’ of 
which they themselves were imperfect replicas. This not only implies that he thought 
                                                
17 Gregory Curie, The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), Susan Feagin, "The Pleasures of Tragedy," American Philosophical Quarterly 
20, no. 1 (1983), Peter Lamarque, "How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions," British 
Journal of  Aesthetics 21, no. 4 (1981), Peter and Stein Haugom Olsen Lamarque, Truth, 
Fiction and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Colin Radford, "How 
Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?," in Driving to California 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), David Hume, "Of Tragedy," in Essays: 
Moral, Political, Literary (Indiannapolis: Liberty Fund, 1742). Kathleen Stock, 
"Imagination and Fiction: Some Issues," Philosophy Compass 8, no. 10 (2013). This is 
not an exhaustive list, but provides some of the main contenders in the debate on the 
nature of fictions. 
18 Carroll, "Critical Study: Mimesis as Make-Believe." 94-5. 
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aesthetic qualities were instantiated by non-art, but that the aesthetic qualities of non-art 
were of an importance that ought not to be distorted by art. If art’s aesthetic qualities 
distort non-art’s aesthetic qualities, Plato’s argument goes, it can affect human behaviour 
in ways that are not conducive to society. His account stipulated, as we will see, that we 
should be inherently sceptical about what we perceive and the aesthetic qualities of 
performance poetry or the theatre, that these could be deceptive and encourage deceptive 
and basic behaviour. His view, however, was not an outright rejection of the aesthetic, 
but was a rejection of a particular kind of artwork that could misrepresent reality and 
negatively influence human behaviour. On my reading of Plato, non-artistic aesthetic 
properties are explanatorily prior to the aesthetic properties of art. Without them, art 
would have nothing to imitate. Aristotle turned the Platonic view upside down and 
thought that aesthetic properties were perceptual, their form indicative of their function 
and therefore their meaning in a sense to be articulated below. He embedded artistic 
creativity in nature’s teleology so that art was viewed as being produced ‘naturally’, 
although it occupied an ontologically distinct space. Aquinas, inspired by Aristotle, saw 
form and meaning as intimately intertwined within the aesthetic idea, its instantiation a 
manifestation of God.  
 
§ The Aesthetic, Mimesis and Plato 
 
 Much of what has been written about Plato’s aesthetics has been concerned with his 
attack on the arts, the idea that they should be removed from the ideal republic.19 This is 
because his view is thought to be counter-intuitive and seemingly denies what we hold 
to be important about the arts.20 Plato’s metaphysics were essentially sceptical about 
                                                
19 Ian MacHattie Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, vol. I (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), G.R.F. Ferrari, "Plato and Poetry," in Cambridge 
History of Literary Criticism, ed. George A. Kennedy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), Alexander Nehamas, "Plato and the Mass Media," The Monist 
71 (1988), Richard Stalley, 11/01/2011. 
20 Plato, Poaiteia, the Republic: Book 10, trans. Irene Noel-Baker (Aldeburgh: 
Alderburgh Bookshop, MMIV), ———, "Ion," in Early Socratic Dialogues, ed. Trevor 
J. Saunders (Middlesex: Penguin Classics, 412, 1987), ———, Symposium, trans. Percy 
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perception because he viewed it as “just a causal interaction with sensible qualities in the 
world” devoid of awareness of what such qualities were without a thinking subject who 
has a firm understanding of general, universal forms.21 He was also sceptical about 
perception because artists may pander to human pleasures, rather than the truth about the 
world and its objects. Because the arts were considered essentially mimetic, or 
imitations of real-world objects, in that they imitated real world properties, they were 
necessarily prone to misrepresenting their object of origin. According to Plato this was 
true because artists by definition were not specialists on the objects depicted in their 
works and were liable to make mistakes in their depictions, especially if they lacked 
awareness of necessary, universal truth. Being a specialist about beautiful objects would 
mean being a specialist about people’s aesthetic pleasures. 
In the case of producing a chair, for example, a carpenter designing or building a 
piece of furniture, is knowledgeable about non-aesthetic or non-perceptual properties 
that are required for a chair to be a chair: its form is related to its function and its 
function is essential to a chair being a chair, rather than another object. Carpenters are 
knowledgeable about chairs to the extent that they can produce pieces of furniture that 
function as chairs. If we now consider a painting of a chair, no knowledge of the good-
making properties of chairs qua chairs is necessary. The representation, or image of the 
chair in a painting is merely an appearance and need not function as a chair. It possesses 
fewer of the properties required for it to function as a chair, than does a chair designed to 
be sat on. The painting of the chair is, therefore, of a “lower order”, illusory and false: a 
“man-made dream for waking eyes”.22  
According to Plato, the artist draws on a creative source that differs from the 
reasoned planning that goes into the production of a functional object.23 On his account, 
                                                                                                                                           
Bysshe Shelley (South Bend, IN: St Augustine's Press, 385-380 bce), ———, Sophist, 
trans. Nicholas P. White (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1993).  
21 Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed. Essays on Aristotle's De 
Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1999). See the introduction to the volume especially. 
22 Plato, Sophist. 266c. 
23 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short 
History (New York and London: University of Alabama Press, 1966), Eva Schaper, 
Prelude to Aesthetics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968). 
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the artist draws on an inspired state, derived from the divine sources that produce the 
forms, which allow him access to ideal, real, beauty. This provides the artist access to 
beauty as a form, but he is not a reliable source of non-beautiful, or non-aesthetic, 
knowledge about the object depicted. Poets and artists can not provide us with truths 
about the world, such as what the carpenter knows are the good-making properties of a 
chair, but do provide us with works of art that are beautiful, potentially harmful or 
dangerous because they do not convey important non-perceptual or non-aesthetic 
knowledge about their content. 
For Plato, then, the confusion between art and reality is a lack of distinction between 
aesthetic and epistemic properties. Mimesis, Schaper argues, gets in the way of access to 
knowledge in the following ways: it is not inspired by knowledge or reason but derived 
from divine inspiration; art is mimetic both in terms of its perceivable properties as well 
as its content; artworks are copies of copies and therefore inferior to the point of being 
deceptive, unnecessary and redundant; poetry is not knowledge, it is demarcated from 
rational discourse due to pretence and emotion.24 I will go through some of the reasons 
attributed to Plato for being mistrustful of mimetic art. 
The following interpretations of Plato’s views, beginning with Crombie, can provide 
clarity on the negative characterisation Plato attributed to the relation between what we 
perceive, truth, and knowledge as well as how they relate to pleasure. The discussion 
will also contribute to the idea that however damning Plato was of the truth of aesthetic 
properties as they relate to art, he saw artworks as mimetic and dependent on real-world 
objects. So, where an artwork is potentially distasteful for the very reason that an ill-
informed artist has created it, this would not seem to apply to nature, opening up the 
possibility that the aesthetic properties of nature may not be corrupted or corrupting.  
Crombie writes, for example, that Plato’s challenge to the senses is the association of 
what we perceive with truth itself.25 If the artwork, be it a painting or a work of poetic 
performance, is perceived as claiming to have truth value or to be the truth, we run the 
risk of thinking that the artist has knowledge about the real object being depicted rather 
                                                
24 Schaper, Prelude to Aesthetics. 
25 Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. 
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than knowledge about its mimetic appearance. If the real object being depicted is itself 
bad or flawed, and the artwork based on it nonetheless appeals to basic human sensual 
pleasures, “dangerous encouragement is being given to our baser faculties” and therefore 
beautiful art is what’s best for society and the education of the young to develop more 
refined, more discerning, faculties, providing an explanation for why Plato might still 
have had a use for art. Regardless of what the epistemic content of an artwork, it “can 
have aesthetic qualities such as colour, shape, rhythm, harmony as much as any non-
artistic object” that are perceivable. Such beautiful objects and our perceiving them, is 
not problematic for Plato. What is problematic for him is if we associate truth about the 
object being depicted with the content of our aesthetic perceptions. 
One take on this that relates to the problem of pleasure, and the link between aesthetic 
perception and truth, as Halliwell and Nehamas have both documented and argued, 
relates specifically to theatrical performance. The nature of theatrical performance was 
mimetic to the extent that acting was imitative of ‘real’ human action. According to 
Halliwell and Nehamas, Plato seemed to think that much of Greek attic drama (such as 
Homer, Aeschylus, Thepsis, Euripides, Sophocles, Aristophanes) appealed to the 
audience’s basic, unrefined, human pleasures. The playwrights pandered to human 
pleasures by presenting performances that seemed to imitate reality, but in fact presented 
“a counterfeit reality”, performances that appealed to what pleased rather than what was 
the truth.26 
Rather than emphasising ‘counterfeit’ reality, as Halliwell does, Nehamas addresses 
the issue of mediation and transparency in representation. The representation of an 
object mediates how the object itself is perceived, but does so in a way that is 
transparent (unless a real object is available for comparison): we simply, naively accept 
the representation of the object as true. For example, he writes: 
To be inherently realistic is to seem to represent reality without artifice, without 
mediation and convention. Realistic art is, just in the sense in which Plato thought 
of imitation, transparent. This transparency, […], is not real. It is only a result of 
                                                
26 Stephen Halliwell, "Aristotelian Mimesis Reevaluated," Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 28, no. 4 (1990). 505. 
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our often not being aware of the mediated and conventional nature of the 
representation to which we are most commonly exposed.27 
 
Nehamas draws the comparison between Greek drama, which were performed in 
theatres packed full of spectators armed with vegetables, ready to hurl them at whatever 
situation they did not like on stage (hence the platonic view that Greek attic dramas 
appealed to basic human pleasures and behaviour), 1980s American television and what 
Arthur Danto called ‘disturbational art’, such as Allan Kaprow’s ‘Happenings’ of the 
1950s and 1960s. 
According to Nehamas, each of these ‘artforms’ seems to be mediated and 
transparent. The former two can be accused of perverting the audience. Nehamas writes 
that “[…] Plato accuses poetry of perverting its audience. Poetry is essentially suited to 
the representation of inferior character and vulgar subjects: these are easy to imitate and 
what the crowd, which is already perverted to begin with, wants to see and enjoy.”28 The 
problem for Plato was that perceiving these plays that he thought were designed to 
appeal only to sensual pleasures did not lead us to the truth: the senses, or perception, 
could not alone provide us with real knowledge about the beauty of the object of 
experience and could not distinguish between reality and a performance that imitates 
that reality. This appeal to sensual pleasure encouraged an audience to act on mere 
impulse or emotion. This was down to confusion between performance and reality and 
the audience’s absorption into performance despite themselves.29 The difference was 
between perception, the use of the senses, and the use of the senses coupled with reason, 
the latter of which could put audience members in touch with the forms that constitute 
what they perceive. 
The case of the ‘Happenings’, however, is peculiar, but illustrative nonetheless. For 
example,‘18 Happenings in 6 Parts’, is considered by Danto, writes Nehamas, as being 
an atavistic introduction of reality into ‘art’.30  Plato’s worry is turned upside down. 
                                                
27 Nehamas, "Plato and the Mass Media.", 223-224. 
28 Ibid. 217. 
29 Schaper, Prelude to Aesthetics. 44. 
30 Allan Kaprow, ‘18 Happenings in 6 Parts’, 1959, presented at the Reuben Gallery in 
New York. Kaprow synthesised his ‘training in action’ with his study of John Cage’s 
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Rather than the performance being confused with reality, reality can be considered 
performance. Although such projects as Kaprow’s ‘Happenings’ were reacting against a 
perceived distance between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘real world’ domains, which in the 1950s and 
1960s was firmly entrenched in a world of art that was autonomous and Modernist, 
distinct from the everyday experience or the experience of nature, Danto is right that 
they could not escape the world of art for the concept ‘art’ is required for the work to 
succeed as a work of art. 
Whether or not a ‘Happening’ can be considered an artwork is an epistemic issue 
that, admittedly, plays on the idea of aesthetic perception and what that involves. 
Whether or not a ‘Happening’ or an ancient theatrical performance may be considered 
aesthetic is instead a matter of perception and perceiving the beauty or ugliness of that 
performance according to the Platonic view I’ve articulated. Whether or not either 
succeeds artistically is not necessarily bound up with its aesthetic status. Whether it 
succeeds aesthetically must depend on whether or not they instantiate perceivable 
aesthetic properties. We can see both in Plato’s case, and the case of ‘Happenings’ as 
discussed by Nehamas, that the aesthetic can come apart from the artistic, that the 
experience of beauty is not predicated on the experience of art.  
Similarly, Ferrari writes that Plato’s worry about the ‘counterfeit reality’ or 
‘transparency’ was that it encouraged the “tendency, in our estimation of poetry, to 
confound the values of performance with the values of understanding”, but this does not 
mean, as the Kaprow example indicates, that aesthetic properties are not instantiated in 
either artistic or theatrical representation of the ‘real world’.31 Imitation by the actor in 
performances was imitation of behaviour that exists in the real world, outwith artistic 
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representation, with the consequent potential for having a detrimental influence or effect 
on childhood imagination and the development of character.32 Poetry or the arts were not 
only aesthetic, but essentially ethical, and could directly affect human action: no clear 
distinction was drawn between the aesthetic, the understanding and the ethical. The term 
‘kalos’, for instance, which might be translated as ‘beautiful’ or ‘handsome’ was also 
used to express moral approval and Plato often used the beautiful and the good 
interchangeably.33 There is no doubt, as the exclusion of the arts indicates, that Plato 
thought that the aesthetic and art had an impact on character and conduct.  
 To sum up, before moving onto specific points related to the overall argument being 
presented in the thesis, Plato’s metaphysical system was built on the idea that reason, 
and not the senses, acquainted us with the ideas, or as he called them ‘forms’, of beauty, 
the good and justice. Any object that manifested these properties was not a pure 
instantiation of the true, abstract and complete forms it imitated. Plato thought this 
because he was sceptical that the senses could provide any knowledge about the forms. 
Instead, the use of reason would guide us back to the forms and help us make sense of 
the properties experienced through the senses. The causal interaction of our sense 
modalities with the particular objects of experience could not provide the true nature of 
those objects. However, our grasp of general concepts, the universal forms, could. 
Mimetic objects were even more dubious for the very reason that they could not claim to 
be the ‘real’ thing, hence their expulsion from the ideal republic. 
There are a number of elements to be highlighted in relation to the idea of aesthetic 
perception here. One is that Plato thought perception essentially hollow, including the 
mere perception of aesthetic qualities in the sense that deeper meaning about what is 
seen and heard is required to understand it properly. Otherwise artists pander to their 
audience’s sensual pleasures and the audience seeks no further improvement of character 
or behaviour. A second element relates to the idea that aesthetic qualities, in his case 
‘beauty’, are not essentially perceptual and that understanding it requires that the general 
form, or concept, of beauty is understood insofar as this is possible. A third is that, 
                                                
32 Ibid. 111 
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because we know more about what Plato thought about how the ‘aesthetic’ related to 
‘art’ than we do about what he thought about how the ‘aesthetic’ relates to ‘non-art’, it is 
difficult to disambiguate the concept of the ‘aesthetic’ from the concept of ‘art’, but it 
seems that aesthetic qualities are to be found in the objects that art represents and 
primarily so. Fourth comes the idea that aesthetic qualities must importantly and 
primarily be instantiated in non-art in order for art, if mimetic and representational in the 
way Plato describes it, to properly be mimetic and representational. I will take these 
each in turn. 
 First, the idea that perception in general is essentially hollow, and that perceiving art 
is complicated by the intervention of an artist who knows only about those qualities that 
will appeal to basic human pleasure, entails that aesthetic qualities were instantiated 
despite the audience not necessarily having the appropriate understanding or knowledge 
to properly understand the quality they perceive. Ridding his republic of the art that is 
potentially deceptive also removes the possibility for unnecessary deception, but this 
does not seem to equate to the thought that aesthetic qualities as they relate to non-art 
should be removed (only better understood). 
Second, comes the idea that we need to understand what Plato meant by the general 
concept of beauty. According to Plato, it is only by appealing to non-perceptual 
knowledge, or to the universal, idealist, invisible, unchanging and eternal form of 
beauty, that we may either complement the beauty that we perceive, or dislodge it as 
inappropriate in that instance. Beauty can only be discovered in the abstract form of 
beauty, abstract because it transcends both space and time, as well as the perceivable 
realm of cause and effect. Many objects could be beautiful but the essence of beauty was 
abstract beauty. Mimetic artforms, being imitations of ‘real’ external objects, were 
therefore potentially harmful in their propensity for misrepresenting an object whose 
perceivable qualities were already dubious representations of reality, let alone when 
represented by artists who aren’t specialists on the object being represented or imitated.  
The distinction was between appearance and reality: the senses could provide us with an 
object’s appearance, but not what an object is in reality or in truth, or in its abstract 
 29 
form.34 The object’s true nature could only be revealed through reason. Removing the 
mimetic object from his ideal republic meant removing what might be wrong or 
deliberately deceptive, an unnecessary layer that got in the way of the truth.  
The trouble is, as indicated by disagreement between classicists and philosophers 
about how to characterise the forms, Plato provides no clear indication or valid argument 
for what he means by them. He seems to mean that they are a general concept for 
something we are already familiar with, something that we have previously learned. 
What we perceive as beautiful can be cultivated and can also cultivate our ability for 
abstract thought. We can recognise the beauty of a person because that instantiation of 
beauty participates in the general concept of beauty. 
However, this again is premised on the idea that aesthetic qualities such as beauty are 
essentially perceptual, and that knowledge about them can be derived from our 
perceptual experiences rather than abstract, cognitive processes or criteria that appeal to 
universals. The force with which Plato excommunicated the arts was a testament to the 
power of aesthetic qualities. While we may want or need to be sceptical about what we 
perceive, and irrespective of abstract reasoning, aesthetic qualities are immediately 
instantiated, such as when we respond to the beauty of a sunset, the sublimity of 
mountainous landscapes, the prettiness of a forget-me-not, the glamour of a person or 
the grotesqueness of a Breughel. This is important to the argument presented here 
because beauty, and, ultimately, other aesthetic qualities, are not thought to be criteria-
led, as we will see in my discussion of Sibley in the chapters below, but are led by 
paying particular attention to what we perceive and being clear about how we can 
characterise it. 
Third, comes the issue about whether the aesthetic qualities of art that represents an 
object can tell us anything about that object’s non-aesthetic qualities. As we have seen, 
because the artist is not knowledgeable about the object he represents in his art, we 
should be sceptical that art’s aesthetic qualities could ground knowledge about the non-
art objects it represents. We should indeed be further sceptical that the aesthetic quality 
of beauty could ground non-aesthetic knowledge about the object. Knowledge about 
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beauty can be found in the abstract, ideal, form of beauty, but it cannot be found in 
perception. According to his view, the senses are not sufficient for the provision for 
knowledge of the truth of what an artwork represents, especially if the artwork, a 
mimetic object, is a misleading imitation of its object of origin. We have, however, no 
explanation about how we can access abstract reasoning about the beauty of an object 
without first perceiving it as such, so there must be something primarily important about 
perceiving beauty before knowing to seek it proof in the general forms. 
Fourth, there’s the issue that aesthetic qualities can be found in non-art objects as 
well as art objects. It is true that Plato primarily wrote about art, but it doesn’t follow 
from this that aesthetic qualities are not to be found in non-art objects and primarily so. 
The claim for mimesis was derived from the thought that the causal interaction of our 
sense modalities with the particular objects of experience could not guarantee the 
provision of the true nature of those objects. We must therefore accept that the artist may 
get things wrong and that those experiencing the artist’s end product may get things 
wrong. Implied is the thought that non-art objects have qualities that can be imitated, or 
represented in artworks. Human intervention is required for the artwork to be created. 
Although Plato made no explicit demarcation between craft (techne) and fine art like we 
do today, he did make the distinction between productive, creative, crafts and acquisitive 
crafts that generates revenue for the artist or creator. In the case of productive, creative, 
crafts, a new product emerged out of the manipulation, assembly and transformation of a 
natural material. While it did not require knowledge about the object to be imitated or 
represented, it did require being able to perceive its qualities, including its aesthetic 
qualities, as well as knowledge about the materials being used to represent it. 
Presumably, then, non-artistic aesthetic qualities are importantly primary. It seems that 
the aesthetic is primarily linked with the non-artistic world. In chapters two and three we 
will see how priority is given to nature specifically in the eighteenth century. 
 To conclude, the imperfections and worries that Plato had about the arts were based 
on his suspicion of their claim to truth and on reasons for doubting that the senses could 
provide the requisite knowledge for making correct epistemic judgments. Non-art 
objects, too, according to Plato, could not embody the knowledge provided by the ideal 
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forms. Appreciating beauty in a particular object could lead one to appreciate beauty 
more generally, and this would cultivate an interest in the beautiful. Our perceptions of 
ordinary objects and mimetic artworks are incomplete and imperfect because the 
moment of perception does not provide us with the knowledge to fully comprehend our 
perception of the object and because the object itself is potentially misleading. If we 
could fully comprehend, we would be perceiving the forms themselves. The particular 
beauties we experience in the world can give us only a glimpse of the universal form of 
beauty, which in turn brings us closer to nature. I disagree with Plato that it is by 
appealing to our knowledge of the abstract form of beauty that we can prove the truth of 
beauty perceived. It may be that the abstract form of beauty is an explanandum of beauty 
perceived, but the truth of the existence of beauty, and other aesthetic properties, lies in 
perceiving them, which is what I will argue for in the thesis. 
 
§ The Aesthetic, Mimesis and Aristotle 
 
Aristotle provided the most convincing historical underpinning for the idea of 
aesthetic perception of the three philosophers discussed in this chapter. This is because 
he put sensual experience and pleasure, even if cathartic pleasure, at the centre of his 
aesthetics, in addition to linking beauty with teleological function. He argued for the 
importance of perceptual experience without requiring an appeal to the forms as dictated 
by Plato or Aquinas’ pantheistic metaphysics, as we will discover in the following 
section. His view of mimesis was not solely based on artworks being imitations of the 
objects we perceive, but also of the creative process being similar to the teleological, 
purposeful creative processes of nature.  
 Unlike Plato, Aristotle celebrated the mimetic, aesthetic properties of art, which he 
thought could communicate the deep complexities of human psychology. This was born 
out by his writings on tragedy, and the cathartic effect tragedy was to have on its 
audiences and his writings on perception. Catharsis was the process of releasing, and 
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thereby providing relief from, strong or repressed emotions.35 His concern was therefore 
less about whether and how far fictional, artistic representations were true to the objects 
represented or were true to abstract general concepts and were more about the creative, 
psychological and productive processes that brought them into being, which for him 
were embedded in nature’s teleological function. This, combined with his writings in De 
Anima, on human perceptual sophistication, challenged Plato’s aesthetics by rejecting 
Plato’s view that perception lacked awareness, in that perception was merely a causal 
relationship between perceiver and perceivable, sensible properties of external objects.36 
As we shall see, Aristotle thus challenged Plato’s thoughts on perception and aesthetics 
by flipping his metaphysical picture around.   
 Aristotle’s thoughts on mimesis contrasted with the ‘transparency’ or ‘counterfeit 
reality’ of Platonic mimesis by “acknowledg[ing] the dual aspect of mimetic 
representation: its status as created artefact, as the product of artistic shaping of artistic 
materials, as well as its capacity to signify and offer to the mind the patterns of supposed 
realities”.37 Although mimesis is often taken to merely mean the ‘imitation’ or naïve 
representation as in Plato’s writings, Aristotle spoke of it as “both an intrinsic property 
of works of art and as the product of artistic intentionality”.38 Without mimesis, artworks 
could not be artworks. Artworks were imitations of objects in the external world and 
necessarily depicted properties of that external world, but human creativity was the 
vehicle through which this was achieved.  
 Aristotle’s view was unlike Plato’s because for him perception and mimesis did 
provide access to the aesthetic whereas for Plato both perception and mimesis lacked the 
ideal content of his original forms and artists and performers dealt not with the abstract 
forms, but with cheap and necessarily flawed and ugly imitations. Aristotle emphasised 
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38 Ibid. 505. 
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that the artwork remained causally related to the object represented and that this was due 
to artistic intentionality and creativity.  
Although human creativity belonged to the productive capacities of nature, Aristotle 
separated the practical realm, to which ‘art’ belonged, from the theoretical realm, to 
which cognition and knowledge belonged. Both realms exemplified different sorts of 
rationale, but by separating them, Aristotle established autonomy for the arts. His 
approach created an ontologically distinct status of art, that not only held that an artwork 
was self-contained and followed an internal rationale, but invited a richness of sincere 
interpretations through the sensual experience of artistic form that is inherently linked 
with the work’s content. For Aristotle, mimesis in art showed how nature worked and 
did so by constructing its own creation. Art imitated nature’s productive activity and 
aimed to create representations as well as fictions about the world, as Schaper writes: 
For Aristotle, what art imitates is nature’s productive activity. Since nature in the 
Aristotelian scheme is a way of acting, art does not directly imitate what nature is 
in its products, but how nature acts. Imitation, in this usage, is not the production 
of a likeness, but the creation of a work of poiesis. The poet imitates not by reason 
of copying or trying to copy, but by reason of making something, of creating a 
new thing.39 
 
The creative process, akin to the creative processes of nature, occasioned an autonomous 
realm for the artwork to which both positive and negative aesthetic values and positive 
and negative artistic values could be attributed. Within this autonomous realm, the 
structure of the artwork and its internal relations could be observed.  
Failure to take the above into account has resulted in mistaken interpretations of 
Aristotle’s aesthetics being equated to a kind of narrow formalism similar to that which 
made its debut in early twentieth century thinking in aesthetics.40 Formalism is the view 
that what’s important when looking at an artwork are the form and colour it has as an 
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autonomous work of art (not whether it is a meticulous imitation), a view that was 
originally advocated by Bell and Fry and, arguably, originally put forward by Kant.41  
 Yet Aristotle’s interpretation of mimesis precludes the possibility for narrow 
formalism, not only in the sense in which nature’s teleology is of marked importance, 
but also in the sense that human action and creativity belong within such a teleology. His 
aesthetics is about more than merely the artwork’s or object’s form and colour. In the 
Poetics seven and eight, for instance, Aristotle writes: 
We have laid it down that a tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete in 
itself, as a whole of some magnitude. […] The unity of a plot does not consist, as 
some suppose, in its having one man as its subject. An infinity of things befall that 
one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner 
there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action.42 
 
Although the work is whole, complete and unified, I take it that it is not just the 
tragedy’s formal qualities that are of import, but the infinity of things that befall the one 
man that merits attention, along with the many interpretation that may be had.43 
Halliwell writes: 
[…]Aristotle assumes that all mimesis is concerned to present and explore some 
idea of a possible world - a world whose sense the audience of art can grasp and 
evaluate in ways that are not sharply different from the ways in which they 
interpret the world outside art.44 
 
For Aristotle, mimetic art could be a representation of the non-artistic, world, beliefs 
about the world, and normative ideas but it nevertheless offered the possibility of being 
judged in the same way we judge non-art.  Whether behaviours on stage are morally 
valuable or not is not what’s at stake, nor is the worry that an illusory ‘transparency’ can 
infect the populace. Although our responses to artworks are based on what we, in fact, 
perceive, that is to say, the aesthetic properties that are artistically, intentionally 
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instantiated in them, cognitive and affective elements form part of the structure of our 
experience in our aim to understand them and should put to rest any thought that only 
formal qualities mattered. Aristotle was not a narrow formalist for he advocated that the 
experience as a whole is of import. This resembles the Kantian view that what is 
perceived is a whole entity whose qualities and features form an integrated whole, and 
that this sort of Gestalt is linked with other non-causally related features such as 
knowledge and affect. 
 According to Aristotle, there was a correlation between the elements that make up the 
arts and human feeling, where artworks need not be restricted to meticulous, visual 
representation. Aristotle brought a relational and imaginative meaningfulness into 
artistic production that was non-existent in Plato. He allowed each of the arts to develop 
imaginatively, allowing them to adopt an internal coherence, so that an aesthetic 
pleasure and continuity could be created for the subject perceiving it.  
Not only that, aesthetic qualities existed both in nature and art, as Townsend writes: 
Oak trees, for example, may be pruned and cut for wood, but they grow into their 
natural shape because they are that kind of tree. But things that have to be made 
must be given their form according to externally determined patterns and purposes. 
Thus they follow some other form and are imitations.45 
 
While things in nature make their own aesthetic presence, the creation of works of art or 
tragedies follow the artist’s rationale, which follows its own natural patterns and 
motivations.  
Aristotle’s explored the arts and their capacity to relate to what we are given by 
nature: the senses, emotion, thought. He viewed creative intentionality and cathartic 
response as parts of the natural creative process. Not only was the creative process a 
natural creative process, it used the environment as a source for both aesthetic and non-
aesthetic qualities, and transposed them to the arts. For Aristotle, the aesthetic and the 
artistic were bound up together.  
Aristotle thus focused on human creativity, which to him was not only analogous to 
the creativity of nature, but communicated the depths of human psychology through 
                                                
45 Townsend, "Introduction to Aristotle's "Poetics"." 21. 
 36 
aesthetic properties that were inextricably tied with the artwork’s content. Sensible, 
aesthetic properties were the means by which meaningful content was both 
communicated and consumed. He emphasised the importance of perception, human 
psychology and artistic creation as embedded in nature’s teleology. Aesthetic properties 
were considered in terms of teleology, as manifestations of an object’s function. Artistic 
creativity was embedded in nature’s teleology, and aesthetic properties were considered 
in terms of human productivity and expression. 
What this means for my overall argument in the dissertation is that Aristotle gives us 
the historical underpinning for the idea of aesthetic perception and that human existence, 
and the products of human creativity, are themselves a part of nature. While we may not 
be tempted to think otherwise, it should also not be surprising that this gives us reason to 
be interested in nature’s aesthetics and how they relate to our responses. Rather than 
being sceptical about perceiving aesthetic properties, as Plato was, he welcomed it as a 
natural human creative process without denying the intellectual sphere the aesthetic may 
lead us to. Although there was an ontologically distinct realm for the arts, the arts were 
firmly rooted in nature’s creative processes, providing another reason for arguing that 
the aesthetics of nature is at least as important as the aesthetics of art. 
 
§ The Aesthetic, Mimesis and Aquinas 
 
I now turn to Aquinas’ writings on beauty. For Aquinas, like Aristotle, beauty was a 
compound idea that encapsulated both form and content. Unlike Plato, he was not 
sceptical about perceiving aesthetic properties and thought that beauty was made up of 
wholeness, balance and radiance. Beauty was a real property that was endowed with 
divine content. In respect of beauty being a real property, he was influenced by Aristotle 
and understood form as the manifestation of an object’s function. An object’s aesthetic 
property, beauty, the subject’s conception of it and the intellectual content held in the 
concept were part of one idea, but the perceivable property and the intellectual content 
were held by Aquinas to be logically different. Aquinas was concerned with 
ontologically situating the concept of beauty, the object of which could fit into a whole 
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range of categories. For him, both seeing and understanding were cognitive acts, the 
former a kind of discernment and the latter an attempt of thought to make sense of the 
object discerned.  
Medieval philosophers and theologians were interested in beauty as an aesthetic 
concept that was woven in Christian theology, and were little concerned with drawing a 
distinction between aesthetics, the philosophy of art and the philosophy of nature. 
Beauty was part of a teleological, ordered, pantheistic metaphysics that drew on a range 
of aesthetic objects that was much less restricted and focused than aesthetics came to be 
after post-Kantian Idealism. Art was considered to be “the technical construction of 
objects” and “had little to do with the production of beautiful things or the stimulation of 
aesthetic pleasure”, writes Eco.46 For Aquinas in particular, “beauty [was] considered to 
be […] transcendental, it acquire[d] a metaphysical worth, an unchanging objectivity, 
and an extension which [was] universal”.47 However, he was interested in how it could 
be possible for a subject to experience beauty that manifests itself in such a 
metaphysically and teleologically ordered reality.48 
Aristotle’s influence on Aquinas can be seen in Aquinas’ interpretation of mimesis in 
art and his reliance on form as a vehicle for aesthetic transcendence, the transcendence 
of beauty. Aquinas’ influence can in turn be seen in Kant’s aesthetics, where disinterest 
plays a significant role in the apprehension of beauty, although Kant’s metaphysics 
lacked the realism that grounded medieval and other eighteenth century aesthetics. Here, 
the link between Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant is the idea that at the core of aesthetic 
experience lies is the human ability to perceive aesthetic features without self-interest 
(hence disinterest). As we will see in chapter two, this idea was first made explicit by the 
British empiricists, but crystallized in Kant’s approach to aesthetics. The immediate aim 
here is to show the further historical precedence for the view that the aesthetic, and the 
aesthetics of nature is at least as relevant to aesthetic experience as is art (if not more 
so). 
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Eco suggests that artistry in medieval times was “object creation”, a kind of 
craftsmanship that “completed, integrated, or prolonged nature”.49 Like Aristotle, 
Aquinas thought that the artist would observe and imitate nature, but such imitation was 
not a meticulous naturalistic representation of the world, or as Eco writes the “servile 
copying of natural models”, it “was productive like nature and continued nature’s 
creative labours” and “human technology [was] seen as an extension of nature”.50 An 
idea and its exemplified form were thus tightly linked: 
Hence, properly speaking, there is no idea corresponding merely to matter or 
merely to form; but one idea corresponds to the entire composite - an idea that 
causes the whole, both its form and its matter.51 
 
The exemplified form was conceived in thought, the thought of the craftsman, and the 
created object was perceivable by a subject other than the craftsman. The object’s form 
became the template for the form perceived by the subject who could also learn of its 
content. According to Aquinas, the idea, the exemplified form and the form of the 
resultant object are coextensive and require perceiving with awareness and intellectual 
engagement. One difference that might be noted in relation to Kant’s ‘whole’ account of 
formalism, which we will turn to in chapters four and five, was that Aquinas was 
prepared to accept divine knowledge and the object itself were part of its form whereas 
for Kant there was a clear distinction between the object and how we perceive it. 
However, for Kant, what we perceive is non-causally linked with cognitive and emotive 
elements of experience. 
 But what does such an intellectual engagement with the object as described by 
Aquinas consist in, and how does it fit in with Aquinas’ views on disinterest, a concept 
we will have a closer look at chapter two, and that will feature in later chapters too. For 
the moment, we might define as an experience that marvels in an object’s aesthetic 
qualities rather than its function? Just because the medievals had a wider conception of 
the aesthetic than has been the case in more recent conceptions of philosophical 
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aesthetics and didn’t explicitly distinguish between nature, function or art, doesn’t mean 
that they shied away from the possibility of aesthetic experience, as would be the case if 
one thinks that the aesthetic is premised solely on art. Here is Eco again: 
The intellect scrutinizes a thing in its objective truth in order to grasp it accurately 
and adequately. It strives to define the object, to explore it in its depths and in its 
meaning, in its substantial and its accidental structure. It knows the object in 
analytic detail, sees it as true, desires it as good. During the quest for the judgment 
of truth, there may well be concern for an aesthetic outcome; but a disinterested 
perception, concentrated upon formal values, occurs only after the judgment. Only 
then is there an aesthetic experience.52 
 
The issue seems to be, contra my claim above, that the aesthetic and the cognitive are 
not coextensive at all according to Aquinas, but that the aesthetic judgment comes after 
having grasped the object in its entirety. The aesthetic only emerges in light of an 
accurate, adequate and objective truth about an object determined by a scrutinizing 
intellect: “The aesthetic visio comes to birth as a culmination and completion of 
intellectual knowledge at its most complex level. […] [B]eauty sinks its roots deep into a 
complex knowledge of being.”53 Whether Eco’s is a correct exegesis of Aquinas, I do 
not endeavour to pursue here.  
Yet Eco’s own view is tinged by an understanding of disinterest that is ambiguous. In 
the previous quotation above, disinterest equates engaging in a mental process that 
requires abstracting what is perceived into just formal qualities, that is “concentrated 
upon formal values”. Later, he writes: “[Aesthetic pleasure] is a sense of joy and 
triumph, of pleasure in a form which has been discerned, admired, and loved with a 
disinterested love, the love which is possible for a formal structure.”54 Here ‘disinterest’ 
is of the kind that is selfless, in the sense that self-gratification and desires are not 
pursued. 
What is most striking about Eco’s interpretation is his explicit aim to interpret 
Thomist aesthetics “in the light of modern aesthetics”.55 For in his aim to do so, the 
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aesthetic becomes not only secondary, but also accidental, for it is not by virtue of 
cognitively scrutinizing an object with an aim for judgment and truth that beauty 
necessarily emerges. The question that arises is: at what point would ‘disinterest’ kick in 
for the aesthetic experience to occur? Eco does not provide an answer to this question. In 
order to see why this is the case, let us return to the above quotation by Aquinas: 
Hence, properly speaking, there is no idea corresponding merely to matter or 
merely to form; but one idea corresponds to the entire composite - an idea that 
causes the whole, both its form and its matter.56 
 
Aquinas, at least in this short extract, is allowing for the aesthetic form to be coextensive 
with matter within one idea: there is a direct relationship between form, substance and 
object. In addition to this, the intellect, upon scrutinizing the object, is cognitively 
engaged but not, à la Aristotle, conceptually loaded with scientific or practical meaning. 
The process of acquiring knowledge and understanding, including aesthetic knowledge 
and understanding, occurs with the mental, integrative, action through perception, 
experience, the senses and thoughtful attention. We thus begin to see, as Haldane writes, 
“parallels with Kantian aesthetics”.57 Subjective, intellectual fulfilment and contentment 
are sought with the process of a lovely and open-ended engagement with the object. One 
fundamental difference with Kant needs to be observed, however. This is a metaphysical 
difference that belies Aquinas’ naïve realist metaphysics and epistemology and Kant’s 
“regarding the contemplated forms as being structural elements of a mind-independent 
reality”, as we will see in the next chapter.58 While Kant was sceptical of the noumenal 
realm, what Aquinas has in common with him is the idea that the aesthetic is perceptual, 
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 This chapter has sought to trace Plato’s scepticism about perceiving aesthetic 
properties. It has also sought to show how Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas conceived of the 
relationship between perceiving aesthetic properties and non-perceptual, viz. non-
perceptual epistemic properties. Plato’s thoughts about mimesis are puzzling for the very 
reason that he valued mimetic representation that is meticulously detailed, yet provides 
no characterization of the truth of beauty they are intended to replicate.59 These are 
unknowables and those representations that do figure in experience can only ever be 
diluted representations of objects that themselves are impossible to discover in the 
highest, inaccessible realm of reality in which the forms reside. That the arts were a false 
transparency that occasioned negative behaviour in its audience, behaviour that itself 
mimicked dubious performances caused Plato to reject art. My contention on this score 
is that while Plato banished the arts, he did not (nor could he) banish the aesthetic: the 
aesthetic qualities that he found deplorable in mimetic representations were 
representations of ‘real’ objects in which those self-same aesthetic qualities could be 
found, but their instantiation was to be found in perception, not in Plato’s constitution of 
reality through his universal forms. Aristotle, on the other hand, allowed the arts to have 
their own realm, a realm, which was creative and productive in the same way nature, 
was, where the aesthetic qualities that inhered in it, inhered in the object of origin. While 
both Plato and Aristotle wrote primarily about art, Aquinas was rather interested in 
ontologically situating the concept of beauty, a concept that could only arise as the result 
of a cognitively loaded process, as pervasive and not just associated with art. This relates 
to the idea of aesthetic perception in two ways. First, whether aesthetic properties are 
rejected for their potential to deceive or welcomed as a means of expression and 
catharsis, they are available to us provided we attend to the object. Not only that, even if 
we did reject them as instantiations or reinforcements of undesirable human behaviour, 
many non-artistic aesthetic properties would be available to us through nature. In the 
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next chapter, I will explore how philosophers in the eighteenth furthered the idea of the 
aesthetic by making perception central to it in addition to immediacy and disinterest. 
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 This chapter traces the roots of historical, philosophical, concepts that emerged in the 
eighteenth century and that are relevant to the idea of ‘aesthetic perception’, including 
immediacy, the judgment of taste, subjectivity and disinterest, and will culminate in a 
section on Hutcheson’s characterisation of aesthetic perception as epistemic, a particular 
kind of knowledge, but epistemic only in relation to what is perceived rather than to 
universal forms, rules, or categories of knowledge. In particular, the chapter aims to 
make salient concepts that arose during that time as well as their relevance to aesthetic 
perception, and to bring out the importance of nature as a paradigm of aesthetic 
experience by outlining the eighteenth century debate between rationalism and 
subjectivism about aesthetic experience. The idea is to provide historical support for my 
overall argument that if aesthetic experience is rooted in perceptual experience, many 
objects can be the objects of such experience, including nature, and that nature is at least 
as paradigmatic an aesthetic object as is art. 
What is significant about nature, as was tacitly acknowledged in the eighteenth 
century, is its link with the very existence of animal and plant life but also our own 
existence. It should not come as a surprise that as creatures born of nature we also have a 
capacity to experience, discern and evaluate it. Nature not only endows us with the 
capacity for perception and responding to our surroundings in meaningful ways, as well 
as purposeful creativity, it provides the natural objects of which we have such 
experiences. We may and do doubt whether those experiences are veridical or true. That 
we do exist, and are able to perceive in the way that we do, however, gives us reason to 
return to Descartes’ idea that natural objects exist and that, furthermore, we respond to 
how they appear, which in many perceptual experiences involves perceiving aesthetic 
qualities. The aesthetic element comes in when we discern and describe the natural 
world aesthetically, using aesthetic concepts and terms. The eighteenth century is the 
context in which such concepts emerged and helped form the field of aesthetics. That it 
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formally came into existence as an academic discipline is attributable to Baumgarten, 
who introduced the idea of epistêmê aisthetikê as “the science of what is sensed and 
imagined”.60  
This chapter’s first section chronicles the concepts mentioned above as emerging in 
response to the seventeenth century rationalism about aesthetics, influenced by the 
Cartesian method and an over-reliance on Aristotelian principles that underwrote 
tragedy, and that sought to provide a priori reasons for the existence, and our experience 
of, beauty. This had an enduring impact on the creative arts, especially the theatre, 
where, in France, for example, Corneille’s Le Cid and Molière’s L’école des Femmes 
were full of witticisms about critics sitting in their audiences, seeking to ridicule them or 
assiduously reject the rigidity of the formulae for successful plays, as we will see. 
 The subjective turn to be investigated in this chapter enabled a turning away from 
criteria-led requirements for artworks to be successful and correctly appreciated and 
entailed an interest in subjective, perceptual experience that was theorised within a wider 
context of the aesthetic. It did not restrict the aesthetic to art and did not assume artistic 
priority, that art was the essence of the aesthetic. Baumgarten took the aesthetic to be 
essentially perceptual, arguing in the Metaphysica, in which the term ‘aesthetica’ first 
appeared and where Baumgarten argued for a ‘science of sense knowledge’.61 Schaper 
writes that Baumgarten’s ‘science’ of aesthetics was not a philosophy of art or a 
philosophy of aesthetic experience, but both. He was influenced by the Greek tradition 
which, as we have already seen, particularly in Aristotle, the arts were rooted in natural 
creative process which included some rules for making and producing. The subjective 
turn thus initiated an interest in subjective response, and with it an interest in perception, 
‘internal sense’ theories, and aesthetic properties. 
 The second section presents a historical account of the concept of disinterest, a 
concept that was borne of a desire to reject the egoism and self-interest evident in 
Hobbes’ philosophy. Aesthetics was neither prescriptive by reason, as was claimed by 
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rationalism, nor was it fundamentally or genuinely self-interested. Rather, its focus was 
the object, but through subjective experience. The prefix ‘dis’, expressing negation, did 
not refer to lack of interest, but rather lack of self-interest. This meant that the 
experience of beauty was the subjective experience of an object with which that subject 
was genuinely and perceptually engaged, rather than engaged with for reasons of self-
interest.  
With Hutcheson comes an explicit discussion on the idea of aesthetic perception as it 
relates to nature and an argument that beauty belongs to the realm of perception, rather 
than rule-governance. Thus the subjective turn that occurred in the eighteenth century 
brought the aesthetic into the realm of subjective experience, which meant that 
philosophers began to address the nature of that subjective experience, which included 
addressing the nature of aesthetic perception in a wider sense that was primarily focused 
on nature rather than art.  
 
§ The Judgment of Taste and Immediacy 
 
 I will begin by giving some examples of the rationalist approach to aesthetics in order 
to draw a contrast with the subjective turn that followed. Taste theories and the 
‘immediacy thesis’ evolved as a response to the over-reliance on the strictures of 
rationalism. Subjectivism was most clearly brought about by the Abbé DuBos in France 
and Hutcheson and Hume in Scotland, who, as we will discover below, articulated the 
important distinction between a judgment born out of reason and a judgment that results 
from felt experience. 
 Descartes’ scepticism about the senses puts him in the same philosophical position as 
Plato because, on his account, any perceptual experience was potentially deceptive. 
However, rather than appealing to the universal forms as Plato did, Descartes sought 
epistemic certainty by appealing to what he could know with certainty, innately and with 
clarity. In the realm of aesthetics he appealed to mathematics, which is borne out in the 
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Compendium Musicae.62 Here, we can see his mathematical interests at work in his 
desire to prove that musical harmony could be articulated mathematically, by showing 
that its origins lay in mathematical proportions. On the other hand, dissonances such as 
the striking of thunder, are not the proper objects of music for they are unpleasant to 
hear, their dissonance not in keeping with the elegance of arithmetic proportions. Here is 
Descartes, quoted in Sepper’s book: 
For this delight there is required a certain proportion of the object with its sense. 
Whence it happens, for example that the din of muskets or thunder does not seem 
suitable to music: because namely, it hurts the ears, just as the very great brilliance 
of the sun [hurts] eyes directed towards it.63 
 
The dissonance that we hear in the sound of thunder or in the cacophony of musket fire 
lacks arithmetic proportionality and is, for this very reason, unpleasant to the human ear. 
Sepper writes: “The theory is expressed in the mathematics of proportions, but this 
mathematics is precisely what is detected or perceived in the sensation of sound, in its 
aistheisis.”64 That is to say, in the way that it is experienced aesthetically, through the 
senses. 
 Descartes’ Compendium Musicae predates his search for certainty and clear and 
distinct ideas to be found in the Meditations. In the former, he was attempting to justify 
pleasurable sensual experience by appealing to reason, mathematical proportion, rather 
than perceptual or sensual experience. It was this sort of reasoning that had implications 
for the production of art. The thought was related to a quest for the clear articulation of 
phenomena through reason, through arithmetic. Just as arithmetic explained the sounds 
that we hear, so must the creative arts be rule-governed, as the critics who were 
proponents of Descartes held. Some of those critics, like Crousaz, looked directly to 
Descartes for inspiration. Others, like Boileau and Batteux, looked to historical premise, 
the rules set out in Aristotle’s Poetics. 
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 Crousaz, using noticeably Cartesian terminology, was also pre-occupied with 
underpinning a logical definition of beauty: 
Les sentimens, sur tout, qui l’accompagnent s’emparant de l’attention, ne lui 
permettent pas de s’arrêter assez sur cette idée pour la remarquer bien 
distinctement. Par là elle demeure vague & reste dans une confusion qui donne 
lieu à une infinité de mal entendus.65 
 
Je rappellerai ici un principe que j’ai établi ailleurs, [Logique, partie I, chapitre II], 
& dont on conviendra sans peine, dès qu’on l’aura bien compris. Je distingue deux 
sortes de perceptions; j’appelle les unes idées & les autres sentimens. Quand je 
pense à un Cercle, à un Triangle, […] je forme des idées. Mais quand je mange, 
quand je me place auprès du feu, quand j’approche une fleur de mon nez, les 
perceptions de Saveur, de Chaleur, d’Odeur qui me frappent, & qui me saisissent, 
font du nombre de celles que j’appelle des Sentimens, & non pas de simples idées.  
[…] Les idées occupent l’Esprit, les sentimens interessent le Coeur […]. […] On 
exprime aisément les idées, mais il est très difficile de décrire ses sentimens, il est 
même impossible d’en donner par aucun discours une exacte connoissance à ceux 
qui n’en ont jamais éprouvé de semblables.66 
 
Crousaz wrote that felt human responses, sentiments, to works of art evade our attention, 
or our reason, or rationality, are difficult to articulate and communicate, and therefore 
can not, by their very nature, relate to clear and distinct ideas.67 Human sentiment is 
vague and confused, giving rise to an infinite number of misunderstandings. He thus 
made a distinction between two sorts of perception, one sort being ideas, and the other 
being sentiments. When we think of circles or triangles, we form ideas. On the other 
hand, when we eat, sit close to the fire, smell a flower, the perceptions of taste, heat and 
scent hit us and take hold of us, evoking sentiment rather than simple ideas. On his 
account, ideas belong to the spirit, what we would now call the mind, and sentiment 
belongs to the heart. Ideas are expressed with ease, but it is very difficult, indeed 
impossible to describe our sentiments, to glean precise forms of knowledge from them, 
especially if others have not had the same sentiment. 
                                                
65 Jean Pierre De Crousaz, Traité Du Beau (Amsterdam: Chez l'Honoré & Chatelain, 
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66 Ibid. 11. 
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 Other critics, for example, Boileau, appealed to reason in a different way to determine 
the aesthetic value of a genre and logic to literary compositions. They appealed to the 
classical forms of beauty which were innate ideas for Boileau, ideas that appealed to 
reason: 
Quelque sujet qu’on traite, ou plaisant, ou sublime, 
Que toujours le bon sens s’accorde avec la rime : 
L’un l’autre vainement ils semblent se haïr ; 
La rime est une esclave, et ne doit qu’obéir. 
Lorsqu’à la bien chercher d’abord on s’évertue, 
L’esprit à la trouver aisément s’habitue ; 
Au joug de la raison sans peine elle fléchit, 
Et, loin de la gêner, la sert et l’enrichit. 
Mais, lorsqu’on la néglige, elle devient rebelle, 
Et, pour la rattraper, le sens court après elle. 
Aimez donc la raison : que toujours vos écrits 
Empruntent d’elle seule et leur lustre et leur prix. 
Boileau, L’Art Poétique, Canto I68 
 
The creation of poetry for Boileau was not unconditional. It was subject to the existence 
of a series of fixed genres that were perfectly determined by an authority higher than the 
poet himself, as we can see from the above extract, in which he exalts reason’s powers 
to enrich aesthetic experience. 
 Reason’s powers were determined by classical, literary rules laid out by Aristotle in 
his Poetics amongst others, which came to be central to the dispute between the 
rationalists and the subjectivists.69 Artistic genres existed already and could not be 
improved upon, re-created or made up.70 Batteux, one of Boileau’s cohorts, also held 
this view. Batteux evoked, for example, the numbers of Greek tragedies written by 
Eschyle, which numbered 160, and Sophocles, which numbered 120, with the aim of 
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reminding us that such numbers of theatrical production and performance make concrete 
the rules of the genre: 
Mais, quand il est question de former un Art, c’est-à-dire, d’indiquer à des Artistes ce 
qu’ils doivent faire ou éviter pour avoir du succès, les défauts observés fervent autant 
que les beautés. Ils fervent plus, parcequ’ils font sortir plus fortement la règle. La 
Poësie étoit donc assez avancée du temps d’Aristote, pour qu’il fût en état d’en poser 
les vrais principes, & d’en developer les détails. […] D’un autre côté, toute la Grèce, 
passionnée pour les ourvrages de Poësie, de Peinture, de Sculpture, dont elle 
s’occupoit depuis plusieurs siecles, avoit un gout aussi exercé que délicat. Il ne 
s’agissoit presque, pour faire une Poëtique, que de recueillir ses jugemens, & de les 
rappeler aux principes sur lesquels ils étoient fondés.71 
 
Batteux adulated Aristotle’s treatise on the rules of tragedy, catharsis and the purgation 
of the soul. The proliferation of Greek tragedies, which offered examples of both good 
and bad theatre, meant that taste was both exercised and practiced, and therefore 
delicate, apt at forming good judgments. Aristotle’s great achievement, according to 
Batteux, was reminding his readers of the principles on which such judgments were 
formed.  
 There were difficulties with this view, reliant as it was on reason and rule 
governance. Firstly, it relied too heavily on the rules of tragedy as seemingly prescribed 
by Aristotle, and secondly it ‘turned away’ from nature, which was not taken to be 
central to aesthetic experience in the same way that the production of art was.72 I will 
address this latter problem, which is a problem for anyone convinced of the importance 
of nature in aesthetics, in chapter three. The acceptance and over-reliance on priori 
knowledge for the rules of tragedy forced the rationalist perspective to focus on the 
creative process of theatrical production and how it should be experienced. This meant 
that what was prioritised was whether a theatrical production followed the rules set out 
by tragedy, rather than the response, or experience. It is not that I think that the rules of 
tragedy are irrelevant, but what is central to experiencing a theatrical performance 
aesthetically is attending to the performance itself, discerning qualities about it and 
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describing it, the characters, and being able to articulate what has been discerned. This is 
not dissimilar to Descartes’ discovering the mathematical, proportional, underpinnings 
of harmony in music and how it might tell us something interesting about the 
relationship of music to mathematics and proportions, rather than our distinctly 
aesthetic, sensual, perceptual, responses. While it may be that the rules of tragedy 
according to Aristotle and Descartes’ mathematical approach can explain the underlying 
reasons for the success of a tragedy or the sound of music, neither need be seen as 
stipulative for aesthetic response, which is properly located in perceptual, sensual, 
experience.  
 This rationalistic approach could not characterise or explain distinctly aesthetic, 
subjective response. Proportionality and rule-governedness is important because it 
results in a particular kind of experience, but subjective experience need not be ignored 
even if we do emphasise proportions and rules. It imposed the rules of creation for 
playwrights, but also made claims about what ought to be appreciated aesthetically. 
Playwrights, although themselves sometimes close friends of their critics, also took pot-
shots at the critics, as did Molière and Corneille in their plays Tartuffe and Les Discours 
respectively. Corneille wrote, as quoted in Beardsley’s history of aesthetics: 
It is easy for critics to be severe; but if they were to give ten or a dozen plays to the 
public, they might perhaps slacken the rules more than I do, as soon as they have 
recognized through experience things it banishes from our stage.73 
 
Molière wrote: 
If plays written in accordance with the rules do not please, whereas those which 
please are not in accordance with the rules, then it necessarily follows that the 
rules were badly made. Let us therefore disregard this quibbling whereby public 
taste is restricted, and let us consider in a comedy mere the effect it has upon us.74 
 
The frustration with rule-driven artistic production was evident in the dispute between 
the ‘Ancients’ and the ‘Moderns’. At that time, the ‘Ancients’ advocated either a priori 
or rule-driven artistic production and aesthetic response and the ‘Moderns’ appealed to 
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felt responses. Noteworthy in Molière’s quotation above that we should “consider in a 
comedy merely the effect it has upon us”, which is reminiscent of the subjective turn 
that we will see with DuBos and Hume below. 
 The frustration was not only evident in the theatre and poetry, but in the realm of 
painting. The conflict in the realm of painting occurred as a result of a dispute over 
colour and whether or not colour could be the foundation of painting. For example, those 
who favoured paintings by Poussin (as opposed to Rubens) agreed with him that 
judgment is based on drawing, which appeals to reason and not on colour, which appeals 
solely to the senses. Because drawing can provide a foundation for painting by its 
delineating, for creating properties, it appeals to reason, by its ability to depict a visually 
distinctive, recognisable object rather than blobs of colour. It appeals to the rational, 
organising and designing principles of the mind.75 
 The Abbé DuBos, having traveled to England and met the likes of Locke, read 
Addison, Shaftesbury and probably other British counterparts, considered “[t]hat it is 
useless to dispute, whether the part that takes in the design and the expression be 
preferable to that of the colouring”, the title to chapter XLIX of his Critical Reflection of 
Poetry and Painting, the opening lines for which are: 
That a sensible pleasure arises from poems and pictures, is a truth we are 
convinced of by daily experience; and yet ‘tis difficult matter to explain the nature 
of the pleasure, which bears so great a resemblance with affliction. And whose 
symptoms are sometimes as affecting, as those of the deepest sorrow. The art of 
poetry and painting are never more applauded, than when they are most successful 
in moving us to pity.76 
 
The thought here is not about whether there are a priori principles or rules that underpin 
our aesthetic experiences but that the importance of the experience is based on the 
response that it evokes in us, a similar claim as that made by Molière above. The way in 
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which the subject has been impressed by the work of art is what matters to DuBos. 
Morizot writes, for instance, that DuBos “underst[ood] that sensuousness decides in the 
favour of painting, because it is a sensible medium”.77  
 Theories of taste found their basis in subjectively felt responses, among which 
Montesquieu’s Essay on Taste, Shaftesburry’s Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times, Gerard’s An Essay on Taste and Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the 
Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Montesquieu, diverging from his rationalist 
predecessors, wrote: 
These […] pleasures of the mind constitute the proper objects of taste, those 
objects which we term beautiful, good, agreeable, natural, delicate, tender, 
graceful, elegant, noble, grand, sublime and majestic, as also the qualities to which 
we give the name of Je ne sais quoi.78 
 
The sources, therefore, of beauty, goodness &c. lie within us, and of consequence, 
when we enquire into their causes, we do no more than investigate the springs of 
our mental pleasures.79 
 
We perceive objects to which we attribute qualities internally: our aesthetic responses 
are therefore subjective, pleasures of the mind which are both their cause and our 
enjoyment. 
 Along these lines, Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Hutcheson notably articulated 
what was meant by the ‘internal sense’: 
Let it be observ’d, that in the following Papers, the Word Beauty is taken for the 
Idea raise’d in us, and a Sense of Beauty for our Power of receiving this Idea. 
Harmony also denotes our pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds, and 
a good Ear (as it is generally taken) a Power of perceiving this pleasure.80 
 
It is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, 
Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather 
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chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas an Internal Sense, were it only 
for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other sensations of Seeing and 
Hearing, which men have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony.81 
 
Part of Hutcheson’s project was accounting for non-perceptual objects that are 
“accompanied by pleasure”, like the “beauty perceiv’d in Theorems, or universal Truths, 
in general Causes, and some extensive Principles of Action”.82 Hutcheson made room 
for a priori and universal knowledge but made the important distinction that a priori 
universal knowledge is not the means by which we experience pleasure in the beautiful, 
but that the external senses are. In a note to this introduction to his own essay, Gerard 
wrote of Hutcheson that Hutcheson terms the internal sense as “subsequent” or “reflex” 
senses “because they suppose some previous perception of the objects, about which they 
are properly referred to our external organs”.83  
Hume, who was influenced by Hutcheson, thought that taste was based on immediate, 
felt, subjective response. Such responses were accurate or inaccurate, correct or 
incorrect, depending on how refined or experienced the subject. Experience, in this 
sense, did not mean discerning the a priori mathematical, formal values underpinning 
beauty, nor did it entail appealing to universal criteria. Rather, it entailed the ability to 
objectively and sensibly discern and appreciate beauty or to recognise deformity. This 
claim was straightforward especially where our experience of, for example, nature was 
concerned. However, Hume conceded that reason played a role, insofar as it helped us to 
refine the ‘internal sense’, in the experience of objects that prima facie did require an 
appeal to universal principles, such as works of art. He writes, as Shelley quotes: 
[I]n order to pave the way for a [judgment of taste], and give a proper discernment 
of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, 
that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons 
formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. 
Some species of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first appearance 
command our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it is 
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impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, or adapt them better to our 
taste and sentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the fine 
arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning in order to feel the proper 
sentiment.84 
 
In relation to art, taste was an internal sense for Hume, and one that could be developed 
by the art critic through practice and experience. The more we have experienced and 
have internalised those experiences, the more we could rely on those internalised 
experiences to guide our judgments of taste. This does not mean that the external senses 
had no role to play, just that we have aesthetic ideas that correspond to the properties of 
art that we experience through our external senses. 
 Importantly, Hume mentions that “some species of beauty, especially the natural 
kinds, on their first appearance command our affection and approbation; and where they 
fail of this effect it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence or adapt 
them better to our taste”.85 Here we see a direct correlation between beauty and the 
aesthetic that in contemporary aesthetics has expanded, thanks to Sibley, to include a 
wider range of positive and negative aesthetic qualities. However, Hume is also 
suggesting that where natural beauty is concerned, there is something primal about our 
response to it, one that no reasoning or justification could alter. This contributes to the 
overall argument that sees the aesthetics of nature as at least equivalent to the aesthetics 
of art precisely because it is immediate in the sense that it does not require the kind of 
theorising or contextualising that our experiences of art do.  
 In any case, if resisting the rule-governed basis on which the rationalists built their 
concept of the aesthetic was what subjectivists were doing to in part, and that resulted in 
emphasising perception and internal sense; how could we distinguish genuinely aesthetic 
response from ‘ordinary’ perception both in nature and in art? This is where ‘disinterest’ 
becomes a key concept, a concept that we will return to throughout the thesis, because it 
is the distinctive feature that differentiates aesthetic perceptual experience from non-
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aesthetic perceptual experience. A proper understanding of disinterest allows us to see 
why perceptual, aesthetic, experience need therefore not be dependent an intentionally 
created art object, but on many objects, including nature and other non-art objects. 
 
§ Disinterest  
 
 Disinterest is a concept that emerged alongside the concepts of taste and immediacy 
in the eighteenth century, and reached its fullest and most detailed articulation in Kant. 
My aim in this section is to make sense of the concept within its historical context and 
re-assert its importance to aesthetic experience and aesthetic perception specifically. 
Disinterest was important both because of its relationship with the aesthetic and because 
of its relationship with virtue. Indeed disinterest in eighteenth century British aesthetics 
found its genesis in the philosophical desire to reject that moral action and aesthetic 
appreciation should be based on self-interest and desire rather than attending to virtuous 
actions or external objects.86 Kant then explicitly made a clear demarcation between the 
aesthetic and the moral. 
 Just as the eighteenth century concept of taste countered overly rigid, rule-driven 
rationalism, the eighteenth century concept of disinterest countered the psychological 
egoism and ethical self-interest in, for example, Hobbes’ philosophy that describes the 
human psychological state as acting solely out of self-interest, curbing self-interest only 
to ensure civility in contractual relations with others. The ‘dis’ in disinterest thus 
referred to the denial of self-interest, rather than the denial of a subjective, non-selfish, 
interest in an object. We will see the importance of the following discussion on ethics to 
aesthetics as the concept of disinterest comes to fruition below and in subsequent 
chapters when it will re-emerge. I now focus on the ethical to explain the background 
against which the concept of disinterest came to fruition. The conclusion I will draw 
later in my thesis is that disinterest does not necessarily entail aesthetic formalism or 
attitude theories, but is the very locus that enables aesthetic perception due to the kind of 
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perceptual attention it entails. I turn first to the ‘state of nature’ and ‘self-interested’ 
view, before turning to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson who contested it. 
 Chapter thirteen of Hobbes’ Leviathan is known for his negative and pessimistic 
outlook on human self-interest and compulsion for war. Here he writes for example: 
For […] equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. 
And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they 
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is 
principally their owne conversation, and sometimes their delectation only,) 
endeavour to destroy or subdue one an other.  
 
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure 
himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the 
persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to 
endanger him. So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of 
quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.87  
 
The natural state of man, according to Hobbes, is a state in which he is not empowered 
by reason to seek peace through proper relations with others in society, is overcome with 
self-interested desire to the extent that he enters easily into disagreement.  
 Shaftesbury denied the view that we enter easily into struggles with others because of 
our self-interested desires. He viewed ethics as being derived from reason and sentiment 
and gave a pejorative account of self-interest, one which does not serve the public good, 
even when used in a religious context: 
It may be consider’d withal; That in this religious sort of Discipline, the Principle 
of Self-love, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being no-way moderated or 
restrain’d, but rather improv’d and made stronger every day, by the exercise of the 
Passions in a subject of more extended Self-interest; there may be reason to 
apprehend lest the Temper of this kind shou’d extend it-self in general thro’ all the 
Parts of Life. For if the Habit be such as to occasion, in every particular, a stricter 
Attention to Self-good, and private Interest; it must insensibly diminish the 
Affections towards Publick Good, or the Interest of Society; and introduce a 
certain Narrowness of Spirit, which (as some pretend) is peculiarly observable in 
the devout Persons and Zealots of almost every religious Persuasion.88  
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This way of thinking challenged the spirit of Hobbesian self-interest and will have 
implications in the aesthetic context and for aesthetic perception. Self-interest in 
political and religious contexts should be rejected according to Shaftesbury, but not just 
for the greater good of public life, for society, but for their value as intrinsic entities.   
And a Life without natural Affection, Friendship, or Sociableness, wou’d be found 
a wretched one, were it to be try’d. ‘Tis as these Feelings and Affections are 
intrinsically valuable and worthy, that Self-interest is to be rated and esteem’d. A 
Man is nothing so much himself, as by his Temper, and the Character of his 
Passions and Affections.”89 
 
 Our self-interest is embedded in the relations we have with others, our affections and 
social interactions. A life without these is not desirable. Hobbes’ view of man’s natural 
state could not be right, for such a state leaves her without those things that are 
intrinsically valuable and worthy, rather than valuable to her own self-interested 
projects. Natural affection and friendship and attending to objects for their own sake was 
as, if not more, important that one’s self-interested projects. 
 For Stolnitz, this was a pre-cursor for disinterest. “[T]he virtuous man”, writes 
Stolnitz about Shaftesbury’s view, “is like nothing so much as the art-lover, from whom 
he differs only in the objects which he apprehends.”90  The virtuous man, in this context, 
is one who does not display the characteristics evident in Hobbes’ characterisation of 
man in his natural state. If man is virtuous, that is to say, not in a state of self-interested 
desire, he is able to contemplate objects of aesthetic interest, namely, art. In support of 
this Stolnitz quotes the following passage: 
The case is the same in mental or moral Subjects, as in ordinary Bodys, or the 
common Subjects of Sense. The Shapes, Motions, Colours, and Proportions of 
these latter being presented to our Eye; there necessarily results a Beauty or 
Deformity, according to the different Measure, Arrangement and Disposition of 
their several Parts. So in Behaviour and Actions, when presented to our 
Understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent Difference, 
according to the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects. 
 
                                                
89 Ibid. 53. 
90 Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic 
Theory," Philosophical Quarterly II, no. 43 (1961). 133. 
 58 
The Mind, which is Spectator or Auditor of other Minds, cannot be without its Eye 
and Ear; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment 
or Thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels the 
Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a 
Foul and Fair, a Harmonious and a Dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any 
musical Numbers, or in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible 
Things.91 
 
Stolnitz’ point about the link Shaftesbury makes between virtue, aesthetics and art, “that 
the capacity for such perception and for the feeling of approbation or disapprobation is 
virtue” is apt. The quotation taken from Shaftesbury also makes evident the view that the 
qualities of beauty, harmony or deformity are perceivable and indicate something about 
“Sensible” qualities, as is being argued here. Such perceiving is not about advancing 
one’s own self-interested motivations, but about attending to the qualities of the 
“Sensible” object. We perceive these qualities and therefore have an opening on objects 
in the external world. These qualities are vivid and tell us something about those 
external objects and potentially about the state of affairs external to us.  
  Stolnitz’s article on the concept’s etymology and its historical usage helps to locate 
the term within the philosophical writings of the eighteenth century.92 Stolnitz argued 
that ‘disinterest’ first appeared in the writings of Shaftesbury, that the concept then 
evolved in the writings of Hutcheson and Burke, achieving its status as an object-
oriented phenomenological experience in Alison, rather than a subject-oriented one. In 
what follows, I am going to settle on a discussion of Hutcheson, because of his 
important contribution to our understanding of ‘disinterest’ and because Hutcheson’s 
views on these matters have figured in recent debates concerning the nature of aesthetic 
properties, aesthetic experience and the very essence of the aesthetic.93 
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 Hutcheson’s contribution chimes with that of Shaftesbury, but he makes explicit the 
thought that ‘disinterest’ is borne of virtue and characterises it as ‘lack of self-interest’: 
Self-love, or Desire of private Interest; since all Virtue is either some such 
Affections, or Actions consequent upon them, it must necessarily follow, That 
Virtue springs from some other Affection than Self-Love, or Desire of private 
Advantage. And where Self-Interest excites the same Action, the Approbation is 
given only to the disinterested Principle.  
 
As to the Love of Benevolence, the very Name excludes Self-Interest. We never 
call that Man benevolent, who is in fact useful to others, but at the same time only 
intends his own Interest, without any desire of, or delight in, the Good of others. If 
there be any Benevolence at all, it must be disinterested; for the most useful 
Action imaginable, loses all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that 
it only flowed from Self-Love or Interest.94 
 
Another important concept that links in with the judgment of taste and disinterest needs 
to be mentioned here. That concept is ‘immediacy’, as referred to in the introduction. It 
needs to be mentioned not only because of its importance in relation to disinterest, but 
also because of its importance in relation to knowledge. That disinterested aesthetic 
judgments are not dependent on a priori reasoning was a claim used against rationalism 
as written in section one of this chapter, and it is a claim I wish to vindicate for my 
characterisation of aesthetic perception later in my thesis.  
 That claim is based on the view that disinterested aesthetic judgment is immediate: 
we do not reason our way to the sensual pleasure but perceive it and feel it in the 
immediate moment. Hutcheson acknowledges the possibility of attributing our 
knowledge of aesthetic qualities to a priori knowledge and universal principles by 
invoking the ‘internal sense’. Experience that arises out of the ‘internal sense’ is similar 
to the experience to be had via the five senses as resulting from the external sense, but 
not accountable by them. Non-perceptible aesthetic qualities are attributable to the 
former: 
                                                                                                                                           
no. 4 (2004), Shelley, "The Concept of the Aesthetic.", James Shelley, "The Prolem of 
Non-Perceptual Art," British Journal of  Aesthetics 43, no. 4 (2003). 
94 Hutcheson, "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two 
Treatises." 102, 103. 
 60 
There will appear another reason perhaps hereafter for calling this power of 
perceiving the ideas of beauty an internal sense, from this, that in some other 
affairs where our external senses are not much concerned, we discern a sort of 
beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observed in sensible objects, and 
accompanied with like pleasure. Such is that beauty perceived in theorems, or 
universal truths, in general causes, and in some extensive principles of action.95  
 
The beauty of a theorem is not perceived through the external senses, but through the 
internal sense. And yet, non-perceptible aesthetic qualities are not determined by a 
priori, reasoned, rational universal principles either in the case of the internal sense or in 
the case of the external sense, as written in the paragraph with the subheading “Its 
[Internal Pleasure’s] pleasure necessary and immediate”: 
This superior power of perception [the internal sense] is justly called a sense 
because of its affinity to the other senses in this, that the pleasure does not arise 
from any knowledge of principles, proportions, causes, or of the usefulness of the 
object, but strikes us at first with the idea of beauty. Nor does the most accurate 
knowledge increase this pleasure of beauty however it may superadd a distinct 
rational pleasure from prospects of advantage, or from the increase of knowledge. 
[…] And farther, the ideas of beauty and harmony, like other sensible ideas, are 
necessarily pleasant to us, as well as any prospect of advantage or disadvantage, 
vary the beauty or deformity of an object. For as in the external sensations, no 
view of interest will make an object grateful, nor detriment distinct from 
immediate pain in the perception, make it disagreeable to the sense. […] Hence it 
plainly appears that some objects are immediately the occasions of this pleasure of 
beauty, and that we have senses fitted to for perceiving it, and that it is distinct 
from that joy which arises upon prospect of advantage.96  
 
For Hutcheson, because we can apply the concept of beauty to a priori, rational, 
theoretical objects as well as objects perceived through the senses, it would be 
implausible to think that aesthetic response comes from knowledge rather than 
perception, as did the Cartesian philosophers and critics, hence his need to establish the 
immediacy of experience for both the internal sense and the external senses. The beauty 
of internal or external objects is grasped immediately, non-self-interestedly, viz. 
disinterestedly, with senses “fitted” for the discernment of beauty or deformity. 
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Furthermore, because Hutcheson did not draw any distinction between the external 
object perceived and its representational counterpart in the mind, he claimed that 
“external objects were beautiful in their own right” and that what we perceive is their 
beauty.   
 We can bring this back to the claims about moral self-interest made by Shaftesbury. 
A person “who is generally fair-minded or able to take the point of view of the 
disinterested spectator in moral situations would likewise be able one supposes, to take 
the point of view of a ‘man in general’ when exercising critical judgment”.97  If we are 
able to put our self-interested desires to one side in the case of morality, there seems no 
reason to think that this shouldn’t be possible in the case of aesthetics. In the case of 
morality, as in aesthetics, we are thereby encouraged to treat others and external objects 
as ends in themselves, and in the case of aesthetics. In the aesthetic case, however, it is 
rich qualities attributable to the object of experience that we must attend to. 
 For Kant, this meant that our pleasure in the beautiful was not linked to action, as is 
the case in morality, but that our pleasure in the beautiful is “merely contemplative”.98  
Kant systematised the concepts discussed above, namely, disinterest, immediacy and 
taste. In Kant’s philosophy, disinterest was one of the defining criteria of taste. A 
judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, grounded in a subjective response, in 
perceptual appearance, rather than grounded in our cognitive capacities. It is a judgment 
that can be taken seriously once we are certain that it is not grounded in interest: those 
judgments that appeal to our idiosyncratic tastes, or those that are related to the things 
we know already, that we desire or those that we relate to how we think the world ought 
to be are not pure judgments of taste.  
 If disinterest is a criteria for the pure judgment of taste, than a judgment of taste 
relates to the qualities of my phenomenal experience, rather than whether or not the 
object of my phenomenal experience is agreeable to me. A judgment that is related to 
what is agreeable to me, such as my penchant for sweet, juicy, chunky pieces of 
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pineapple does not have the immediate novelty that my recent discovery of the savoury 
saltiness of edemame beans, although this too, might turn into an agreeable judgment, 
rather than one of taste. In other words, I should recognize that my judgment of 
pineapple, or my future consumption of edemame beans is agreeable because I have a 
penchant for them however much my initial judgments of them may have been pure, 
without a pre-existing interest in them and therefore without the judgment being mixed 
with desire. Because I now have a pre-existing penchant for them, it is likely that I will 
desire them. Once this happens, it is likely, although not necessary, that I am attending 
to the nature of my idiosyncratic taste for them, rather than their qualities.  
 A judgment of taste is also interested, and therefore not a pure judgment of taste, 
according to Kant, if it is linked with the good. If the judgment is linked with the good, it 
is also automatically linked with purpose, desire and outcome. Again, the issue is 
nuanced. Kant is concerned that the judgment should be linked to the qualities of 
phenomenal experience, rather than thoughts about how a person should act, or the role 
the aesthetic object has in action. Propaganda seems a plausible, if extreme, example: if 
a subject is a Nazi sympathiser and declares Leni Riefenstahl’s films to be beautiful, it is 
unclear whether that judgment is made based on the film’s phenomenal aesthetic 
qualities or whether it is based on the subject’s political sympathies. If based on the 
latter, the Nazi-sympathiser’s desire for the construction of a world that would appeal to 
him, who sees good in a world free from anyone but the Aryan race, that judgment is not 
a judgment of taste, but an interested judgment: one that “[consequently] will[s] a 
satisfaction of the existence of an object or of an action, i.e. some sort of interest”.99  
Hence the Nazi-sympathiser willing the good (according to him), namely, existence of a 
society like that depicted in the film. It is still possible that Leni Riefenstahl’s films may 
be exemplars of film-making in terms of its aesthetic qualities, however unpalatable the 
views expressed or implied in it. It may also be true that the moral case against them 
trumps the aesthetic case for them, but the point is that the Nazi-sympathiser’s judgment 
will clearly be interested insofar as he wills the society depicted or implied in the film.  
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 Another way of looking at this is to compare the judgment of taste with a moral 
judgment. In the first instance, a moral act is permissible, according to Kant: if a maxim 
can be formulated to capture a reason to act a proposed way; if that maxim can be taken 
as a universal law of nature (and all rational agents must follow that law); if acting in 
that way is conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature, and if it is rationally 
possible to will to act according to the maxim in such a world. Given that a judgment of 
taste is immediate and aesthetic, rather than cognitive, a categorical imperative for taste 
that is based on reason is not possible: the judgment comes to fruition, and terminates, in 
the pleasure of the beautiful, judgment of taste “whose determining ground cannot be 
other than subjective”.100 The kind of explanation that we can provide for the moral lives 
we unreflectively get on with cannot be provided in the aesthetic case. 
 One final way of understanding disinterest in light of its historical background is by 
appealing to Schopenhauer. For Schopenhauer, self-interested desire was a kind of 
suffering, one that could only end by not desiring, by liberating ourselves from our 
desires and from our restlessness. Disinterest for Schopenhauer entailed the “temporary 
escape from the will because it is the disinterested appreciation of the art object which 
forces us to set aside our normal concerns”.101  It is through our experiences of art that 
we can gain access to, and hence knowledge of, the objects beyond cause and effect, the 
platonic forms or the noumenal objects of Kant’s metaphysics. Because true art is the 
product of genius, an artist whose creativity and imagination is able to transcend cause 
and effect, it gives us a glimpse of what is not ordinarily known. It is suited to 
disinterested contemplation, free from the will, practical reason and desire. Carroll 
writes that according to Schopenhauer: “The domain of art is the senses; art gives us 
sensitive or sensuous knowledge via perception.”102 Our disinterested, aesthetic 
experiences allow us to transcend both our individual selves and the phenomenal world, 
giving us freedom practical, self-interested concerns. Here is a pertinent section that 
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makes vivid Schopenhauer’s account of disinterest and one to which aesthetic 
experience is often equated: 
Raised by the power of the mind, a person relinquishes the usual way of looking at 
things, stops tracing, as the forms of the principle of sufficient reason prompt him 
to do, only their interrelatedness, the final goal of which is always a relation to his 
own will. He ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of 
things, and looks simply and solely at the what. He does not allow abstract 
thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but 
instead, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, immerses himself 
entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet 
contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a 
crag, a building, or whatever it may be. He loses himself in this object (to use a 
pregnant German idiom), i.e., he forgets his very individuality, his will, and 
continues to exist only as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it 
is as if the object alone were there without anyone to perceive it, and he can no 
longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one, 
because the whole of consciousness is filled and taken up with one single sensuous 
picture. […] The person, rapt in this perception is thereby no longer individual (for 
in such perception the individual has lost himself), but he is a pure, willess, 
painless, timeless subject of knowledge.103 
 
 When a subject is attending to an object for its own sake, without willing to satisfy a 
need or a desire or without it serving some moral purpose, they experience it for its 
properties, which may include positive or negative aesthetic properties. The subject also 
attends to the experience as one of interaction between perceiver and perceived. Hence 
the thought that disinterest contributes to sympathetic attention, attending to the object 
as an end in itself. 
 
§ Aesthetic Perception and Hutcheson 
 
 Now that we have looked at the judgment of taste and disinterest, the aim of this 
section is to trace the roots of the idea of aesthetic perception and Hutcheson’s appeal to 
nature as the paradigm of such experience, an idea that was most clearly articulated by 
Hutcheson in the eighteenth century. The secondary literature on Hutcheson focuses on 
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whether he views aesthetic perception as requiring knowledge. By the end of this section 
I hope to present a convincing argument for the view that Hutcheson’s characterisation 
of the aesthetic is perceptual and epistemic, but epistemic without needing to appeal to 
categories of art or science, which further supports the perceptual account of aesthetic 
experience I wish to support as well as the importance of nature as a paradigm of 
aesthetic experience.  
 The controversy about whether or not Hutcheson characterised aesthetic perception as 
epistemic is important because it has repercussions for how philosophers have construed 
aesthetic perception as contributing to aesthetic attitude or formalist theories of 
aesthetics. Philosophers who have argued that Hutcheson’s view is non-epistemic 
because of his claims about disinterest, taste and immediacy, have seen a clear 
progression from Hutcheson’s aesthetics to twentieth century aesthetic attitude and 
formalist theories which is celebrated by some philosophers as purely aesthetic or 
derided by other philosophers for negating the importance of content or context.104 
Either way, his view on this account is characterized as merely perceptual, lacking 
awareness or content that relates to non-perceptual features (such as contextual, 
historical information about the object). If, on the other hand, we can isolate his view 
that beauty is a matter of aesthetic perception, while acknowledging that that beauty has 
an underlying, material and measurable structure, we can see that an epistemic correlate 
may be at play, that there’s a link between our reflexive response and the beauty the 
structure of which we may or may not be aware.   
 To recap how Hutcheson contributes to an ‘internal sense’ theory, his contribution 
makes the connection between what we perceive aesthetically, via the senses, and the 
internal, aesthetic responses to the qualities of external objects presented to the mind 
presented via those senses. It also retains a plurality of possible internal responses and at 
least implicitly rejects a need for epistemic categories. We know already that disinterest, 
pleasure in the beautiful rather than self-interested awareness of pleasure in the 
                                                
104 Stolnitz, "On the Origins Of "Aesthetic Disinterestedness".", Peter Kivy, "The 
"Sense" Of Beauty and the Sense Of "Art": Hutcheson's Place in the History and 
Practice of Aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53, no. 4 (1995). 
 66 
beautiful, was an important factor for Hutcheson.105 Another related factor for him was 
that our perceptions of beauty are accompanied by pleasure and are not subject to our 
will: they can be either pleasurable or displeasurable and we cannot procure or be 
guaranteed of either one or the other. Furthermore, we know that Hutcheson included in 
his theories on aesthetic perception the internal sense, a sense that could be applied to 
abstract objects, such as mathematical theorems as well as external objects that are made 
available to the mind by the senses: 
It is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, 
Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather 
chuse to call our power of perceiving these Ideas, an internal Sense, were it for the 
convenience of distinguishing them from other sensations of Seeing and Hearing, 
which men may have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony.106 
 
Hutcheson’s idea of beauty was an idea of internal sensation that found its origin in 
corporeal sensation but was brought about by a reflection.107 The inner sense of beauty 
includes both ‘absolute’ or ‘original’ beauty and ‘comparative’ or ‘relative’ beauty. The 
former is described as “uniformity amidst variety”, also referred in the secondary 
literature as a “compound ration” and relates to works of nature, harmony in music, 
some works of art when these are not mimetic. The latter, ‘comparative’ or ‘relative’ 
beauty is mimetic and therefore essentially dependent on another object. Absolute 
beauty is to be discovered by the internal senses, which include “the good ear” and a 
“sense of harmony”.108  
 The internal sense relates to the beauty of mathematical theorems as well as the 
external qualities of objects. Hutcheson is allowing for the possibility that aesthetic 
qualities are measurable and analyzable mathematically, and his view starts to resemble 
the Cartesian rationalism I discuss above, in particular the thought that aesthetic beauty 
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can be measured proportionally and that ugliness and dissonance would lack such 
proportionality. He is also allowing for the possibility of comparison and not, I would 
propose, just the comparison of mimetic object with its object of origin, but the 
comparison of mimetic object with previously perceived objects of a similar kind. The 
reason for this is that, in his more general theory of perception, Hutcheson gives an 
account of the “Idea of the Imagination”, a “weak idea of things previously 
perceived”.109  In looking at a painting of a chair, I may, in my own mind, compare it 
with the particular, original chair on which it is based, if I have been fortunate enough to 
see it. I may alternatively compare it to any chair I have seen or I may compare to 
paintings of other chairs. This, however, is only possible if, according to Hutcheson, I 
have seen these other objects and use my imagination to evoke them.  
 Aesthetic perception is subjective, on Hutcheson’s account, but it is also universal in 
that, given we are creatures of more or less similar dispositions, we can experience 
absolute beauty through uniformity amidst variety and comparative beauty through 
comparisons of external objects with objects of similar kinds. These comparisons are 
epistemic to the extent that they rely on discernment, but that internal sense has, unless 
very young or inexperienced, already been moulded by previous experience in the case 
of comparative beauty. In the case of absolute beauty, although we may not be able to 
provide a mathematical explanation for the accompanying pleasure we feel in a positive 
experience of beauty, it is likely that an experience that has mathematical proportionality 
will be accompanied by the idea of beauty.  
 Those who take Hutcheson’s view to be non-epistemic argue that he “excludes any 
concern for knowledge of the object”, that the object is “wholly different from the 
enjoyment of beauty” and can have no effect upon the experience of beauty.110 If the 
internal sense equates to taste, that is to say if taste is “immediate, instinctive and 
disinterested”, than knowledge can by definition have no role to play in the resultant 
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experience.111 Some argue that Hutcheson’s notion that the aesthetic is immediate is 
inconsistent with his second definition of beauty: if relative beauty is comparative, it is 
necessarily epistemic and requires a mode of cognition that the immediacy Hutcheson 
seemingly espouses cannot capture.112 Others suggest explicitly that Hutcheson 
momentously divorces knowledge from aesthetic perception by referring to Hutcheson’s 
claim that “[m]any of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful, 
immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or 
how the Objects excite it or are the Occasions of it […]”.113 This divorce between the 
perceptual and the epistemic is supposed to have been the genesis of formalism.114   
 We do not have to look very far to establish that Hutcheson was not making a claim 
denying any link between perceptual aesthetic properties and knowledge. Shelley, for 
example, argues that Hutcheson was merely claiming that we cannot reason ourselves 
into experiencing beauty, that perceiving beauty is, well, a matter of perception. 
Furthermore, given that Hutcheson emphasized the importance of the internal sense, 
which accounted for theoretical, abstract beauty, it would have been obviously 
inconsistent to deny the relationship between aesthetic perception and knowledge. Since 
beauty could exist as an internal sense and could be linked with theoretical knowledge, a 
relation between the two could be established. For Hutcheson, beauty belongs to the 
category of the sensible, rather than the rational, categories and that he is claiming “what 
Sibley does when Sibley claims that aesthetic properties are perceptual”, a comparison 
that Shelley makes.115  
Sibley writes, for example, that taste is about the discernment of aesthetic qualities in 
things, the ability to recognise aesthetic merit and make judgements of aesthetic worth. 
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This involves looking to see whether “things have aesthetic properties about which 
correct or mistaken judgments can be made and defended” and “whether it is possible to 
defend, as beyond question, various general principles of evaluation, for example that if 
something is graceful it has, pro tanto, and barring special explanation, some aesthetic 
merit.116  
 
§ Conclusion  
 
 The aim of this chapter was to give an account of the origins of the subjective turn 
that occurred in the eighteenth century. For aesthetics, this entailed a turning away from 
rational principles that dictated the production and appreciation of aesthetic properties. 
Eighteenth century philosophers explored the concept of taste, disinterest, immediacy 
and aesthetic perception. Through Hutcheson especially, we can see an account of the 
aesthetic that was sensitive to the perceptual aspects of the aesthetic, in that beauty was 
part of the sensible, but it was a property that could be applied both to external objects 
and internal knowledge. Rather than necessarily leading to aesthetic attitude or formalist 
theories, it attempted to characterize what it is that is distinctive about aesthetic 
perception. I will leave to a later chapter the provision of my own account of aesthetic 
perception, but the idea is that our faculty for perceptual discernment that is fundamental 
to the aesthetic, as we have seen with the development of the aesthetic in the eighteenth 
century, and its culmination in Sibley’s writings. 
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 This chapter follows on from the previous two chapters by focusing explicitly on 
nature as an aesthetic object, immediately and aesthetically perceivable, in the areas of 
the history of philosophy presented in chapters one and two. The first section presents a 
discussion of nature in ancient and medieval philosophy, in which nature was broadly 
thought to be prior to art, explained by the idea that mimesis is essentially nature, or the 
external world, represented. The section then turns to the idea that both Descartes’ 
philosophical method and his Compendium Musicae eliminated nature from the aesthetic 
and artistic realms. Section two goes onto to show that Hutcheson and Kant saw nature 
as the central case in aesthetics and culminates in a discussion of Hegel’s explicit 
rejection of nature from aesthetics. Section three rejects the idea that some concepts, 
such as ‘disinterest’ and ‘formalism’ necessarily follow from Hutcheson, Kant and their 
aesthetics of nature as the precursor for a narrow understanding of the aesthetic. It then 
turns to contemporary philosophers who have brought nature back into the aesthetic 
realm and begins to locate their respective views so that I may later show that nature is 
at least as important an aesthetic object as is art, especially if aesthetic properties are 
thought of as perceptual properties. All sections sketch varying approaches to the 
aesthetics of nature taken by philosophers that help show that nature is an aesthetic 
paradigm. 
 
§ The Turn Away from Nature: from the Ancients to Descartes 
 
 In chapter one, we saw that despite Plato and Aristotle’s opposing metaphysical 
differences about the importance of art and the aesthetic, both would have acknowledged 
the importance of aesthetics more widely conceived. We should note, at this stage, that 
the term aesthesia dates back to Greek times and meant ‘to sense’, ‘to apprehend’, and 
‘to feel’ through the senses and was a term that implied ‘perception’. Plato rejected art 
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from his ideal republic but he did not reject the universal concept of ‘beauty’. While 
Aristotle made no reference to nature as an aesthetic object as such, he did conceive of 
human creativity, and its resulting aesthetic properties, as part of nature’s teleology, an 
extension of nature’s creative powers and an important locus for understanding human 
nature. Aristotle ranked sensory pleasure, which for him were sensual pleasures, 
suggesting that our aesthetic experiences could be experiences of any object.117  
 It is clear from ancient poetry that its authors thought that the characters featured in 
their plays were embedded in their natural contexts. Nature itself thus played an 
important role. Grand emotions were felt by characters and written about in relation to 
overpowering natural spectacles. That the examples from plays and literature cited 
below incorporate nature indicates an interest in nature over and above human affairs. 
Many Greek tragedies incorporated significant roles for the sun, the sea or forests. One 
such example is Philoctes, where the Isle of Lemnos has a role that rivals the hero’s: 
ODYSSEUS 
This is the shore of the seagirt land of Lemnos, untrodden by mortals, not 
inhabited. Here it was, you who were reared as the son of the noblest father among 
the Greeks, son of Achilles, Neoptolemus, that I once put ashore the Malian, the 
son of Poeas-on the orders of those in command-whose foot was dripping from a 
malady that was eating it way; since we could not pour libations or sacrifice in 
peace, but he filled the entire camp with savage and ill-omened cries, shouting and 
screaming. But why must I talk of that? It is not the moment for long conversation, 
for fear he should learn that I have come, and I should spill out the whole scheme 
by which I plan at once to take him. But from now on your task is to help me, and 
to see where in this place there is a cave with two mouths, such that when it is cold 
there is a double seat in the sun, and in summer a breeze wafts sleep through the 
cavern with its opening at both ends. A little below it, on the left, you may see a 
spring with drinking water, if it is still there. Go forward quietly, and tell me 
whether he still occupies the same place or he is somewhere else; so that for the 




Come now, as I depart I will call upon the land! Farewell, home that shared my 
watches and water nymphs of the meadows, and strong sound of sea beating on the 
promontory, where often my head was drenched inside my cave by the battering of 
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the wind, and often the mountain of Hermes brought back to me a groan answering 
my voices as we are leaving you, we are leaving now, though we had never dared 
to trust this hope. Farewell, Seagirt land of Lemnos, and waft me on a peaceful 
voyage that I cannot complain of, to where mighty Fate is taking me, and the will 
of my friends and the all-subduing god who has decreed this!118 
 
In Oedipus at Colonus, a few lines set a natural scene before the play begins. These 
read: 
The scene is a rural setting, near the sacred grove of the Eumenides at Colonus, 
northwest of Athens. Somewhere in the middle of the stage a rock, which can be 
used as a seat, is visible; the grove is bounded by a low ridge of rock, and one 
could sit upon its edge. On the stage can be seen the statue of the hero Colonus. 
Enter OEDIPUS and ANTIGONE.
119 
 
And nightingales are almost immediately mentioned: 
 
ANTIGONE 
Unhappy father, Oedipus, the walls that surround the city look to be far off; and 
this place is sacred, one can easily guess, with the bay, the olive, and the vine 
growing everywhere; and inside it many feathered nightingales make their music. 
Relax your limbs here on this unhewn rock; for you have gone a long way for an 
aged man.120 
 
On one view, Sophocles incorporated the nightingale, known for her “sweet song, but 
also for her association with lament, arising from the tragic myth of Procne and Tereus”, 
“an important symbol of tragic poetry and its transformative function”.121 122 
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is of importance because Sophocles will have deliberately chosen to write about them. 
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 The idea that symbolism related to nature also played an extensive role in the 
Medieval period. Scholastic writers of the medieval period, like John Scotus Eriugena, 
were thought to have “read” nature “as if it were a vast store of symbols” that 
“conceived of the universe as a revelation of God in His ineffable beauty, God reflected 
both in material and ideal beauty, and diffused in the loveliness of all creation”.123 This 
was also evident in texts like Guigemar, one of the lais of Marie de France, courtly 
stories intended as oral performances for lords and ladies. These lais were about war, 
love and magic, steeped in the idea that nature is divine knowledge and eloquence. They 
also featured symbolic representations of nature, not unlike the nightingale above, that 
symbolised the concept of love:  
De tant I out mespris Nature 
Kë unc de nule amur n’out cure.124 
 
Which translates as: 
 
But Nature had done him such a grievous wrong that he never displayed the 
slightest interest in love.125 
 
At the beginning of the story, nature is what is supposed to (and will later) provide 
Guigemar the Knight, the lais’ hero, with an interest in love. A clearer example of 
symbolism, however, would be that of the stag: 
En la flur de sun meillur pris 
S’en vait li ber en sun païs 
Veeir sun pere e sun seignur, 
Sa bone mere e sa sorur, 
Ki mult l’vaeient desiré. 
Ensemble ode us ad sujurné, 
Ceo m’est avis, un meis entier. 
Talent li prist d’aler chacier. 
                                                                                                                                           
We can say that post-Cartesian authors did not include elements in their plays, hence the 
thought that they were distinctly human and social affairs. 
123 Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, trans. Hugh Bredin (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1986). 18. 
124 Marie de France, Guigemar (Durham: Durham French Texts, mid-13th Century). 
Lines 57-58. 
125 ———, "Guigemar," in The Lais of Marie De France (London: Penguin Books, 
1986). 44. 
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La nuit sumunt ses chevaliers, 
Ses veneür e ses berniers; 
Al matin vait en la forest, 
Kar cil deduiz forment li plest. 
A un grant cerf sunt aruté, 
E il chien furent descuplé. 
Li veneür curent devaunt, 
Li damaisels se vait targaunt: 
Sun arc li portë uns vallez, 
Sun ansac e sun berserez. 
Traire voleit, si mes eüst, 
Ainz ke d’iluec se remeüst. 
En l’espeise d’un grant buissun 
Vit une bise od un foün; 
Tute fu blaunche cele beste, 
Perches de cerf out en ta teste. 
Sur l’abai del brachet sailli. 
Il tent sun arc, si trait a li, 
En l’esclot la feri devaunt; 
Ele chaï demeintenaunt. 
La seete resort ariere, 
Guigemar fiert en tel maniere 
En la quisse desk’al cheval, 
Ke tost l’estuet descendre aval; 
Ariere chet sur l’erbe drue 
Delez la bise k’out ferue. 
La bise, ki nafree esteit, 
Anguissuse ert, si se paineit. 
Aprés parla en itel guise: 
‘Oi, lase! Jo sui ocise! 
E tu, vassal, ki m’as nafree, 
Tel seit la tue destinee: 
Jamais n’aies tu medecine, 
Ne par herbe ne par racine! 
Ne par mire, ne par poisun 
N’avras tu jamés garisun 
De la plaie k’as en la quisse, 
De si ke cele te guarisse 
Ki suffera pur tue amur 
Issi grant peine e tel dolur 
K’unkes femme taunt ne suffri, 
E tu referas taunt pur li; 
Dunt tut cil s’esmerveillerunt 
Ki aiment et amé 
Avrunt 
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U ki pois amerunt après. 
Va t’en de ci! Lais M’aveir pes!’126 
 
Which, translated into English would be: 
At the height of his fame this noble knight returned to his homeland to see his 
father and his lord, his loving mother and his sister, who had all longed for his 
return. He had spent a month with them I think, when the fancy took him to go 
hunting. That evening he summoned his knights, his hunters and his beaters, and in 
the morning went off into the forest, for hunting brought him great pleasure. They 
gathered in pursuit of a large stag and the hounds were unleashed. The hunters ran 
in front and the young man lingered behind. A servant carried his bow, his 
hunting-knife and his quiver. If the opportunity arose, he wished to be ready to 
shoot an arrow, before the animal had stirred. In the heart of a large bush he saw a 
hind with its fawn; the beast was completely white with the antlers of a stag on its 
head. When the dog barked, it darted forth and Guigemar stretched his bow, fired 
his arrow and struck the animal in its forehead. Immediately the hind fell to the 
ground, but the arrow rebounded, hitting Guigemar in the thigh and going right 
through into the horse’s flesh. He was forced to dismount and fell back on the 
thick grass beside the hind he had struck. The animal, wounded and in great pain, 
lamented in these words: ‘Alas! I am mortally wounded. Vassal, you who have 
wounded me, let this be your fate. May you never find a cure, nor may any herb, 
root, doctor or potion ever heal the wound you have in your thigh until you are 
cured by a woman who will suffer for your love more pain and anguish than any 
other woman has ever known, and you will suffer likewise for her, so much so that 
all those who are in love, who have known love or are yet to experience it, will 
marvel at it. Be gone from here and leave me in peace.’127 
 
The stag’s wound would have been read or heard (as these are fragments of the oral 
tradition that were written down) as a symbol of love and the dark side of love that has 
nevertheless been granted to the protagonists of the story. It is a prefiguration for the 
characters who fall in love, heal their hearts, heal the warring factions who are the 
backdrop to the story, and also heal the stag of the pain inflicted on it. 
 To contrast with this symbolist view, not dissimilar to contemporary views in 
semiotics, Aquinas presents a slightly different ontological picture. Although we find, in 
both Eriugena’s and Aquinas’ approaches, no contrasting sensibilities when it comes to 
aesthetically experiencing art and nature, both types of experience are of one kind. 
Aquinas makes an explicit distinction between art and nature whereby art is 
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ontologically dependent on nature and nature is not intended to be read like a book of 
symbols. Eco writes: 
Aquinas’ universe was a hierarchy of real existents, each of which acquire its 
individual value through participation, a value made concrete within definite and 
stable limits. In such a universe all beauty is good, and at the root of every good is 
a manner of being which consists in the definite perfection associated with a 
certain act of existing.128 
 
This is important because beauty is primarily found in nature as God’s creation and it is 
good for its own sake. Aquinas did not, however, associate the aesthetic with the artistic, 
as Hegel, Bell and Wollheim did, as we will see. Art, the product of human creativity 
could not trump that of divine creation. Again, according to Eco, for Aquinas, art is 
limited by the fact that it can never fully and completely imitate nature, and attempts to 
only insofar as it can; art operates on the natural material which precedes it and is 
therefore ontologically dependent on a “material substratum whose substantial nature is 
not altered”.129 This does not mean that art cannot provide the “values of proportion and 
integrity” but it can do so only because nature, i.e. God, has not only created the external 
world, but the artist’s own physical, bodily, existence.130 An artist may create an 
artwork, a building, a sculpture but they can only do so by altering materials that already 
exist, materials like stone, clay and colour pigments. 
 While there seems to have been a genuine, if not always entirely explicit interest in 
nature in Ancient and medieval times, Cartesian philosophy flipped the medieval 
metaphysical picture around and caused a turning away from nature.131 It encouraged a 
form of idealism that drew on antiquity’s ideas, that may itself have applied to or 
incorporated nature, but it did not draw on or seek inspiration from nature itself. In 
seeking what he could be certain of, Descartes, in Meditations on the First Philosophy, 
found that he could be certain that he was a thinking being. God would then intervene by 
being the source of our clear and distinct ideas so that he could be certain of things other 
his existence as a thinking being. Despite this, his was a form of extreme subjectivism 
                                                
128 Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas. 52-3. 
129 Ibid. 174-175. 
130 Ibid. 175. 
131 Krantz, L'esthétique De Descartes. 244-254. 
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that ended in accounting for human consciousness as being separate from the body and 
was, at least in the first instance, concerned with subjectivity. Descartes’ philosophy 
inspired the idea that external objects, including nature, were not of primary importance, 
since our senses (or an evil demon) may trick us in certain ways. We must be sceptical 
of what we perceive.132 
 Of central importance for Cartesian philosophy was a proof for the existence of God, 
whose status as a perfect being is called upon to explain human consciousness and 
enables us to believe in our perceptual experiences and thereafter in the existence of an 
external world. God provides us with clear and distinct ideas, which are true. The 
external world, nature, is at our disposal and therefore thinking subjects are of primary 
interest, not the external world. It is God that proves the existence of nature rather than 
nature that proves the existence of God. We turn away from our external, bodily, senses 
as well as the world in order to seek truth in God and our capacity for abstraction. 
Nature is thus insignificant except in its capacity to fit in with the a priori. 
 
§ The Turn Away from Nature: from Hutcheson to Hegel 
 
 We might now recall Hutcheson’s internal sense theory and the conclusion 
Hutcheson draws that perceiving aesthetically is an epistemic act, not an act guided by 
internal knowledge, but an act guided by attending to the object of aesthetic interest. The 
beauty seen in an object was that object’s beauty, the uniformity amidst variety that it 
displayed and that is picked up by the mind. On his view, because an object’s quality is 
not determined by the category that the object belongs to, but by its “uniformity amidst 
variety”, the object itself is the foundation for “our Sense of Beauty in the Works of 
Nature”. 
 Hutcheson muses on the beauty of nature, the “vast Profusion” of which is 
noteworthy in expanses across the universe, in grand landscapes and within “minuter 
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Works of Nature”. “Original”, “Absolute” beauty is thus to be discovered in nature both 
on a universal scale, where great variety abounds within species of animals, plants and 
vegetation. Most of Hutcheson’s examples of absolute beauty, the perception of 
uniformity amidst variety that stands alone and without comparison, are, unlike relative 
beauty, drawn from nature. His view was similar to Aquinas’, as he considered nature to 
be beauty’s original source. Anything else was in relative contrast to nature. He showed 
an interest in the causes of nature, in nature as a discrete object, without appealing to or 
requiring the sceptical machinery that Descartes brought into his metaphysical scheme. 
That interest carried over into nature’s aesthetic properties and our perception of them, 
but perceiving its properties did not entail understanding its causes.  
 Understanding Hutcheson’s account of aesthetic perception can help us understand 
the reasons for which nature is paradigmatically aesthetic. For Hutcheson, the complex, 
real, primary qualities generated secondary, sensible qualities. These secondary, sensible 
qualities (such as heat, cold, bitterness, sweetness) were sensible by virtue of our 
external senses being able to access them, to see, hear, smell and feel them. For 
Hutcheson, the very “uniformity amidst variety” that nature displays professes an 
excellence that is fitted to the pleasurable and natural response we have towards it. 
“[A]esthetic pleasure is therefore a natural response to and a natural mark of excellence 
in objects […].”133 However, while we have sensibilities that are well adapted to 
receiving aesthetic, sensible information about the world, there is nothing in that 
sensibility that provides the more complex information about primary qualities. While 
Hutcheson thought that aesthetic properties were real, he did not believe that they 
automatically acceded to complex ideas, or knowledge about the underlying structure of 
the property concerned: felt heat, for example, did not equate to knowledge about the 
underlying causes of heat. Here is Michael: 
We can, over time, acquire an understanding of the causes of these sensations by 
means of observation and inference. But there is nothing in a sensible idea of heat 
from which one could abstract an intellectual idea of the small bodies in motion 
which have the power to excite this sensation. That is, data adequate to acquire a 
correct intellectual idea of the simpler real qualities is directly provided in sense 
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experience; but proper sensibles of the external senses are no more than signals or 
indicators of certain complex real qualities.134 
 
Sensible ideas do not themselves provide knowledge of their underlying causes. It is by 
observing and attending to them, and drawing inferences, that we can potentially reach a 
correct and true understanding of an object’s primary, objective and underlying 
properties.  
 The necessity of inferring from sensed qualities to properties of objects would require 
that we treat those objects as ends in themselves. Sensed qualities of objects were the 
components of “uniformity amidst variety”. Experiencing the seemingly designed 
“uniformity amidst variety” of nature perceptually and aesthetically is necessarily non-
instrumental in the sense that we might use it to some end that is beneficial to us. This is 
because the very excellence the natural object displays requires it to be treated as an 
object in itself and because of its pre-existing suitability for having been experienced 
aesthetically. It requires a kind of attention to the pleasure of sensible qualities that rules 
out thoughts about the object’s utility or the subject’s self-interest. It resembles what 
Kant came to formalise as the concept of disinterest, of which I will say a few words 
below and will be addressed in more detail in the next section. 
 
 Disinterest is one of the defining criteria of the judgment of taste in Kant’s aesthetics. 
Like Hutcheson, Kant’s primary concern was with nature. Disinterest was the locus for 
accounting for nature’s aesthetic properties, its “varieties to the point of opulence, 
subject to no coercion from artificial rules” that “provide taste with lasting 
nourishment”.135 Kant, however, provided explicit reasons for the priority of nature over 
the priority of art. For example, he writes about birdsong: 
Even the song of a bird, which we cannot bring under any musical rules, seems to 
contain more freedom and thus more that is entertaining for taste than even a 
human song that is performed in accordance with all the rules of the art of music: 
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135 Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment. 126. 
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for one grows tired of the latter far more quickly if it is repeated often and for a 
long time.136 
 
It must be nature, or taken to be nature by us, for us to take such an immediate 
interest in the beautiful, and even more so if we are to be able to expect of others 
that they should take this interest in it; which in fact happens, as we consider 
coarse and ignoble the thinking of those who have no feeling for beautiful nature 
(for this is what we call the receptivity to an interest in its contemplation) and who 
confine themselves to the enjoyment of mere sensory sensations at table or from 
the bottle.137 
 
 The freedom that Kant finds in nature, such as that which he associates with birdsong, 
resembles the purity of Hutcheson’s absolute beauty. Freedom marks the “free play” of 
the imagination with understanding that characterizes aesthetic judgment. The idea is 
that the mind is grasping the beauty of an object, not by applying determinate concepts, 
as might be the case of an environmental scientist attempting to make sense of the 
decline of a particular butterfly species when making observations about it in the field, 
or the scientist who looks at the foxglove as a source of heart medicine. In a moment of 
distraction both scientists, having set down their tools, might look upon the High Brown 
Fritillary butterfly or the foxglove not by applying scientific concepts, but by attending 
to their beauty, an experience where the subject’s imagination becomes immersed in the 
object’s aesthetic properties without being determined by pre-existing concepts. This 
moment is disinterested not because there is a lack of interest or intentionality, but in the 
sense that it is free from prejudice and free from scientific, practical or self-interested 
concerns.138 
 Kant also had a conception of dependent beauty that resembled Hutcheson’s relative 
beauty. In §16 of The Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant wrote about ‘free’ and 
‘dependent’ beauty: 
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confusing art with life if art is not considered the paradigm aesthetic object.  
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There are two kinds of beauty, free beauty (pulchritude vaga) and merely 
accessory beauty pulchritude adhaerens). Free beauty does not presuppose a 
concept of what the object is [meant] to be. Accessory beauty does presuppose 
such a concept, as well as the object’s perfection in terms of that concept. The free 
kinds of beauty are called (self-subsistent) beauties of this or that thing. The other 
kind of beauty is accessory to a concept (i.e. it is conditioned beauty) and as such 
is attributed to objects that fall under the concept of a particular purpose.139 
 
Something possesses dependent beauty in proportion to its approximation to the 
standards of perfection for an object of that type. The faculty of taste is not required for 
judgments of dependent beauty, for which determinate concepts of ends and perfection 
suffice: we can judge a horse as a beautiful horse relative to the concept of a perfect 
horse, a particular butterfly relative to its species. In the case of free beauty, no such 
dependence on a concept is required. The scientist may view the beauty of a particular 
High Brown Fritillary butterfly as related to what he knows of the species in general or 
he might attend to its beauty. The first is a case of dependent beauty, the latter a case of 
free beauty.  
 A further element to take into consideration where nature is concerned is the 
objective purposiveness that Kant ascribes to it. He says that it “can rightly be called an 
analogue to art” in the sense that we ascribe beauty to it in relation to reflecting on it 
seeming to have been designed. By this, Kant means that nature is analogous to art 
because “inner natural perfection, as is possessed by those things that are possible only 
as natural ends and hence as organized beings, is not thinkable and explicable in 
accordance with any analogy to any physical, i.e., natural capacity that is known to us”. 
“Since we ourselves belong to nature”, and are hence not nature’s creator, the analogy 
with art is misleading. The thought is that we can perceive nature’s properties and 
conceive of them as “as if” they have been designed to please. In fact, this seeming 
intentionality can only be ascribed to nature itself and cannot be determined either by 
supernatural or, presumably, other causes, for these other causes would issue 
determinate concepts in order to make sense of the natural world aesthetically perceived, 
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problematic for Kant because aesthetic experience could not be governed by concepts.140 
This claim does not entail that we first need to have a concept of art but that we need 
Kant’s ‘as if’ concept of ‘purposiveness without purpose’, that the external world was 
created as if to delight.141 
 Despite the fact that the noumenal realm is beyond our grasp, and that the beauty we 
see in the world ought not to be determined by concepts, ought not to be rule driven, 
Kant writes that “we can and should be concerned to investigate nature, so far as it lies 
within our capacity, in experience, in its causal connection in accordance with merely 
mechanical laws […]”. However, judging the natural object’s form as dependent on 
those mechanical laws would entail closing off the possibility of “obtain[ing] even one 
experiential concept of the specific form of these natural things”.142 The point here is 
that on the one hand, we can be interested in nature’s teleology, but this is a distinct 
activity from attending to it aesthetically. However on Kant’s account artistic beauty 
based on the judgment of natural beauty, because “[a] beauty of nature is a beautiful 
thing; the beauty of art is the beautiful representation of a thing”.143 Nature is thus a 
more fundamental aesthetic object than art. 
 
 After Kant, there came another shift against the incorporation of nature into the 
aesthetic realm. While Descartes did not explicitly reject nature, although I’ve attributed 
such a rejection to him on the basis of the Compendium Musicae and his Meditations, 
Hegel was explicit in his rejection: 
By the above expression [aesthetics] we at once exclude the beauty of Nature. 
Such a limitation of our subject may appear to be an arbitrary demarcation, resting 
on the principle that every science has the prerogative of marking out its 
boundaries at pleasure. But this is not the sense in which we are to understand the 
limitation of Aesthetic to the beauty of art.[…] We may, however, begin at once 
by asserting that artistic beauty stands Higher than nature. For the beauty of art is 
the beauty that is born - born again, that is - of mind; and by as much as the mind 
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and its products are higher than nature and its appearances, by so much the beauty 
of art is higher than the beauty of nature. Indeed, if we look at it formally i.e. only 
considering in what way it exists, not what there is in it - even a silly fancy such as 
may pass through a man’s head is higher than any product of nature; for such a 
fancy must at least be characterized by intellectual being and by freedom. […] 
Mind, and mind only, is capable of truth, and comprehends in itself all that is, so 
that whatever is beautiful can only be really and truly beautiful as partaking in the 
higher element and as created thereby. In this sense the beauty of nature reveals 
itself as but a reflection of the beauty which belongs to the mind, as an imperfect, 
incomplete m ode of being. As a mode whose really substantial element is 
contained in the mind itself.144 
 
Hegel is concerned solely with the products of the human mind, imagination and 
expression which seemingly has aesthetic value and which are ranked higher than 
nature. And yet, there is no doubt in his mind that we speak as though nature does have 
aesthetic value, however reluctant he might be to attribute aesthetic value to it: 
It is true that in common life we are in the habit of speaking of beautiful colour, a 
beautiful sky, a beautiful river, and, moreover, of beautiful flowers, beautiful 
animals, and, above all, of beautiful human beings. We will not just now enter into 
the controversy of how far such objects can justly have the attribute of beauty 
ascribed to them, or how far, speaking generally, natural beauty ought to be 
recognized as existing besides beauty.145 
 
And yet, he provides no reason why art’s status as aesthetically valuable should be 
ranked any higher than nature. Hegel’s minimising of the possibility for nature to be the 
proper object of the highest form of aesthetic experience relates to his wider philosophy, 
his idealism, in which he, like Descartes, saw human rationality as the true provider of 
freedom and the material world as obeying the laws of reason. Any thought about what 
nature might be beyond the bounds of human experience or rationality could not make 
sense to Hegel because he was an idealist and therefore rejected Kant’s noumenal 
reality. Gardiner’s explanation for Hegel’s apparent rejection of nature was that, for 
Hegel, “we can not find our selves in what is objectively presented to us, the natural 
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world takes on the appearance of a ‘limitation’ or a ‘barrier’”.146 This did not tally with 
the freedom that Kant found in nature, the fact that it was unbound by rules. For Hegel, 
works of art were activities of the “spirit”, expressions of truth and had an ‘indisputably 
cognitive dimension”.147 148 
 Hegel was attempting to provide an account of the necessary historicity of works of 
art and some contemporary writers argue that he in fact aimed to ‘re-enchant’ nature.149 
Whatever we think about Hegel’s metaphysics, his thoughts about the necessary 
historicity of the human experience of nature, or his alleged efforts to re-enchant nature, 
it is worthwhile for Hegel to attempt to make sense of why it is “that in common life we 
are in the habit of speaking of beautiful flowers, beautiful animals, and beautiful human 
beings”.  
 One way of doing this would be to go back and appeal to Descartes’ rationalism. As 
we saw above, Descartes attempted to explain beauty by demonstrating its mathematical 
integrity and proportionality. However, this then raises the question of whether 
understanding a mathematical explanation provides an account or characterization of the 
very beauty perceived. Understanding the underlying mathematical equation for an 
object’s being beautiful, formal, or proportional does not necessarily entail perceiving or 
experiencing beauty, for the latter implies something about subjective sensibility to an 
object, rather than the mind’s ability to understand the object or its secondary features. A 
person might experience beauty knowing nothing about underlying mathematical 
explanations. We can experience proportionality without recognising that that is what 
we’re experiencing and without understanding the mathematical functions that can 
explain it. While this might be enough for a rationalist like Descartes that it is just the 
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proportionality that explains or justifies our aesthetic response does not warrant that 
other potential features of the experience are irrelevant. 
 Another way to make sense of why it is we speak of beauty in nature, as Hegel wrote, 
is by appealing to how eighteenth century philosophers articulated the ‘subjective’ turn 
that predates Hegel’s view. Both the external senses and the existence of external, 
material, objects, are central to these theories. Because the concept of taste was central, 
and taste was an internal sense, it was not automatically or primarily applied to art. At 
this time, nature was the original source of aesthetic response because it was the source 
of external objects, their causes and their qualities. The concept of taste facilitated the 
articulation of the sensations we feel when we come across objects and their properties. 
Nature’s centrality did not mean art was not accepted as an aesthetic object, but that art 
was secondary because it did not hold the same importance in terms of providing an 
explanation for the existence or essence of objects in the world that surrounds us. Nature 
provided the objects and materials used in artistic practice and could provide the route to 
understanding the cause of things. 
 This section and the previous section end in accounts that turn away from the external 
world, and hence nature, for different reasons. The subjective turn that followed 
Descartes’ extreme scepticism entailed an interest that turned inwardly, and that wished 
to provide mathematical justifications for aesthetic response. Hegel, who rejected Kant’s 
noumenal world, thought that the human spirit could provide the most sophisticated 
articulation of aesthetic expression, and therefore pushed art into the foreground. The 
third section below will address how more contemporary philosophers have reopened 
subjective, aesthetic, experience to nature, as well as some complexities to do with the 
residual effects that ‘disinterest’ and ‘formalism’ have had not only in the genealogy of 
art history, but in the neglect of nature. 
 
§ Beyond Art: the Return of Nature 
 
  Since Hutcheson and Kant, much progress has been made in the aesthetics of nature. 
This is primarily due to Hepburn, who refocused attention on nature with his influential 
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essay ‘Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Nature’.150 It is also due, however, 
to more recent, vibrant contributions made by Brady, who offers an approach that 
integrates subject and object in nature appreciation; to Budd, who argues for a ‘nature as 
nature’ approach; to Carlson, who offers a cognitivist, science-based approach to nature 
appreciation; and to Carroll, who puts forward the arousal theory of nature 
appreciation.151 
 Before delving into these respective, contemporary approaches to the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature, we will first turn to an issue that is of significance to the wider 
argument being put forward here, and that has been addressed in a discussion between 
Carroll and Shelley touched on in chapter two.152 It is about the historical status of 
‘disinterest’ and ‘formalism’ that have been mischaracterised, but whose 
mischaracterisation has had, directly and indirectly, a residual influence on both the 
aesthetics of nature and the philosophy of art. We will, by the end of the section, see 
how Sibley and Levinson can help provide an account of aesthetic experience that can 
help accommodate Carroll’s criticism of aesthetic experience. 
 In “Beauty and the Genealogy of Art History”, Carroll argues that art has been 
subsumed into the concept of the aesthetic, an aesthetic inspired by Hutcheson, Kant 
(and later Bell and Beardsley) due to the residual influence of certain historical concepts 
like ‘beauty’, ‘aesthetic perception’, ‘disinterest’ and ‘formalism’. This focus on the 
aesthetic, perceptual features of aesthetic experience, and therefore of art, has 
unfortunately resulted in other, epistemic, features (notably contextual, historical, moral 
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and political features of art), being excised from experiences of art. The residual 
influence of concepts related to the aesthetic echoes in the genealogy of art history, the 
argument goes, and causes confusion, because the aesthetic in art is pursued at the 
expense of artistic intention, art history, morality and politics and, presumably, non-
perceptual art. Part of the reason for this is that the historical concepts mentioned above 
are based on nature, since for Hutcheson and Kant, nature was the paradigm of aesthetic 
experience and since the idea of the aesthetic originates in their writings. 
 In ‘Aesthetics and the World at Large’, Shelley goes some way to showing Carroll’s 
interpretation of Hutcheson’s aesthetics as misplaced. Shelley writes that Hutcheson’s 
aesthetics did not reject the idea of reflexivity or cognitive elements, even where nature 
was concerned. As, as we saw in the chapter two, and section two above, there was, 
rather, a complex relationship between sensible, perceptible properties, such as beauty, 
and the knowledge we have internalised. Just as the concept of ‘disinterest’ resisted 
Hobbesian conceptions of egoism and self-interest, both Hutcheson’s and Kant’s 
aesthetics rejected rule-governed approaches to aesthetics such as those that we saw in 
Descartes’ philosophy, for example. Beauty, both according to Hutcheson and according 
to Kant did not arise as a conclusion to rational deliberation, but, as Shelley writes “a 
sensation that strikes us at first”, whereby “you need not be schooled in principles, 
proportions, or causes in order properly to judge the beauty of things”.153 
 Despite these objections to Carroll’s argument, there are reasons to sympathise, as 
Shelley himself does, with Carroll’s concern that aestheticians (analytic or not), have 
“laboured under the crippling prejudices of theories they take themselves to have 
abandoned”.154 We might suggest that these crippling prejudices have not only affected 
aesthetics, the philosophy of art, and art itself, but have contributed to trivialising the 
importance of nature in aesthetics, as Hepburn came to argue.155 Of course, there is an 
interesting overlap between nature, the practice of art, the aesthetics of nature and the 
aesthetics of art, and there has been a resurgence of interest in the aesthetics of nature. 
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However, it is worthwhile to try making sense of why it is that nature was itself 
sidelined by a narrow form of aesthetics that Carroll repudiates in the philosophy of art 
and that forms part of the crippling prejudices under which some aestheticians labour.  
 Carroll’s repudiation of aesthetic experience narrowly construed, however, should not 
be based on the idea that aesthetics as a discipline was built upon nature as the paradigm 
object of aesthetic experience, but on a misunderstanding of disinterest, as addressed in 
chapter two, and the austere accounts of formalism that have been posited by some 
aestheticians, as we will see in chapter five. Carroll also suggests that the concept of 
beauty as conceived by Hutcheson and Kant has loomed large in the analytic tradition, 
but this is simply not true if we consider, for example, the influence that Sibley has had 
in analytic aesthetics, by having opened up the category of the aesthetic, as we will see 
below. It is important to contest the claims that Carroll makes about nature, disinterest 
and form and beauty, because this contributes to the idea that nature is not as important 
as art and because it could be seen as undermining the claim that aesthetics as a 
discipline is grounded in perception. 
 Because the aesthetic, at least according to Hutcheson, Kant and later Sibley, is non-
condition governed, and because we do have experiences of beauty (and other aesthetic 
properties), there must be another way to explain beauty as well as other aesthetic 
properties. It is for this reason, presumably, that the Greeks thought of them as 
perceptual properties, as the original definition of aesthetics suggests, as do more 
contemporary aestheticians, like Brady, Gould, Levinson, Sibley, and others too. 
Aesthetic properties might be thought of as Locke’s secondary properties, in that they 
originate both in the object and the subject in question. In chapter six we will explore 
this idea more fully. However, suggesting that perceptual and phenomenal grounds 
constitute an aesthetic experience does not mean that what we know about the object of 
experience or about our subjective response to it is completely irrelevant to the overall 
experience. In order for it be aesthetic, the experience should at least be grounded in 
such perceptual features. 
 Disinterest, as characterised in chapter two and section two of this chapter above, 
means precisely that we are in “rapt absorption”, it means that the object is of some 
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importance, because it is the thing of which we are having an experience and it means 
that a person is of importance to the aesthetic experience too because her physical 
presence and capacity for experience enable her to experience the object aesthetically. 
This does not mean, contra Bell and Carroll, that disinterested aesthetic experience 
collapses into the kind of detachment or austere formalism aspired to by Bell, where “we 
need to know nothing whatever about the artist”, “when things were made”, or “why 
they were made”.156 It just means that we attend to the object of aesthetic interest in its 
entirety (and not just to its formal properties), that its perceivable features are central to 
the idea that our experience of it can be aesthetic.  
 It is interesting to note that Carroll’s arguments against defining art aesthetically are 
similar to those provided by philosophers who deny nature’s place in aesthetics, as we 
will see in chapter four: one such argument, for example, is a worry about confusing art 
with life, as Wollheim suggested, or aesthetic and non-aesthetic, as Sibley suggested. 
Now that we have lamented, alongside Carroll, the residual effects of formalism and 
(misconstrued) notions of disinterest, and, with Shelley’s help, countered some of 
Carroll’s claims about disinterest in particular, I also briefly want to make a point about 
Sibley’s contribution to the opening up and diversifying the category of aesthetic terms 
to include terms other than beauty, the sublime, and picturesque, and to include terms 
related to art, which is another historical, tacit influence in contemporary aesthetics, 
according to Carroll. Sibley writes:  
Aesthetic terms span a great range of types and could be grouped into various 
kinds of subspecies. […] Their most endless variety is adequately displayed in the 
following list: unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, sombre, dynamic, 
powerful, vivid, delicate, moving, trite, sentimental, tragic. The list is not limited 
to adjectives; expressions in artistic contexts like telling contrast, sets up a tension, 
conveys a sense of, or holds together are equally good illustrations.157  
 
While it may be that beauty figured large in analytic (and non-analytic) aesthetics, there’s 
also a case for saying that thanks to Sibley, analytic aesthetics has been opened up to a 
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great range of terms and concepts, many of which apply both to the ‘world at large’ as 
well as ‘art’.  
Sibley was interested in pinning down an argument for a sui generis class of aesthetic 
concepts, which, contra Carroll shows an active interest in aesthetic properties other than 
beauty, but which are nonetheless perceptual properties. On Sibley’s account, what was 
important to aesthetics was the having of perceptual, aesthetic experiences, and how those 
could be distinguished from non-aesthetic experiences, as we will see in chapter four 
below. Sibley was also interested in expanding the range of aesthetic subject matter 
beyond art such that nature and smells could be incorporated in the realm of the aesthetic 
and so that a diversity of rich aesthetic experiences of non-art, nature, could be accounted 
for too. This does not mean, as we might infer from a Carrollian view of the matter, that 
other features do not matter, but that it is important to be clear about and scrutinise what 
it is that is of aesthetic interest. 
It is important to Sibley’s argument, therefore, that experiencing objects perceptually 
is crucial to having aesthetic experiences. It is what aesthetics is about, though not in the 
sense that the object’s non-aesthetic features, such as Cartesian mathematical properties, 
will provide conditions for the application of an aesthetic concept, but in the sense that 
they provide the aesthetic qualities that give their correlating concepts structure. By 
saying that aesthetic concepts are “non-condition governed” or, not involving reason or 
rational support, Sibley seems rather to be indicating the importance of perceiving the 
aesthetic object’s features, rather than projections or constructions of aesthetic concepts. 
This takes me to another claim that Sibley may have contested, but is one that will 
fully be developed in chapter six. It gives credence to the importance of perceptual 
features in both our experiences of both nature and art. The thought is that in saying that 
aesthetic concepts are non-condition governed, there is something to which we refer 
when we judge an object aesthetically and that something is an ‘appearance property’ as 
notably argued by Levinson.158 It may be tempting to think that such a perceptual, 
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aesthetic account does not fully do justice to either our aesthetic experiences of art or our 
aesthetic experiences of nature because it does not capture those elements Carroll wishes 
to include.  
On the other hand, perceiving aesthetically, according to Sibley, is the perceiving of 
the richness of aesthetic features that are (probably) afforded by the object. There’s no 
mysterious leap from the non-aesthetic, that is, knowing the historical, political, moral (or 
other non-perceivable) status of the art object or natural object to the aesthetic, as per 
Hutcheson and Kant, you either see the object’s aesthetic features or you don’t. There 
seems to me to be a claim to realism, although Sibley himself resists making it. 
Furthermore, that cultural, historical, political, moral (or other non-perceivable) 
influences may be at play in the immediacy of perceptual experience can be borne out 
and addressed through critical discourse according to Sibley. 
 
 To sum up, and before moving onto the aesthetics of nature within the contemporary 
debate, I began with Carroll’s discussion of the residual influence of the idea of the 
aesthetic and beauty on the philosophy of art. This allowed me, following Shelley, to 
argue that, while it might be thought that the idea of the aesthetic has had a pernicious 
influence on the philosophy of art, it need not have done. The idea of the aesthetic, and 
related concepts, have themselves been misconstrued to adopt a meaning that can also be 
said to have been detrimental to the aesthetic appreciation of nature. It also allowed me 
to introduce Sibley, who opened up the category of the aesthetic to a rich variety of 
aesthetic concepts and perceivable aesthetic properties. 
 The fault line between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic is not equivalent to the fault-
line that distinguishes whether an object is a work of art or not.159 It is rather, as 
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suggested by Hutcheson, Kant and Sibley and as we will explore more fully in chapter 
six, a matter of perceiving aesthetic properties that emerge from, but are not reducible to, 
the non-aesthetic properties that constitute them. All this having been said, I now turn to 
contemporary approaches to the aesthetics of nature. 
 
 If anything, and despite not having the kind of intentionality behind its appearance 
that art does, history, politics or morality in the same sense that they are attributable to 
art, nature provides us, as argued by Hepburn and Brady, with a richness of perceptual, 
by which I mean multi-sensual and multi-perspectival, expressive, emotive and 
imaginative resources for aesthetic experience. Not only this, but the imaginative aspect 
that we can associate with it, as both Hepburn and Brady have also argued, reveals a 
sometimes simple but nevertheless profound engagement with nature, one in which we 
recognise our own existence relative to it, and its existence relative to us. The 
imagination is important because part of the definition of imagination is that it is not 
rule- or epistemically-governed. 
 Hepburn’s essay on the neglect of nature was first concerned with bringing nature 
back into aesthetic, philosophical discourse, by characterizing the experience of nature, 
and distinguishing it from our experiences of art.160 This is important given complaints 
about an overly-narrow conception of aesthetic experience as argued by Carroll, and one 
that, as we will see in chapter four below, helped to push nature out of the realm of the 
aesthetic. Hepburn advocated an aesthetic that centred on the perceptual, but also one 
that attended to the object of experience as well as its effect on the subject: 
The object is also the centre of, and is the occasion of, many possible lines of 
reflection or movements of the mind, transformations of perception, attitudes and 
feelings that might affect a person’s life and modify the quality of his experience 
long after he has ceased to contemplate the particular object itself. No doubt, some 
trains of reflection prompted by works of art or contemplated natural objects can 
be aesthetically irrelevant, idiotic, syncractic, fortuitous. But others can be highly 
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relevant, part of what makes the object worth contemplating, part of what gives 
seriousness to the aesthetic dimension of human life.161 
 
 He thought that we typically experience nature both as subjects and as engaged in an 
activity, such as taking a walk; the natural object is not demarcated by a frame or a 
plinth, but is part of the environment and most often engages multiple senses; the formal 
qualities of shape, colour, pattern and movement may be taken into consideration, but do 
not exhaust the aesthetic experience of nature; the imagination comes into play in an 
attempt to process what forces might be responsible for the natural object or 
phenomenon. Our aesthetic experiences of nature are singular and particular to a 
moment that has not been intended by an artist, but that nevertheless offers vast, ever-
changing possibilities. Nature has a vast potential for the aesthetic with complex inter-
connections to be made between it and our experience of it. 
 Like Hepburn, Berleant pursues the idea that nature provides a rich and meaningful 
resource for aesthetic experience and has argued for aesthetic experience to be an active, 
engaged immersion in the natural world.162 Berleant’s view dismisses some of the 
traditional concepts related to aesthetics. First among those is ‘disinterest’. Like Carroll 
he thinks it an overly narrow approach to aesthetics more generally, but especially to the 
aesthetics of nature. This is because he thinks that ‘disinterest’ abstracts and objectifies 
what we see, and does not allow for the multi-perspectival, multi-sensual, fully 
immersive experience that we have of nature. His environmental aesthetics explore the 
values that we associate with the environment, the everyday and the their transformative 
possibilities.163  
 For reasons that we saw above I do not think that disinterest is incompatible with an 
immersive view of aesthetic experience. This is why Brady’s ‘integrated aesthetic’ is an 
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attractive approach to the aesthetics of nature. It grounds multi-sensuous engagement, 
imagination, emotion and knowledge in the concept of disinterest.164 As we saw in the 
last chapter, historically, the concept of disinterest, according to Hutcheson, Hume and 
Shaftesbury, resisted the idea of self-interest and, according to Kant, celebrated the idea 
that “our duty with regard to beautiful things is exhausted in our judging them 
aesthetically to be beautiful”, meaning it is “merely contemplative”.165 This 
contemplation is in keeping with multi-sensuous engagement, imagination, emotion and 
knowledge insofar as concepts and rules do not govern the experience.  
 Although most aesthetic philosophies of nature acknowledge the complex inter-
relationship between nature and art, and also acknowledge that we may sometimes look 
at nature through the artistic styles, most think that the aesthetic experience of nature is 
distinctive of the aesthetic experience of art. However, some philosophers, namely 
Davies, Savile and Wollheim, argue that aesthetically appreciating nature requires 
adopting an aesthetic attitude as though nature were art.166 This sort of view is normally 
stated as part of an aesthetic theory that sees art as its paradigm object. It is not about the 
aesthetics of nature as such, but about the aesthetics of art, and will be addressed in 
chapter four. 
 There are, however, views in the aesthetics of nature that argue that nature should be 
seen as ‘nature’ and not as ‘art’, which do not deny that we can perceive aesthetic 
properties in nature and that these relate primarily to nature. The experience states that 
we should be true to what nature actually is, that is, not art. It further states that trying to 
discover any underlying, philosophical, aesthetic, theory to explain our aesthetic 
experiences of nature are tantamount to a ‘chimerical quest’.167 The idea here is that 
nature affords us freedom that art cannot and does not provide. According to Budd, we 
are free from the limitations of art, from its frames and conventions and we are free from 
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the manner in which we appreciate art: we are not constrained by Walton’s ‘categories 
of art’, the idea that we need to know about art and how it is categorised to be able to 
make correct aesthetic judgments about it.168 “Freedom”, according to this view, “is 
integral” to the appreciation of nature.169 
 Budd’s main target in this regard is the scientific, cognitive, positive model of 
aesthetic appreciation. Here we can find support for the thought that nature is a proper 
objects of aesthetic experience to be experienced in a different way to that in which we 
experience art, for example in the way we traverse landscapes, use our senses, and the 
differences perspectives we adopt in relation to it. The origins of the cognitive model 
arose out of Carlson’s adoption of Walton’s categories. Just as Walton argues that the 
aesthetic properties that an artwork possesses are a manifestation of the category to 
which it belongs, for Carlson, the aesthetic properties of natural objects have correct 
categories to which they belong.170 The idea here is that we can appeal to biological or 
scientific theories to ensure correctness of aesthetic judgments made about natural 
objects. The companion thought to this argument is that nature is essentially 
aesthetically good, positive. The difficulty with this view will be explored in detail in 
chapters five and six, but it may be worth mentioning that it is difficult to establish the 
correct scientific categories on which to base our aesthetic responses to nature, for they 
are not necessarily settled. Even if they were settled, there’s a question that centres on 
whether nature is idealised in a sense that is not necessarily in keeping with negative 
human responses to it, such as disgust or fear. Finally, there’s the issue of whether a 
‘categories’ approach to nature can really work, for nature’s aesthetic properties change 
over time, we have no frames to bound it, no correct or incorrect perspective from which 
to view it, nor do we have artistic intentionality or history to keep our experiences “in 
check”. 
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 Finally, another contemporary approach to the aesthetics of nature is one Carlson and 
Parsons have called new formalism, which we will address at length below.171 
Formalism, as we have seen, is the view that the perceivable qualities of shape, pattern 
and design are of aesthetic value. Both moderate and extreme formalism have been 
argued by Zangwill to apply to nature: the former, to organic nature and the latter to 
inorganic nature. The difference between them is the extent to which non-aesthetic, non-
perceivable properties, or reference to history or context, are required for aesthetically 
experiencing them.172 In both cases, perceivable, aesthetic properties are required, but in 
the case of inorganic nature, non-perceivable properties are not required.  Both, 
however, seem to require an abstraction of what is seen into formal properties rather 




 This chapter has aimed to show that there are historical, philosophical reasons for 
arguing that nature is a paradigm in aesthetics. While the ancients did not have a neatly 
delineated discipline of aesthetics, nature featured as an object of mimetic practice, 
which indicates an interest in nature that did not feature so prevalently later, for example 
in eighteenth century French theatre. In medieval times nature was a rich resource for 
symbols, such as the stag’s representing love in Guigemar. In ancient and medieval 
times beauty was found in the natural world, and the natural world provided resources 
for contextualising human experience. Mimetic practice itself was considered 
representation of the ‘world at large’. Hutcheson and Kant, too, thought nature to be 
central to aesthetic enquiries, holding it up as a paradigm, a rich resource that matched 
the mind’s capacity for experiencing it. Problematic for nature were rationalist views, 
such as Descartes’, that aimed to show that the experience of beauty was the result of 
understanding the underlying mathematical structures and proportionalities. Also 
                                                
171 Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, "New Formalism and the Aesthetic Appreciation 
of Nature," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62, no. 4 (2004). 
172 Nick Zangwill, The Metaphysics of Beauty (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2001). 
 97 
problematic for nature was Hegel’s thought that because art was the highest 
manifestation of human creativity, nature should not figure in an analysis of aesthetics. 
These negative arguments worked against nature being included in the aesthetic domain 
and combined with an overly narrow interpretation of certain Hutchesonian and Kantian 
concepts, such as ‘disinterest’ and ‘form’ that pushed aesthetics toward a rarefied form 
of aesthetic objects: Modern art. Despite these negative arguments, the aesthetics of 
nature has developed into a vibrant field, one that has difficulties, difficulties that will be 
addressed in the coming chapters.  
 The chapter’s role in the thesis has been to provide historical precedence for nature’s 
importance as a paradigm in aesthetic experience and the historical reasons its role as an 
aesthetic paradigm has been downplayed. This helps set up the framework for arguing 
that nature is at least as rich and engaging an aesthetic object as art, if for different 
reasons. In chapter four I bring this debate up to date, by looking at reasons why our 
aesthetic experiences of nature were thought to be beyond the bounds of explanation, 
despite the expressive properties that we attribute to it. 
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 In his paper “Art or Nature?”, Diffey’s first sentence is “I begin by asking a big 
cloudy question, namely, which is aesthetically prior, art or nature?”.173 The question 
about the priority of art or nature is not so much the aim here as showing, at least in one 
strand of the argument, that nature is at least as important a paradigm of the aesthetic as 
is art.  Nevertheless the question brings with it difficulties, such as, how do we define 
the ‘aesthetic’, and how does it relate to the objects of art or nature? If we can begin to 
provide answers to these questions, we may well also make inroads into why “the issue 
[Diffey’s question] seeks to address is not concealed far below the surface of 
contemporary aesthetics”.174 Diffey’s argument is really an argument for an aesthetics-
first view, taking seriously the idea that the aesthetic is a sui generis category of 
experience that ranges both over nature and art. I agree with Diffey, but will take a 
different direction in this chapter, from the direction he takes. I intend to show how it 
could be true that nature is as important, if not more important, than art, bearing in mind 
the kind of perceptual account of the aesthetic that I will develop in the final chapters 
below. 
 The chapter builds on the historical discussions that have preceded it, by 
complementing the interpretation of ‘disinterest’ as defended by Shelley and the 
historical arguments that have contributed both to the idea that nature is the paradigm of 
aesthetic experience and to the idea that art is the paradigm of aesthetic experience. I do 
this first by laying out the reasons for why art has been seen as being the best 
exemplification of the aesthetic. The idea was addressed by Hegel, Bell, Wollheim, and 
Savile and is premised on the idea that because nature lacks the kind of intentionality 
that is behind art, it doesn’t offer the kind of significance we might attribute to art, and is 
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therefore less significant. The main problem with this view is that it obfuscates the 
aesthetic significance of our experiences of nature and its pertinence to how we relate to 
nature, to our own thoughts and feelings. More important than this, however, is the 
existential claim that is being made: art would not exist without humans and humans 
would not exist without nature. Moreover, nature offers an exploration for the structure 
of our own mental states, as we will see below. 
Section two builds on the historical material I considered in the first three chapters 
and shows that nature is a rich resource for aesthetic experience and that many of the 
assumptions that are made by aestheticians who support art as the most significant 
paradigm of the aesthetic. Such assumptions include, for example, that an aesthetic 
experience can only occur when “the concepts in the mind of the artist are met by the 
concepts in the mind of the spectator”, and that we might confuse art with life if art is 
not considered the paradigm of the aesthetic, or that we can look upon nature as 
purposively having been designed.175 In section three, I will show that nature is a 
meaningful object of aesthetic experience by making sense of the emotive properties that 
are used in our experiences of it, such as the following examples, taken from Howarth: 
“The angry sea rages, thunders, is turbulent, frenzied, destructive, forceful, sashes 
against the cliffs” and “[t]he cheerful brook moves much as a cheerful person might: it 
babbles and plays, pauses awhile, ruses on, darts, has a quick, light movement.” As she 
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§ Art and the Aesthetic 
 
It has been assumed and argued by Davies, Savile and Wollheim, following Hegel, 
that it is art that best instantiates and exemplifies the aesthetic. If art is the source and 
provider of experiences deemed to be paradigmatically aesthetic, an appeal to the 
concept of art is necessary for aesthetic experience more broadly conceived, including 
the aesthetic experience of nature and the everyday. Appealing to the concept of art is 
necessary because art is the best instantiation of the aesthetic. It is the best instantiation 
of the aesthetic because its very purpose is to be aesthetic: another human mind has 
intended it to be an aesthetic object. According to this view, presumably, it is unclear 
that nature is intended to be aesthetic. Moreover, even though we do have aesthetic 
experiences of nature, our aesthetic experiences of nature are contingent on the one hand 
because of its indeterminacy, and on the other hand, because the subject’s experience of 
it is accidental. It is not a pre-requisite of our experience of nature that it should be 
aesthetic in the same way as it would be with most artworks. 
On this account, the aesthetic is tightly linked with art, because art demarcates the 
range of objects that can properly be called aesthetic. One of the important features of 
the argument is that human freedom and intentionality lie behind the creation of works 
of art. The concept of art encompasses a range of objects that involve the expression or 
application of human creative skill, imagination and ideas. It incorporates the notion that 
an artwork is a creative work, a perceivable object, involving human creative 
intentionality insofar as it requires decisions about how the artwork will be and appear.  
As we saw in chapter three, Hegel explicitly excluded the beauty of nature from 
aesthetics because he thought of art as the highest expression of the human mind as the 
highest expression of nature. Nature’s beauty existed relative to the human mind. 
Natural beauty was to be explored through scientific practice, but the real and proper 
interest of aesthetics was art.177 Following on from this the early formalists, Bell and 
Fry, also argued that although there is form in nature the beauty of nature is not a 
question for aesthetics. According to them, the beauty of nature is not a form to which 
                                                
177 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. 3-4. 
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we can attach significance in the sense that we might attribute significance to forms in 
art. The reason for this was, they argued, that human intentionality is not behind nature’s 
aesthetic form.178 Bell’s definition of ‘Significant Form’ was that it is a “quality shared 
by all objects that provoke our aesthetic emotions” and that in each object “lines and 
colours combined in a particular way” that “certain forms and relations of forms, stir our 
aesthetic emotions”.179 Significant form was an emotion Bell thought could only be 
evoked by valuable works of art but rarely by nature: 
Everyone, I suspect, has called a butterfly or a flower beautiful. Does anyone feel 
the same kind of emotion for a butterfly or a flower that he feels for a cathedral or 
a picture; surely, it is not what I call an aesthetic emotion that most of us feel, 
generally, for natural beauty? I shall suggest […] that some people may, 
occasionally, see in nature what we see in art, and feel for her an aesthetic 
emotion; but I am satisfied that, as a rule, most people feel a very different kind of 
emotion for birds and flowers and the wings of butterflies from that which they 
feel for pictures, pots, temples and statues. Why these beautiful things do not move 
us as works of art move us is another, and not an aesthetic, question. Nature does 
not have significant form and art does. Because nature does not have significant 
form, we cannot experience it aesthetically.180 
 
Bell’s formalism might make it sound as though intentionality does not matter, but he 
clearly states that whatever it is that moves us in nature is not an aesthetic emotion. Fry 
helps provide an explanation for the thought that the lack of intentionality matters in 
aesthetic experience by attributing a “creator” to nature: 
I have admitted that there is beauty in Nature, that is to say, that certain objects 
constantly do, and perhaps any object may, compel us to regard it with that intense 
disinterested contemplation that belongs to the imaginative life, and which is 
impossible to the actual life of necessity and action; but that in objects created to 
arouse the aesthetic feeling we have an added consciousness of purpose on the part 
of the creator, that he made it on purpose not to be used but to be regarded and 
enjoyed; and that this feeling is characteristic of the aesthetic judgement proper.181  
 
                                                
178 Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto and Windus, 1928). Roger Fry, "An Essay in 
Aesthetics," in Vision and Design, ed. Roger Fry (London: Chatto & Windus, 1920). 
179 Bell, Art. 8. 
180 Ibid. 12-13. 
181 Fry, "An Essay in Aesthetics." 38. 
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Bell and Fry followed Hegel’s view that when responding to, or experiencing nature, we 
do not attribute intentionality behind the beauty that we see, unless of course, we believe 
in God as the creator of all things. In the case of art, because the artist is behind the 
creation of an artwork, we can gain essential, and essentially human, meaning, from the 
artwork. 
 
A more demanding view comes from Wollheim who wrote that the artist has 
produced an artwork for the contemplation of the perceiver who brings with her a 
“matching correspondence between the concept in the mind of the spectator and concept 
in the mind of the artist”.182 
Wollheim also thought that art was the primary source for aesthetic experience. The 
aesthetic attitude is created based on the experience of art, and the intending subject, and 
only thereafter extends to other objects, including nature. Nature, on his view, is only 
contingently and unpredictably aesthetic. Once we have aesthetic experiences of art we 
can properly have aesthetic experiences of nature, but only in virtue of being able to 
draw on the concept of art and our experience of it:  
For the central case, which must be our starting point, is where what we regarded 
as a work of art has in point of fact also been produced as a work of art. […] This, 
of course, is not to deny that we can regard objects that have not been made as 
works of art, or for that matter pieces of nature that have not been made at all, as 
though they had been: we can treat them as works of art. For once the aesthetic 
attitude has been established on the basis of objects produced under the concept of 
art, we can then extend it beyond this base: in much the same way as, having 
established the concept of person on the basis of human beings, we may then, in 
fables or children’s stories, come to apply it to animals or even to trees and rocks, 
and talk of them as though they could think and feel. [W]hen the Impressionists 
tried to teach us to look at paintings as though we were looking at nature – a 
painting for Monet was une fenêtre ouverte sur la nature, this was because they 
themselves had first looked at nature in a way they had learnt from looking at 
paintings.183  
 
                                                
182 Wollheim, Art and Its Objects.113. 
183 Ibid. 112. This point is also made by Stephen Davies, who writes: “an aesthetic 
response to artworks is primary and … an aesthetic response to nature is derivative.” 
Davies, Definitions of Art. 193. 
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Wollheim’s concern was that art could be trivialised as superfluous. Art was made by 
Kant to be dependent on life and, secondly, could therefore be trivialized as superfluous. 
Kant’s aesthetics was premised on the idea that both pure aesthetic experience and 
artistic expertise come from nature. Wollheim, on the other hand, was really concerned 
with art’s psychological importance. 184 If we don’t know the difference between ‘art’ 
and ‘life’, we have no means of truly being able to ascertain the difference between the 
aesthetic and the non-aesthetic.185 Not only that, we fail to acknowledge the value of an 
artwork as more than just a combination of “bare constituents”. Wollheim seems to have 
based his idea of the aesthetic attitude on an interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics that I 
rejected in chapter two, an interpretation that assumes the preclusion of being able to 
delve into the human meaning, expression and intentionality that lie behind the 
artwork’s constituents and make it meaningful. In the case of art, according to 
Wollheim, the aesthetic is not contingent as it is in nature: 
For when we listen to the bird songs in Wagner, even in Messiaen, we are not 
simply reduplicating the experiences that we might have in the woods or fields. In 
                                                
184 I go along with the generally view that Kant thought nature to be more fundamental 
to experiences of the aesthetic than art. However, there is a debate about whether Kant 
thought nature was prior to art. In the Critique of the Power Judgment, Kant restricts his 
examples primarily to nature, thinking nature a purer manifestation of the aesthetic, that 
provides an immediate, intellectual and moral interest in the beautiful: “Now I gladly 
concede that the interest in the beautiful in art […] provides no proof of a way of 
thinking that is devoted to the morally good or even merely inclined to it. By contrast, 
however, I do assert that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature […] is 
always a mark of a good soul, and that if the interest is habitual, it at least indicates a 
disposition of the mind that is favourable to the moral feeling, if it is gladly combined 
with the viewing of nature.” Or “This pre-eminence of the beauty of nature over the 
beauty of art in alone awakening an immediate interest, even if the former were to be 
surpassed by the latter in respect of form, is in agreement with the refined and well-
founded thinking of all human beings who have cultivated their moral feeling”. Kant, 
The Critique of the Power of Judgment. §42, 178-179. Guyer, for example, has written a 
paper in which he argues that “Kant’s own theory of art and our response to it actually 
allows beauties of art to have just as much claim to this intellectual interest as do objects 
of natural beauty.” Paul Guyer, "Interest, Nature, and Art: A Problem in Kant's 
Aesthetics," The Review of Metaphysics:  a Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 4 (1978). 
581-582. 
185 This is not dissimilar to Plato’s concerns and issues that arise from artistic 
‘Happenings’ as discussed in chapter one. 
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the aesthetic situation it is no mere contingency, as it is in nature, that we hear 
what we do.186 
 
On the other hand, according to Wollheim, it would be rather “absurd” to attempt to 
show concern “by concentrating on the action of the yokel who rushed up on the stage to 
save the life of Desdemona”.187 I take it that, by this, Wollheim means that it would be 
absurd to act like the yokel, that he has made a mistake, and that his actions are not in 
keeping with maintaining an aesthetic attitude. If non-art were the paradigm of aesthetic 
experience, we would end up in absurd situations where our responses to art could be 
responses to ordinary experiences, such as racing up on the theatre stage to save a 
character in a play from their tragic fate. 
 Savile gives a more precise articulation for the view that our experiences of nature are 
art-like aesthetic experiences, by relying on Kant’s ‘as if’ ‘purposiveness without 
purpose’. Nature, following Savile’s argument, should be seen as if it were art, as if an 
artist had created it: 
The natural object is not one that comes into existence in God’s studio as the 
construction of something answering to a problem posed within aesthetic 
constraints, but none the less it is perfectly possible for us to view it in that light.188  
 
Kant’s purposiveness without purpose is the thought that nature looks to us as if it were 
designed to appeal to our aesthetic sensibilities without our being certain about what the 
purpose entails. However, Savile takes this idea one step further by arguing that if nature 
looks as if it were designed to please, it looks as if we have a solution to a creative 
problem. If it looks like a solution to a creative problem, it ought to evoke the correct 
and appropriate response in us. Savile asserts that the difficulty with this is that a natural 
object will always look beautiful qua some artistic style or other. The solution to this 
                                                
186 Wollheim, Art and Its Objects. 118. This is an interesting contrast with the quotation 
I used from Kant in chapter three: “Even the song of a bird, which we cannot bring 
under any musical rules, seems to contain more freedom and thus more that is 
entertaining for taste than even a human song that is performed in accordance with all 
the rules of the art of music: for one grows tired of the latter far more quickly if it is 
repeated often and for a long time. Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment. 126. 
187 Wollheim, Art and Its Objects. 114. 
188 Savile, The Test of Time. 176. 
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dilemma, he proposes, is that the subject can freely choose a style relative to the natural 
object and ascertain whether a description of that natural object fits into the artistic style 
chosen. Rather than turning away from nature, Savile uses this artistic-aesthetic-
experience account of nature not only to unify the objects of aesthetic experience under 
a general rubric that provides a unified account of our aesthetic experiences of art and 
nature, but also to give an account for our love of nature and our desire to be and feel 
integrated within it. The difference between Savile’s interpretation of Kant’s ‘as if’ 
principle and my own is that I don’t think Kant is making the further claim that a natural 
object ought to fit into some artistic style, just that it seems to have been designed to 
appeal to us aesthetically, and as a natural object. We will return to this idea in my 
discussion of whole formalism in chapter six.  
To sum up, then, the arguments for denying nature its place in aesthetics are 
principally due to viewing human creativity as the most sophisticated expression of 
aesthetics, that a meeting of minds occurs between the artist and the subject 
experiencing her work, that we would otherwise end up in the situation of not being able 
to tell the difference between art and life (and therefore fail to value art accordingly) and 
that because we have no access to the real purpose behind nature’s apparent 
‘purposiveness’, we are offered no possibility but to aesthetically experience art as if it 
did have a creator. These are the elements that make cogent the idea that responding to 
an artwork or artefact aesthetically is prior to, or instantiates the aesthetic in a 
paradigmatic way compared with art.  
 
§ The Aesthetic and its Objects 
 
 Let us take a closer look at these claims. First, we have the Hegelian claim that the 
sophistication of the human spirit exemplifies design and creativity at a level not 
otherwise seen in nature, as discussed in chapter three. It is true that human production 
through the ages has resulted in works of architecture,  music, painting, sculpture and in 
the creation of drinks and foodstuffs, such as  tea, coffee, wine, cheese, and a history of 
cookery, that are exemplified in world regions and that are attributable to distinctly 
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human endeavours. These are examples of the sorts of human-made objects to which we 
have aesthetic responses and in whose experience and value we should, of course, be 
keenly interested. 
As mentioned earlier, there are a number of criticisms to be made of the Hegelian 
claim. I’ll recap on these because more contemporary accounts, such as those provided 
by Davies, Savile and Wollheim, that are sceptical of the attribution of aesthetic 
properties to nature are premised on similar arguments. One is that although we can and 
do have aesthetic responses to human-made objects, this does not mean that we don’t 
respond meaningfully to non-human-made objects. Naturally occurring objects may not 
be human-centred in the sense that a person has created them, but they may, and often 
do, offer the possibility for aesthetic response such as delight or awe. While the 
Hegelian is not committed to denying that nature offers aesthetic experiences, he is 
committed to denying the objective presence of and our openness to nature’s aesthetic 
properties. A look at what he says might help in this regard: 
Indeed, if we look at it formally i.e. only considering in what way it exists, not 
what there is in it - even a silly fancy such as may pass through a man’s head is 
higher than any product of nature; for such a fancy must at least be characterized 
by intellectual being and by freedom. […] Mind, and mind only, is capable of truth 
and comprehends in itself all that is, so that whatever is beautiful can only be 
really and truly beautiful as partaking in the higher element and as created thereby. 
In this sense the beauty of nature reveals itself as but a reflection of the beauty 
which belongs to the mind, as an imperfect, incomplete mode of being. As a mode 
whose really substantial element is contained in the mind itself.189 
 
With the emphasis being on the human mind rather than nature, Hegel does not take 
account of the objective existence of nature’s aesthetic properties, nature’s aesthetic and 
expressive properties or the subject’s distinctly perceptual experience of it, since “even a 
silly fancy such as may pass through a man’s head is higher than any product of nature”. 
His justifications for turning to the products of the human mind are precisely the 
justifications, hyperbole excluded, for allowing nature its place in aesthetic discourse. 
We will see one of the reasons this is true in this chapter’s final section on expressive 
                                                
189 This is part of the quotation used in section one, chapter three. Hegel, Introductory 
Lectures on Aesthetics. 3,4. 
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properties and other reasons for this later in the thesis, when we come to address the 
perceptual nature of aesthetic properties.  
 One objection to the Hegelian view is how we can make sense of the idea that we 
can have experiences of an object not intentionally created for our aesthetic delight? 
Secondly, and a point that was made by Aristotle in chapter one, the human person is 
herself a product of nature. Third, and a point that was made by Aquinas, the objects of 
human creation are themselves derived from naturally occurring materials. The objection 
to the Hegelian view I’ll focus on is one that aims for a shift of emphasis from the idea 
that art has the kind of priority expounded by Hegel and other philosophers who clearly 
do take an art-first approach to aesthetics, to nature and our distinctive aesthetic 
experience of it. The objection is an existential claim about us, about nature and about 
the complex relational dynamic between nature and ourselves, as I’ll detail below. 
It would not seem true to think that if all aesthetic experiences of art were wiped from 
our memories and all artworks, galleries or human-made products were, due to some 
fluke, eradicated from the planet, aesthetic experiences would disappear altogether. 
What of our responses to rainbows, waterfalls, moors, meadows, deserts and forests? 
Seriously approaching nature as an aesthetic object can bring with it different 
experiential, imaginative, integrated, multi-sensual emphases, as Hepburn and Brady 
have written about, and as discussed in chapter three, that not only bring us closer to 
valuing nature in itself, but that encourage us to engage with the aesthetic and moral 
complexities linked with how we value it and how we perceive it. Furthermore, it may 
well be that these different experiential emphases re-orientate our approaches to 
attending to and experiencing art, particularly art that is to be experienced with more 
than just the visual sense and from multiple perspectives.  
The art-first philosophers aren’t committed to denying that we can experience 
aesthetic properties in nature or that this can subsequently influence our experience or 
appreciation of art. However, the emphasis they place on art’s being revelatory of the 
human mind and human intentionality, and that art is therefore the paradigm of aesthetic 
experience, has meant a historical, pre-eminent and residual interest in art to the 
detriment of nature. This is not to suggest that art is of little or no value or importance, 
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which would be senseless, but that we should consider it as part of a broader 
understanding of the aesthetic that recognises that art is dependent on the artist, who is 
ultimately dependent on nature: it is an existential claim about the importance of the 
aesthetics of nature, an aesthetic dimension that differs from the aesthetics of art. Nature 
offers a richness of aesthetic content that we can integrate into the fabric of our 
experience, whilst recognising its objective independence. 
 
The point made by Wollheim, that the concept of the mind of the spectator meets that 
of the artist when the spectator is experiencing an artwork is very compelling too, and 
may be true in many experiences of art.190 One way of undermining the art-first view 
that holds that aesthetic experience involves a meeting of the minds of the artist and the 
artwork’s perceiver is that we have no reason to think that we don’t have meaningful 
experiences of nature despite nature’s not having been intentionally created. In the case 
of art, though, one possibility of experiencing the work might be to see, look for, 
understand, what the artist has expressed or hopes to express. However, we are not 
bound by what the artist wanted to express, or the concept in her mind, when we do 
experience the work aesthetically, as Wollheim later conceded. This is especially true if 
we think of aesthetic properties as perceptual properties first and foremost, which is the 
argument being established here. An artwork’s aesthetic properties are not necessarily 
linked to the artist’s intentions. There may be many other ways of making sense of the 
work’s aesthetic properties, such as how they relate to the social, geographical and 
political context in which it was created, how it fits into a particular style, works in 
relation to preceding and succeeding works by the same, or other, artists. We might learn 
about perspective, or even imagine our own story in relation to it. How we experience it 
need not necessarily be determined by how the artist intended it. Another point to make 
here is that the artist may not be held responsible for what she has created: it is not 
                                                
190 It is worth bearing in mind that Wollheim sought to make sense of ‘projective’ or 
what we might also think of as ‘expressive’ properties of nature, as we will see in the 
section below. If aesthetic properties are like expressive properties, he probably thought 
that these were projected too. If they are projected, he must have thought they were 
necessarily evaluative rather than descriptive. 
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inconceivable that artwork would be created as a result of a mental disorder or unusual 
set of beliefs. This does not mean that I reject the possibility that attending to artistic 
intention is one possible way of approaching an artwork; I merely contest the view that it 
is the only way to do so. 
This does not mean that we need to be relativists about aesthetic judgments. What it 
does mean is that attention to the works’ perceivable features, and getting them right, as 
Sibley has argued, is of primary importance. This is in addition to interpreting the work 
relative to artistic intention, historical or cultural framework, religious belief, or how it 
relates to historical, contemporary or future works, subjective moods or emotions or 
even metaphysical or scientific explanation. 
While the art-first proponent can give an explanation for why we can see nature as 
possessing aesthetic properties, by appealing to the ‘as if’, intentionalist argument, they 
are appealing to a category of objects that are not true to the phenomenology of 
experiencing nature as a different sort of entity, one that is not designed by man, even 
though it may seem to be. It is because nature exemplifies seemingly non-artistically 
intended aesthetic qualities that imaginative engagement with it, its aesthetic and 
expressive properties reminds us of the non-rule-governed freedom we have in 
aesthetically experiencing it as well as artworks, as we saw in Hutcheson’s and Kant’s 
aesthetic theories. 
 
We will now turn to the point, also made by Wollheim, that, if art were derivative of 
nature, our responses to both art and nature would be confused and that we may not 
value art accordingly. Presumably, if many experiences are subsumed under the 
umbrella of aesthetic experience, people not only get confused between art and life or 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic, but art is not afforded the special value it undoubtedly has. 
The point refers to the aesthetic being primarily linked with art and brings to mind the 
idea of aesthetic and psychical distance.191 Here, presumably, a lack of disinterest or 
                                                
191 Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," 
British Journal of Psychology 5, no. 2 (1912), George Dickie, "Psychical Distance: In a 
Fog at Sea," British Journal of  Aesthetics 13, no. 1 (1973), ———, "Bullough and the 
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aesthetic distance as put forward by Stolnitz or Bullough, is what causes Wollheim’s 
“yokel” to rush to Desdemona’s assistance.  
I will briefly characterise the aesthetic attitude or psychical distance theories 
presented by Stolnitz and Bullough since they are thought to build on the concept of 
disinterest that has been mentioned in previous chapters, because disinterest has, at 
times, been mischaracterised, and because Bullough’s theory especially will help us 
resolve Wollheim’s worry. Stolnitz thinks that having an aesthetic attitude toward 
something is “the disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any 
object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone”: 
THE FIRST WORD, “disinterested,” is a crucially important one. It means that we 
do not look at the object out of concern for any ulterior purpose which it may 
serve. We are not trying to use or manipulate the object. There is not purpose 
governing the experience other than the purpose of just having the experience. Our 
interest comes to rest upon the object alone, so that it is not taken as a sign of some 
future event, like the dinner bell, or as a cue to future activity, like the traffic 
light.192 
 
The idea is that we attend to the object in a way that allows its features to constitute our 
experiences of them, how we perceive them, rather than our experience being guided by 
the fulfilment of our desires or everyday, practical behaviours as we saw earlier. 
Bullough bases his psychical distance theory on the concept of disinterest without 
using the term ‘disinterest’ to get away from the implications it evokes for some people, 
for it implies a “lack of interest, or a denial of speculative importance” in the experience 
of art, implications it need not have as I have argued. The idea of psychical distance is 
similar to ‘disinterest’ as I have characterised it above for in its application it would 
“entail the cutting out of the practical side” of experience in order to allow for the 
“elaboration of experience on the basis created by the inhibit[ing] action of distance”. 
                                                                                                                                           
Concept of Psychical Distance," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22, no. 2 
(1961), Dickie, "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude." 
192 Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and the Philsophy of Art Criticism (Boston: The Riverside 
Press, 1960). 35. 
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That inhibiting action relates to the “cutting out of the practical side of experience” that 
constitutes most of our experiences.193 Bullough writes: 
Thus, in the fog, the transformation by Distance is produced in the first instance by 
putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our practical, actual self; by 
allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends - in short, 
by looking at it ‘objectively,’ as it has often been called, by permitting only such 
reactions on our part as emphasise the ‘objective’ features of experience, and by 
interpreting of even our ‘subjective’ affections not as modes of our being but 
rather as characteristics of the phenomenon.194 
 
It is worth noting that Bullough uses ‘fog’, a natural phenomenon, as an example. 
This might serve as reminder that ‘disinterest’ was used in relation to natural objects, as 
we learned in chapters two and three. The ideas of disinterest and distance have also 
been discussed and applied to the theatre, which will have some bearing on Wollheim’s 
concern that we might confuse art and life, as might be said of the Greek audiences, to 
Plato’s lamentation. We might be reminded of Nehamas’ description of audience 
behaviour that took place, with members of the audience throwing rotting vegetables or 
fruit at characters they objected to, or the “atavistic” introduction of life into art, as in 
Kaprow’s famous Happenings. Another nice example in relation to this phenomenon is 
discussed in a paper by Lewis, and turns around the moment Peter Pan turns to the 
audience and says: “Do you believe in fairies?... If you believe, clap your hands!”195 
The crux of this discussion rests on whether audience participation is incompatible 
with maintaining psychical distance. Lewis argues, not against Bullough, but against the 
idea that it should be assumed that Peter’s calling out to the audience, and the audiences’ 
response to him, really amounts to a lack of distance. On the contrary, distance, on 
Lewis’ and Bullough’s accounts, renders the characters fictitious and the aesthetic state 
contributes to our awareness of fictional characters. The children’s response, à la 
Walton, is an imagined ‘as if’ response, as if the characters are real.196 I would also 
suggest that audience behaviour is, in these moments, a matter of convention. The 
                                                
193 Bullough, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle." 87. 
194 Ibid. 89. 
195 Peter Lewis, "A Note on Audience Participation and Psychical Distance," British 
Journal of  Aesthetics 25, no. 3 (1985). 273. 
196 Kendall L. Walton, "Fearing Fictions," Journal of Philosophy 75, no. 1978 (1978). 
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majority of the people in the audience will know that it is fine to be taken away by the 
aesthetic moment and to respond to Peter. This is particularly true of the peculiarly 
British phenomenon of pantomime, to cite an example of theatre that thrives, joyously 
and jubilantly, on audience participation, but not any less magically. Moreover, knowing 
how to behave at the theatre, or in a gallery, is merely a matter of convention or of 
normativity. It was acceptable for Greek audiences to behave in ways that were 
distasteful to Plato: 
The plays were not produced in front of a well-behaved audience. The dense 
crowd was given to whistling (syringx) and the theater resounded with its 
“uneducated noise” (amousoi boai plethous, Lg. 700c3). Plato expresses profound 
distaste for the tumult with which audiences, in the theater and elsewhere, voiced 
their approval or dissatisfaction (Rep. 492c). Their preferences were definitely 
pronounced if not often sophisticated. Since four plays were produced within a 
single day, the audience arrived at the theater with large quantities of food. Some 
of it they consumed themselves - hardly a silent activity in its own right, unlikely 
to produce the quasi-religious attention required of a fine-art audience today and 
more reminiscent of other sorts of mass entertainments. Some of their food was 
used to pelt those actors whom they did not like, and whom they often literally 
shouted off the stage. In particular, and though this may be difficult to imagine 
today, the drama was considered a realistic representation of the world: we are 
told, for example, that a number of women were frightened into having 
miscarriages or into giving premature birth by the entrance of the Furies in 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides.197 
  
Nehamas goes on to make a point about realism, transparency and mediation, and 
contrasts the Greek attic dramas with 1980s television. My reason for bringing that vivid 
description of Greek audiences is rather to show that each time period has its 
conventions, and it may be that these conventions change over time. Other examples 
could include responses to high Modernist music and dance, such as that of Schönberg 
and Stravinsky or Antheil that broke with traditional conventions, with audiences 
reacting argumentatively and riotously to what they heard and saw because they could 
                                                
197 Nehamas, "Plato and the Mass Media." 223. 
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not relate to or possibly understand their difficult, dissonant, ‘avant-garde’ sound and 
jarring choreography.198  
 The idea of how we engage with an artwork, and conventions associated with it, 
became the focal point for artists who also resisted an understanding of the aesthetic, 
‘disinterest’, ‘formalism’, as per Carroll’s characterisation of them discussed in chapter 
three. Nehamas, for example, mentioned Kaprow’s artistic explorations between art and 
life: 
This is not art which represents, as art has always represented, disturbing reality. It 
is art which aims to disturb precisely by eradicating the distance between it and 
reality, by placing reality squarely within it.199 
  
Other artists like Felix Gonzales-Torres played on the conventional behaviours in 
galleries with his ‘stack’ and ‘candy’ pieces. His stack pieces were “neat piles of 
unlimited-edition prints that viewers are encouraged to take, but are intermittently 
replaced, resulting in a constantly changing height of the sculpture”, the most poignant 
of which were linked with the AIDS epidemic, representing “the atrophy of AIDS 
victims’ bodies”. One piece was an installation of 175 pounds of multi-coloured candy, 
‘Untitled’, from which people could take a candy, but the candy represented his AIDS-
infected partner’s diminishing strength.200  
As I have suggested with the theatre case, and although some artists, like Kaprow and 
Gonzales-Torres, are partly reacting to what I take to be a misconstrued notion of the 
‘aesthetic’, ‘disinterest’, and ‘distance’, these examples put the spectator-participant in a 
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different, interesting, albeit non-traditional relation to the artwork, one that plays on 
convention, how we are supposed to behave within artistic contexts. We may be a little 
confused about what we are supposed to do, what is conventionally acceptable to do, in 
encounters with Peter Pan, a Happening or whether we’re allowed to sneak a candy. We 
might even heroically rush on stage to save Desdemona. We are not, however, confused 
about whether Peter Pan, the attic Greek performances are plays, the Happening or 
untitled works of Gonzales-Torres are artworks. 
 That these conventions exist, and are sometimes confusing, need not worry us, not 
even to the extent that if art is viewed as continuous with life it should lose its distinct 
value as a work of art. Disinterest and psychical distance are terms for a particular way 
we attend to aesthetic objects, particularly to their perceivable aesthetic features and an 
object’s non-aesthetic features or a subject’s imagination or knowledge may feed into to 
that experience. The way we attend to and perceive objects aesthetically need not be 
understood in terms of how we define art, but it does involve attending to them in such a 
way that its objective features constitute the experience. 
A concrete example of someone misunderstanding Bullough’s views on distance, or 
the concept of disinterest, comes from Goldman. Goldman mischaracterises Bullough’s 
view as one that does not accommodate the pain we feel when we “cry at a tragedy, the 
fear we feel when we jump at a horror movie, or lose ourselves in the plot of a complex 
novel”.201 Goldman writes that in these instances we are not detached from the 
experience, and detachment would require no reaction on the part of the spectator. This, 
however, as Shelley argues, misses the point that Bullough was making, which was that 
the feelings we have during theatrical performances are allowed, and are part of what the 
tragedy, horror movie or complex novel is about rather than disallowed or subjectively 
indulgent.202 Again, we are not being asked by Bullough to distance ourselves from the 
emotions we feel when wrapped up in experiencing a performance, but that experience 
requires our being distanced from our practicalities and desires. This too, is important 
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once we turn our attention to nature’s propensity for being in tune with our moods and 
emotions, as we will discover in section three below. 
Let me summarise how the above points let us respond to Wollheim’s concern that 
we might become confused about or between art and life. One answer is that it is a 
matter of convention how we behave relative to an artwork. Wollheim’s yokel has, first, 
been overly drawn into the story or perhaps he is just not used to going to the theatre. 
For most people (even children) watching Peter Pan, have learned or quickly learn how 
to respond appropriately. Although our emotions are powerful in responding to tragedy, 
horror or the complex plot of a novel, most of us know that Desdemona will not be 
saved from her theatrical fate - even if we did try to intervene. The children’s 
imaginations will be taken to Neverland and be enchanted by fairies and pirates, without 
the children themselves physically participating in the adventure; as adults, we will 
participate in Desdemona’s tragedy without ourselves experiencing her loss in the way 
the characters they act out they do. There is no danger of confusing art with life because 
we know that we are engaging in a special theatrical production and that in some cases, 
the audience may be asked to participate. Disinterest is not a matter of convention, but is 
what allows us to engage fully with an object’s perceptual, aesthetic properties. 
Interestingly, what guides our experience of nature are not necessarily conventions 
similar to those required by artwork’s limitations, or how it is best experienced, or even 
how nature might best be experienced. Restrictions to how we engage with nature are 
determined by the very limitations that nature itself imposes. What we can experience in 
nature is done usually through our traversing a landscape, often using most of our 
senses, uninhibited by the sorts of conventions required by most art. 
Now we turn to Wollheim’s further claim that, because Bullough and Kant do not 
give explicit priority to nature or art as a paradigm of the aesthetic, and because they 
contrast the aesthetic and practical domains, we should, according to them, be able to 
take either a practical or an aesthetic approach towards things.203 For example, in any 
experience, the case of the yokel, Wollheim argues, we ought to be able to take both an 
aesthetic and a practical approach, but taking a practical approach would “surely be 
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absurd to demonstrate what it is to show, say, concern, by concentrating on the action of 
the yokel who rushed up on to the stage to save the life of Desdemona”, rather than the 
play itself.204 The thrust of the argument is that by not providing a paradigm example of 
the aesthetic, an object that by its very nature requires an aesthetic attitude rather than a 
practical one, Wollheim suggests, we are led to the absurdity of trying to demonstrate 
what it would be to show a practical concern for the yokel, when what we should really 
be doing is attending to the play.205  
According to Wollheim, because art is the paradigm of the aesthetic, we can easily 
demarcate how both art and the aesthetic are distinct from the ordinary practicalities of 
life. We can approach art aesthetically and non-art practically. However, according to 
Wollheim, if we accept, as Kant and Bullough do, that the aesthetic attitude applies to 
non-art (‘nature’ or ‘life’) as well as art, we are in the peculiar situation of having to 
accept that we can apply the aesthetic attitude both to art and to non-art (‘nature’ or 
‘life’) and the non-aesthetic, or practical, attitude to art and non-art (‘nature’ or ‘life’). 
We would have to explain from a practical point of view why, according Wollheim, the 
yokel jumps up on stage to save Desdemona, rather than attend to Othello. The play is 
where we should focus our faculties given that we’ve gone to the theatre to see it (and 
not a yokel rushing on stage). From the aesthetic point of view we can understand that 
the yokel is overly immersed in the play, to the extent that he decides to take action. We 
can’t explain the practical point of view because Desdemona is character in a play - we 
know that she cannot be saved. 
 Wollheim has attributed the disinterested aesthetic approach to art and the practical 
approach to non-art. The problem with this, as we pointed out was a problem for Hegel, 
is that the aesthetic experience of non-art is not accounted for. As Stolnitz, Bullough and 
Lewis in particular argue is that ‘disinterest’ and ‘psychical distance’ are not what they 
at first seem to be. In fact we saw this already in the discussion of disinterest in chapter 
two, and later in chapter three. They simply describe our being captured and immersed 
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in an experience that is constituted by aesthetic properties and, possibly, other features. 
The aesthetic, disinterest, or psychical distance do not obliterate the viewing subject’s 
emotions or personality, but require that issues to do with practicalities and self-interest 
do not figure as part of our engagement with what we see on stage.  
Another thought that is relevant to the idea that aesthetic experiences of non-art are 
possible is that it is puzzling why Hegel, Savile or Wollheim give us no explicit reason 
for arguing that the aesthetic does not map onto nature in meaningful ways. While the 
way the arguments presented above make it sound like they have independent, cohesive 
reasons for the idea that the aesthetic maps only onto art and only derivatively so onto 
nature, these are really minor points in their respective philosophical projects, in which 
they already have a vested and assumed interest in art. As Sibley writes, the onus is at 
least as much on those who prefer to direct discussions of the aesthetic to art not to make 
assumptions about the aesthetic priority of art versus nature as it is on those who prefer 
to adopt the perspective that the aesthetic primarily applies to nature.206 In support of 
this claim, here is an objection, inspired by Brady, Budd, and Hepburn, to the idea that 
nature is only derivatively aesthetic, that it is by appealing to art that we aesthetically 
experience nature.  
The question of how we view nature through art, and the relationship between 
landscape, mind, and art is important, as when we look at how artists have depicted 
landscapes in particular historical periods, for example. In this case, our experience is 
likely to be guided, directed, controlled, by the artist’s thoughts, choices, and 
perspective. We learn about humankind’s relationship with nature through the ages by 
looking at art. This however, is a different question from that of aesthetically 
appreciating nature for its own sake, as a distinct phenomenon from art, or an expressive 
object. Looking at nature as if were art is, as Budd writes, “untrue to the phenomenology 
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of aesthetically experiencing nature” because nature is not made by humans, but is the 
product of natural forces and processes.207  
Artistic choices do not control the aesthetic experience of nature and nature should be 
viewed in terms of no particular artistic style, unlike Savile’s idea from the previous 
chapter that we can choose which artistic style we’re viewing nature in terms of. Despite 
this, nature offers possibilities for aesthetic experience that, for this very reason, can 
offer a positive effect, such as the extent to which a person might be immersed in and 
engaged by the natural aesthetic situation itself. The aesthetic situation is often 
immersive, with the spectator an active participant, but also recognising and being aware 
of her own sensual engagement with it. Not only is the spectator-participant aware of her 
natural surroundings, she is also aware of herself in those surroundings, and being in 
motion in those surroundings, which are unframed and probably seemingly boundless.208 
Brady’s ‘Integrated Aesthetic’ also emphasises the idea that the appreciator stands in 
relation to the environment, both spatially, but also subjectively, both in the sense that 
“aesthetic appreciation begins in perception”, which “includes all of the different types 
of our sensory contact with the world - seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching, 
combined with thoughts, imagining and beliefs” and in the sense that aesthetic 
appreciation is disinterested, if disinterested is understood in its original conception as 
discussed in chapters two and three above.209 It might be true, as per the art-first view, 
that we can experience nature as if it were art. The trouble with this view, as we will go 
onto consider, is that it isn’t true to the phenomenology of our aesthetic experiences of 
nature and to the immediacy of the experience or the kind of relation that exists between 
it and us. 
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Our perceptual, multi-sensual, imaginative and other engagements with nature offer 
distinctive aesthetic experiences unmediated by artistic intention. This goes some way to 
explaining how we might conceive of nature’s being as meaningful as art where 
aesthetics is concerned, but meaningful in a different way. The idea that we are 
immersed in nature, but can nevertheless reflect on our immediate encounters with its 
smells, perspectives, sights or our subjective, physical and internal relationship with it 
are a reminder that disinterest and psychical distance are at play in a similar way to 
when we are at the theatre, partaking in a Happening or taking a print from one of 
Gonzales-Torres’ stacks.   
Nature provides a depth of aesthetic experience because it relates to a claim about 
nature’s existence, our own existence, and, as we will see below, a mirroring effect of 
nature’s and our own expressive and mood properties. Furthermore, because we need 
not take the step of acknowledging or implementing the same kinds of conventions 
required of art, as we saw with the theatrical, psychical distance cases, we do not need a 
further concept, that of art, to experience it aesthetically. We can learn from the 
openness, immediacy, imagination, freedom and richness of our perceptual aesthetic 
experiences of nature, and apply them to art. This thought is particularly true of artworks 
that have gone beyond the frame or the plinth, that explore more than just the visual 
sense but many other senses. Budd’s conclusion that nature is indeterminate is a positive 
consequence, one that opens us to the aesthetic, expressive and other possibilities that 
nature has to offer. Although Budd stops there, we have seen other philosophers, such as 
Hepburn and Brady in particular, as well as Berleant, who provide a more precise 
articulation of what it is to aesthetically experience nature that involves multi-sensuous 
engagement, reflection, the imagination, and multiple perspectives. 
 
§ The Expressive Properties of Nature  
 
 As discussed above, one of the reasons art is taken to be prior to nature, where 
aesthetics is concerned, is that it is expressive of concepts and ideas and therefore has a 
psychological, intellectual and intentional content that is not obvious in nature, unless 
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we believe in a higher or pantheistic power. This view is particularly attributable to Bell, 
for whom a sufficient condition for having an aesthetic experience involved ‘significant’ 
form, that is to say, emotion and meaning incorporated into an artwork by a human 
mind. Now that we have seen that nature provides us with meaningful aesthetic 
experiences of a different sort from art and, putting belief about god (pantheistic or 
otherwise) to one side, how can we account for nature’s seeming expressive properties? 
And if we can make sense of nature’s being expressive, can it also be expressive of 
aesthetic properties? It would be odd to suggest that the desolate Yorkshire moors, 
although they may seem lonely and depressing, are themselves lonely and depressed; or 
that lambs, gambolling in a Spring meadow have the concepts of friskiness and joy that 
we have when we experience their playfulness. This is because the expressive properties 
being applied are ordinarily thought of as expressive of human moods and feelings. 
They are purposefully attributed so that thinking the hills as being lonely, for example, is 
the only way of making sense of how they could be expressive of loneliness. How, then, 
do we accommodate the idea that we anthropomorphise natural objects in this way, that 
natural objects seem to express emotions or moods that correspond to emotions we feel? 
Or should we accept that nature exists in such a way that it is independent of human 
sentiment, emotion or mood?  
 The answer to that final question is yes, we should accept that nature has a mode of 
existence that we cannot access, and that the emotions we see expressed or that we 
project onto it are our own. This need not concede the art-first reason for thinking art the 
more meaningful or important paradigm when it comes to aesthetics, but it is revealing 
of the idea that in aesthetically experiencing nature, we are set in a different sort of 
relation to it, one that attends to its aesthetic properties as relating to nature and not art. 
For example, Brady writes that:  
We should not assume that there will always be a correlation between human and 
natural qualities. Sometimes the correlation will be inexact or not exist at all. […] 
While humans themselves are of course natural creatures, there are great 
differences between us and other animals, and between us and other natural things. 
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This fact is perhaps most dramatically shown in cases where we experience the 
wonder and the sublimity of nature.210 
  
Brady is inspired by Hepburn’s thought that we should acknowledge that nature has a 
mode of existing that is independent of human experience and that human experience 
does not always map onto it, that human qualities may not always map onto nature, that 
we might not be able to completely anthropomorphise nature, or experience nature in a 
way other species would. Hepburn also writes: 
 But instead of nature being humanized, the reverse may happen. Aesthetic 
experience of nature may be experience of a range of emotion that the human 
scene, by itself, untutored and unsupplemented, could not evoke”.211  
 
This suggests that by attending to nature, and allowing for its objective presence, we 
can learn about it and emotions can be evoked in us that we would not have in relation to 
a non-natural, particularly human, environment. This suggests that aesthetically 
experiencing nature can help us learn about nature as nature, allow it to guide us in our 
appreciation of it, scrutinise it, attend to it, as much as is possible, and for its own sake, 
rather than being guided by how we might or ought to conceptualise our experiences or 
structure our thoughts in relation to it.  
I will attempt to address the issue of nature’s expressive properties by arguing to the 
conclusion that there is a complex interaction between nature’s objective non-aesthetic 
and non-expressive properties, and our complex projection of emotions, moods and 
metaphors. Even though nature is not intentional in the way art is, we experience mood 
and emotion in relation to its phenomenal features and thereby experience aesthetic 
properties in nature. For much of what I say below, I am inspired by the way Brady has 
brought the idea of nature’s expressive properties to fruition and my aim is to show that 
although nature is not intentionally expressive, or not expressive of an artist or creator’s 
intentions, and may have a mode of existence that we are not sensitive to, it is a rich 
source of “data”, as Hepburn wrote, for our aesthetic responses and therefore 
                                                
210 Ibid. 179. 
211 Hepburn, "Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty." 20; quoted 
in Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment. 179. 
 122 
legitimately an aesthetic object. One way to show that is by appealing to our emotive 
responses to nature.  
Much of what has been written about nature’s expressive properties has put down a 
fertile terrain for discussion. Howarth, in particular, provides an excellent account of 
how moods correspond to natural backdrops and atmospheres, but also how moods are a 
part of our natures, and that our natures themselves are a part of nature.212 Moreover, 
recognising mood means making the aesthetic appreciation of nature a serious 
endeavour: appreciating nature’s backdrops and atmospheres can help us appreciate our 
own moods and those of others. Whereas expressive theories of art focus not only on the 
work, but also on artistic intention, Howarth gives us an account of mood that 
corresponds to the phenomenological experience of nature as nature, that is to say, by 
attending to the atmospheres created by nature, as she argues Wordsworth does in the 
following extract:  
The specific resemblances [Wordsworth appeals to] make the ascription of mood 
terms to nature more intelligible. Wordsworth does not just use the mood terms of 
nature and leave it there. He spells out a basis for, or an elaboration of, the claims. 
In ‘I wandered lonely as a cloud’, glee and jocundity are not ascribed to the 
daffodils out of nowhere: there is a lead up to it. They are dancing, tossing their 
heads, fluttering, in a crowd, in an appropriate setting, beside a lake, beneath the 
trees just as gleeful, jocund people might be. And Wordsworth’s heart, like the 
daffodils, dances.213 
 
In this extract we can see that we apply emotive terms to nature as we do to people. In 
the discussion below we will see how it is that the daffodils’ non-aesthetic features and 
environmental context (such as the breeze or wind that is causing their carefree 
jocundity), for example, correspond to the emotive terms we use to describe them. That 
human beings are a part of that nature allows us to recognise nature’s patterns and 
complexes, atmospheres and landscapes that correspond to our patterns and complexes, 
or moods that descend on us with no clear beginning or end. This means that nature 
might be an “appropriate backdrop that ‘feeds’ one’s mood, helps to prolong it, whereas 
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a different backdrop, bright sunlight, blue skies, balmy breezes, might snap one out of 
it”214: 
An appropriate backdrop for a mood of desolation would be a desolate landscape, 
and similarly for ‘gloomy’, ‘sombre’, ‘dismal’, ‘serene’, ‘tranquil’, excited’, 
‘tense’. All these terms apply to people, identifying, broadly speaking, moods, and 
to nature: to skies, hills, countryside, to lakes, rivers, forest glades. We might not 
have used the same words for the mood and the atmosphere. My claim is that, 
given the correlation between moods and atmospheres, the way that moods 
characteristically ‘spread’ to colour one’s environment, it is natural to use the 
same word for both.215  
 
The idea is that by attending to nature’s moods, we can see how they resonate with 
our own. Perhaps no explanation can be given for them, but the fact that we can look 
both externally and internally for their manifestation, or that we can recognise moods in 
nature while at the same time not feeling it ourselves puts us in a much better position to 
argue for the relevance of nature to aesthetic experience. This is because nature 
instantiates features that we immediately pick up on, such as its having an affinity with 
our moods. This immediacy is, in any case, less mediated than our experiences of art, 
because we don’t need to appeal to artistic intention or representation, art history, or 
other contextual issues to make sense of our experience of nature. We see the sky’s 
murkiness, the expansive, rugged moorland in front of us and associate it with a 
depressive, internal bleakness. That we can associate our moods with atmospheres in 
nature is simply meant to illustrate that nature can complement human experience.  
Carroll gives us an arousal model of nature appreciation that attends to emotions 
rather than moods, where emotions apply to particular states of mind such as joy, anger, 
love, hate or horror and moods are less specific and more diffuse.216 We are emotionally 
moved by nature, and appropriately so when we attend to the nature’s own properties. 
Emotions, for Carroll are not simply subjective projections of human feelings on natural 
landscapes or objects: the subject, the object and the context in which the experience is 
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being had are all factor in the experience. Just as Howarth matches the concepts of 
moods with nature’s atmospheres and backdrops, integrating human existence in the 
existence of nature, Carroll writes that emotion being felt should be appropriate to the 
object. This means that the attribution of expressive properties to natural objects depends 
upon their perceptual configuration, how they look, sound and, presumably, smell.  
Furthermore, the way the objects are configured correspond to human behaviours and 
provide a solution for how it is that we can attribute mental states to inanimate objects: 
A person with her head and shoulders drooped exhibits one of the characteristic 
appearances of sadness. She is sad-looking. When we say she is sad-looking, we 
are not speaking metaphorically, but literally. We are offering a literal description 
of the way in which she looks to us. Similarly, when we call the weeping willow 
tree sad (sad-looking), we are offering a literal description of its perceptible 
configuration. Somehow, probably by resemblance, the tree reminds us of the 
characteristic appearance of sad people. Thus, when we say the weeping willow 
tree is sad, we are saying that it is sad-looking.217 
 
 What is important about both Howarth’s account of moods and Carroll’s account of 
emotions as they relate to nature, if I may synthesise them, is that mood and affect reach 
beyond belief, and subjective feeling. The moods and emotions they associate with 
nature are outward looking, opening onto the way nature presents itself to us as well as 
how we feel as beings that are a part of nature. While it may be true that we may not 
fully comprehend nature’s traits as independent from the mental frameworks we use to 
make sense of nature or its traits, we can be open to the possibility, following Brady and 
Hepburn above, that nature may be differently experienced by another species, and that 
we might learn from nature about our own moods and emotions, moods and emotions 
we may never have previously felt. 
 
 Another philosophical approach to making sense of nature’s expressive properties 
was attempted by Wollheim, whose thoughts on the matter were critiqued by Budd. 
Unlike Howarth, Wollheim set the issue of moods to one side and explored the idea of 
emotive language as it applied to nature and to art. It could also be seen as a precursor to 
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Carroll’s view.218 The precision with which Wollheim advances his thesis can help us 
get closer to, or open further onto nature’s properties, and therefore construct an 
experience of nature that exemplifies rich, natural, perceptual content. He put forward a 
theory of projective properties to resist linguistic, or predicative approaches that denied 
the possibility for mental states being attributed to nature at all.  
Wollheim did not want to deny this, for we rightly do say that nature looks like it has 
certain emotional states, or that a situation evokes a certain mood. The issue is that 
although nature does not have psychological properties, there is some property in nature 
to which we refer when we do attribute mental states to it. The idea, which fits nicely 
with Carroll’s view above, is that nature’s properties correspond to the perceptible 
manifestations of our mental states. These are projective properties that are, according to 
Wollheim, a class of secondary properties, that is, they are of the object and cause the 
experience.219 Projective properties are, however, more complex than secondary 
properties in that they are ‘triadic’: they are perceptual, affective and refer back to 
previous experience, or experiential memory.  
Wollheim draws a distinction between simple and complex projective properties: a 
simple projection is one whereby the mental state being attributed is one that that is of 
the subject, that might change her belief, and whereby the object in the environment has 
the same property as the subject; a simple projection is one that projects onto something 
that has no psychology, where there’s a change in belief and a new attitude towards the 
natural object and where the property in the object is not the same as the property in the 
subject. When a complex projection occurs, there is an affinity between what the subject 
sees, her inner world and her external, natural world. 
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 Budd raises three issues that are of import to the discussion here. The first is the 
claim that Wollheim’s “monolithic project” of applying expressive projection to both 
nature and art is problematic; the second is that complex projection does not seem to be 
true to the phenomenology of the experience; and the third is to do with the 
corresponding projective property in the object, that the object’s intimation has truth 
value. I am particularly interested in the third of these and will address that idea 
momentarily. Considering the right way to respond to Budd’s objection to Wollheim 
helps us clarify how we should think about the expressive properties in nature. 
 The bifurcation thesis, the thesis that projective properties apply both to art and 
nature, that Budd is concerned with relates to the idea that the perception of nature’s 
bearing affective properties is different from the perception of works of art as being 
expressive of emotion. Budd’s thought is that works of art are products of the human 
mind, and can therefore accede onto what the artist hopes to express, whereas the 
expressive perception of nature requires the beholder to feel the emotion she sees nature 
as corresponding to.220  
This kind of idea has led some philosophers to be drawn to formalist theories of 
nature (and of art), as we will see in chapter five. Budd, however, thinks that it is 
because nature is not the result of human creation or endeavour that we have freedom to 
appreciate it in whatever capacity, from whatever perspective we choose. Because Budd 
thinks that nature should be appreciated as nature, rather than appealing to some mode of 
experience (including formalism), nature is appropriate for a different kind of aesthetic 
appreciation than art. Budd’s further point is that the subject would have to actually feel 
the melancholy or happiness required of the landscape in every case in order for 
Wollheim’s triadic model to work. This is because the complex projection itself requires 
nature to actually instantiate the emotion.  
The second criticism that Budd levels against Wollheim is that complex projection 
does not seem true to the phenomenology of the experience of expressive perception, 
that we do not require intimation or complex projection in order to experience the 
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expressive properties of things. This criticism strikes at the heart of Wollheim’s 
argument, for Wollheim is trying to reject the predication view that, for metaphysical 
reasons, does not think emotive predicates can be applied to nature. He therefore wants 
to capture something of the perceptual experience of objects that don’t themselves feel 
the emotions they project, but match them in some important respect.  
Budd’s thought that Wollheim’s projective properties thesis is not true to the 
phenomenology of our experiences of projective properties in nature. I don’t think 
Wollheim requires the beholder to feel the emotion of cheeriness when she notices that a 
babbling brook is cheery. If the beholder has had the experience of a cheery, babbling, 
brook before, the intimation that the brook is cheery would be enough for her to perceive 
that cheeriness is instantiated in this case, without feeling it in that moment. The 
experience requires the brook to intimate cheeriness, because it is that intimation that 
grounds the judgment that the brook is cheery. As Carroll stated above, the weeping 
willow tree’s looking sad offers a literal description of its perceptible configuration. 
What is the truth-value for the intimation that the willow tree looks sad? I would submit, 
à la Carroll above, that it pertains to its non-aesthetic perceptual properties, the fact that 
the branches droop and look wilted. That this is how they look is what intimates the 
emotion of sadness. In addition to the intimation, comes the subject’s inner mental state 
and historical experience of willow trees. The truth value, then, of the intimation arises 
from our looking at the tree itself.  
 
This section has appealed to the idea that expressive properties apply to nature. That 
they apply to nature is indicative that nature can provide meaningful data when it comes 
to our aesthetic appreciation of it. Nature’s mode of existence may be different from 
how we do, or may ever, conceive of it, a reason for which attending to it, scrutinising it 
as a rich source of natural phenomena is integral to appreciating it aesthetically. We 
have seen that there is an internal and external manifestation of expressive and aesthetic 
properties as they relate to nature, and that mood and affect reach beyond belief and 





 The aim of this chapter has been to show that nature is a rich resource for aesthetic 
experience that both enhances our understanding of it and our understanding of 
ourselves. I laid out the reasons for denying why nature is an important resource for 
aesthetic appreciation, which at very least seem to be based on Hegel’s disallowing of 
nature into the aesthetic realm. I resisted those arguments by showing that in having 
aesthetic experiences, we are not necessarily involved with acceding to the mind of an 
artist, or we need not worry about confusing life with art, as Wollheim argued, but we 
attend to the object of that aesthetic experience.  
I introduced the idea of nature’s expressive properties both in order to show our 
affinity with it, but also to provide additional support for the thought that nature is a 
proper object of aesthetic attention, experience and appreciation. Just because the 
intentionality behind nature’s appearance is unknown, that it appears to have a teleology 
that we can’t explain except perhaps by appealing to God, does not preclude it from 
being an important aesthetic object, to which we sometimes respond profoundly and 
emotively. Nature’s objects provide us with the opportunity to experience them 
aesthetically without requiring mediation or understanding of the intentionality behind it. 
We apply expressive properties to it with immediacy, which gives us a purity of 
experience that need not require justification in the same way artworks might and often 
do require. Nature’s expressive properties can be observed and described in terms of 
how a natural object might resemble the property being ascribed to it. The babbling 
frivolity we might feel from the movement of the brook depends on the movement of the 
water through stones and pebbles. How we think about and respond to the brook can 
easily be shared with others. This might be thought of as cognitive insofar as 
commonsense beliefs are joined with perceived qualities, but not in the sense that it 
hinges on scientific understanding or knowledge.221  The expressive qualities of nature, 
therefore, contribute to the overall dialectic presented here by first of all showing that 
our experiences of nature can be simply or profoundly moving, but in a way that need 
                                                
221Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment. 172-174. 
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not engage representational props for art (although it might) but that does engage our 
emotions and moods. We apply these emotions and moods to nature without need for 
fiction-making, but for identifying how we might and do relate to nature. 
In our desire to understand how it is that expressive properties function in our 
interactions with nature, we are one step closer to understanding our relationship to it, 
and ourselves, especially if we recognise that we are a part of nature. I will proceed by 
arguing, in chapter five, against austere accounts of formalism that seek to pare our 
aesthetic experiences of nature down to the very minimum just as I will argue against the 
scientific, cognitivist, approach to the aesthetics of nature. The overall conclusion I am 
arguing towards is that our aesthetic experiences of nature are perceptually rich, 
involving not just formal properties, but a unified set of integrated properties that often 
relate to our emotions, imaginations and the knowledge (scientific or otherwise) that we 
bring to nature as subjects. The advantage of an integrated account along the lines of 
Brady’s position is threefold. It emphasises the core of what it is to have an aesthetic 
experience by articulating why and how perceptual experience matters to overall 
experience. By emphasising the important role perception plays in the idea of aesthetic 
experience we can also explain the perceptual core of aesthetic experience, that it is what 
enables the unified appearance of an object according to how we really experience it 
aesthetically. A subject learns what it is that moves them aesthetically, rather than, for 
example, appealing to a list of criteria to justify that experience. It will come to support 
the whole-formalist view of aesthetic experience, according to which the object 
perceptually manifests itself, displaying order, unity, harmony of parts to form a whole. 
Thirdly, it can explain a broad range of judgments and experiences according to what the 
subject genuinely knows, rather than requiring overly constraining cognitive machinery 
to justify how one ought to experience an object aesthetically. 
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 In chapter four I argued that nature is at least as significant as art where aesthetic 
experience is concerned. One may still, however, insist that it is art that offers us 
meaningful experiences, not nature, because of the distinctly human intentionality 
behind it. Nature does not offer the kind of intentionality that is immediately and in 
many cases intuitively graspable by us in the same way that art does to the extent that it 
is the product of someone or something’s intentional activity. We have experiences of 
nature, and the intentionality behind it, if such intentionality were to exist, is either 
unknown or non-existent, which can make it seem like nature is best be aesthetically 
appreciated either in terms of an austere formalism or in terms of an intellectualist 
approach that relies on scientific knowledge. Despite the last chapter’s conclusions 
about nature’s expressive properties, we might have residual worries that the lack of 
intentionality behind nature means that it should be regarded as of secondary importance 
to art when considering aesthetic experience or that the lack of intentionality entails that 
the only way we can explain our experience of it in terms of formalism. This is because 
formalism is often (if wrongly) defined negatively, or in terms of the experience being 
exclusionary of content, context, expression. If nature is thought of as non-intentional, it 
is a prime candidate for being experienced in terms of formalism. Yet accounts of 
formalism do not seem to do justice to our experiences of nature, which are nevertheless 
rich in non-formal perceptual and emotive features that are linked to its, and our own, 
very existence. One understanding of such a narrow account of formalism is overly 
reductive in the sense that it appeals only to shapes, colours and lines that the object 
manifests.  
 Setting the exclusionary aspects of formalism to one side, a subtle distinction might 
be articulated between austere and non-austere formalisms. The former is one that lists 
particular spatial, temporal, properties and how they relate to each other; the latter takes 
it that the formalism is the presentation of sensibly qualities in an ordered, unified 
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diversity and variety, or harmonious way to form a whole. The former definition might 
make sense in a certain set of circumstances, where an artwork’s properties are arranged 
such that they elicit the type of response that is concerned only with the relation between 
spatial and temporal properties, such as line and shape. Modern art would be a good 
example of this. This, however, seems overly constraining when we want to try to 
include aesthetic objects that are not predisposed to that sort of response. 
The latter definition, although subtly different from the former, is more precise and 
relates the object to its sensible qualities, to actual, sensible, experience, rather than to 
particular qualities the aesthetic object should or should not instantiate. It speaks to the 
idea that what the senses perceive integrate to form a whole, taking into account a 
variety of qualities that are presented by diverse senses and that are unified into the 
presentation of a whole object. While this richer, perceptual, account of formalism does 
not take into account mental, emotional, expressive, historical, institutional or social 
content or context, this does not mean, as we shall see, that these factors are excluded 
from the wider experience.  
It differs from another kind of formalism that is more complete, that takes account of 
more detailed perceivable features the object manifests. In ‘whole’ formalism222, the 
object’s features are appreciated together to form a whole that displays a manifold of 
different non-aesthetic and aesthetic features that are interrelated and interdependent. On 
the other hand, the intellectualist account does not do justice to our experiences of nature 
because it relies too heavily on knowledge at the expense of the richness of perceptual, 
phenomenological, experience. 
Both austere formalism and intellectualist approaches are prescriptive with regard to 
what can or can not be included in aesthetic experience: the former denies the 
importance of non-formal properties in aesthetic experience and the latter denies the 
importance nature’s perceptual, aesthetic properties. These positions, if entrenched, beg 
the question of each other, each laying claim to a principle that denies the obvious 
                                                
222 In chapter six we will look more closely at the idea of  ‘whole’ formalism, which has 
been identified by Zuckert as a better way of making sense of Kant’s formalism, which 
is often characterised as being more austere than Zuckert, or I, think is appropriate. 
Zuckert, "The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant's Aesthetic Formalism." 
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advantage of the seemingly opposing claim. I give an account of both approaches, in 
what follows, which will set up the framework from which a perceptual account of 
aesthetic properties will emerge, which will more fully be articulated in chapter six. This 
account of the nature of aesthetic experience will not entail a whole-hearted rejection of 
formalism, particularly if formalism is afforded a much richer, perceptual definition. Nor 
does it entail that non-perceptual properties, such as scientific knowledge, are 
completely irrelevant to aesthetic experience. 
 
§ Austere Formalism 
 
Formalism, which I introduced in chapter two and discussed further in chapter three 
is often evoked as the best concept with which to make sense of our aesthetic 
experiences of nature because it denies the importance, and in some cases the relevance, 
of non-formal, non-perceptual properties, to aesthetic experience. Nature is 
indeterminate in the sense that we don’t know what lies behind its essence or its 
appearance; it might have a mode of existence that is inaccessible to us. This is the 
thought that motivates reasons to deny its importance as an aesthetic object, if not to 
deny it completely as an aesthetic object, for example in the writings of Hegel, Bell and 
Wollheim to some degree as we have seen in chapters chapter three. It also motivates 
some to consider that attempting to explain our aesthetic experiences of nature a 
“chimerical quest”, as we saw with Budd, also in chapter three. To think through the 
problem of aesthetic indeterminacy as it relates to nature, we can begin with Zuckert’s 
definition of a generic understanding of formalism that is often evoked in the literature: 
Broadly speaking, “formalism” is the view that, in the aesthetic appreciation of an 
object (usually a work of art), we do and ought to pay attention not to the object’s 
representational content, emotional expressiveness, historical, institutional, or 
social context (whether conditions for the production of the objects or its effects), 
but only its form. Formalism is characterized in some sense, then, by what it 
excludes, viz. considerations taken to be external to the object. But it does specify 
positively (if vaguely) that the form of an object is what makes it beautiful.223 
                                                
223 Ibid. 600. This definition is generic, and Zuckert does not argue for it as such, but for 
a refined version of ‘whole formalism’ that is “diametrically opposed” to it. As we will 
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Zuckert does not endorse this definition of formalism, especially when it is related to 
Kant’s thought on formalism. However, the definition captures the idea of formalism as 
it has been advocated by Bell in relation to art, Hanslick in relation to music, and 
Zangwill in relation to both art and nature.224 It is also the definition of formalism as it 
has commonly come to be understood as short-hand by many who wish to argue against 
it, including those who argue for an ‘intellectualist’ approach to the aesthetics of nature, 
as Carlson and Parsons have done.225 
 That definition of formalism seems to accommodate our aesthetic experiences of 
nature because nature has no obvious artist or author in the way works of art do, and 
therefore, as some would have it, no inherent meaning or expression. This is because 
that sort of definition of formalism excludes content, emotional expressiveness, 
historical, institutional or social context, elements that do not obviously figure in our 
experiences of nature as they do in our experiences of art.  
Formalism along these lines is also often cited as the logical result of disinterest, in 
the mistaken sense used by many aestheticians, that is to say, those who think that 
disinterest means ‘lack of interest’ or the ‘suppression of subjective feeling, knowledge 
or interest’ as we saw in chapter two. Carroll, for example, thinks that Bell’s formalism 
is linked with Kant’s insofar as indeterminacy is linked to significant form that allows 
for “rapturous” aesthetic experience divorced from practical life and interests.226 Carroll 
                                                                                                                                           
see, whole formalism is distinct from ‘property formalism’ (of which Bell and 
Zangwill’s formalism are an example) and ‘kind formalism’ (which will not be 
discussed). 
224 Clive Bell, Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Eduard Hanslick, Vom 
Musikalisch-Schoenen (Leipzig: Johann Ambrofius Barth, 1891), Nick Zangwill, 
"Feasible Aesthetic Formalism," Noûs 33, no. 4 (1999), ———, "In Defense of 
Moderate Aesthetic Formalism," Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 201 (2000), ———, 
"Defusing Anti-Formalist Arguments," British Journal of  Aesthetics 40, no. 3 (2000), 
———, "Formal Natural Beauty," in The Metaphysics of Beauty (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), ———, "In Defense of Extreme Formalism About 
Inorganic Nature: Reply to Parsons," British Journal of  Aesthetics 45, no. 2 (2005). 
225 Glenn Parsons, Aesthetics and Nature, ed. Derek Matravers, Continuum Aesthetics 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2008). Chapter three. 
226 Carroll, "Beauty and the Genealogy of Art Theory." 32. 
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not only mischaracterises formalism, he misattributes it to Kant and Hutcheson, in the 
same way he did the concept of ‘disinterest’ as we saw in chapter three above.227 In any 
case, according to Carroll’s view at least, ‘disinterest’ and ‘formalism’ lead to an 
aesthetic experience that has no non-formal or non-perceptual content.  
It is worthwhile pausing momentarily in order to make sense of how formalism and 
the correct account of disinterest that we arrived at in chapter two are linked. We saw 
that the origins of ‘disinterest’ do not equate it to the complete denial of subjective 
reflection or thought in our encounters with aesthetic objects. The idea was that self-
interest, such as the use of the aesthetic to advance political and religious doctrines, was 
rejected in order to value the object of aesthetic interest for its own sake, account for its 
intrinsic value as an object in itself that has certain properties that are aesthetic. We are, 
as Hutcheson put it, “fitted” to experience the beauty or deformity of objects in a sense 
that is appropriate to the object’s features alone, rather than for our own self-interested 
purposes. Kant linked disinterest to the judgment of taste, which was grounded in 
subjective response and perceptual appearance rather than fully fledged theoretical 
knowledge. We later saw, contra Carroll, that disinterest is not in tension with a view of 
aesthetic experience that takes account both of perceptual aesthetic features that do link 
up with cognitive and emotive features, but neither are they reducible to them.  
The perceptual features of the experience are of import, hence an appeal to the 
object’s formal and perceptual features in addition to its expressive properties, the 
emotions and the imagination, as long as they pertain both to the subject and the object 
of the experience. I wish to focus on the austere account of formalism, such as that put 
forward by Bell in particular, and partly by Zangwill, and the reasons it is often evoked 
to characterise our experiences of nature, before going into those complexities. My aim 
is to resist creating too rigid a distinction between austere (or even moderate) formalism 
and cognitivism and to the steer the course between them, bringing out those aspects of 
                                                
227 Noël Carroll, "Clive Bell's Aesthetic Hypothesis," in Aesthetics: A Critical 
Anthology, ed. Richard Sclafani George Dickie, Ronald Roblin (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1989), Carroll, "Beauty and the Genealogy of Art Theory.", Noël Carroll, 
"Formalism," in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, ed. Dominic Lopes Berys 
Gaut (London, New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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both approaches to give a genuine account of aesthetic experience that avoids their 
unfortunate consequences. 
While it is likely that Kant influenced Bell, as Carroll suggests, his account of 
formalism does not explicitly mention Kant (or Hutcheson, for that matter). Bell’s 
formalism or theory of ‘significant form’ was that lines, colours, forms and relations of 
forms “stir our aesthetic emotions” and that “[t]o appreciate a work of art we need bring 
with us nothing but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional 
space”, especially where art was concerned.228 The aesthetic value that Bell attributed to 
art was one that originated in the kind of non-representational art that he was interested 
in, where pictorial, meticulous, representation was of no import according to his art 
critical practice or his vested interest in non-representational art. He then extended the 
idea of formalism to all art.  
It is telling that both Bell’s and Fry’s writings, were paving the way for the aesthetic 
commitments of early twentieth century Modernism. Bell assisted Fry with the latter’s 
second post-Impressionist exhibitions in 1912.229 As critics of art, they were both 
explicitly enthusiastic about bringing French modern painting to London, and not 
without controversy. The issue at stake for Fry was defending the status of paintings (by 
Cézanne, Gauguin, Van Gogh, Matisse, Manet) by way of his formalist denial of the 
aesthetic relevance of what a picture depicts: 
We may, then, dispense once and for all with the idea of [a painting’s] likeness to 
Nature, or correctness or incorrectness as a test, and consider only whether the 
emotional elements inherent in natural form are adequately discovered, unless, 
indeed, the emotional idea depends at any point upon likeness, or completeness of 
representation.230  
 
This idea of likeness in representation ties in with Bell’s conception of ‘significant 
form’ insofar as both Bell and Fry were concerned with getting away from mimetic 
representation in art. They wanted to defend non-representational painting with the aim 
of converting a sceptical British public to new forms of painting. Their thoughts on 
                                                
228 Bell, Art. 8, 27. 
229 Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, Art in Theory 1900-2000 (Malden, MA; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003). 75, 107. 
230 Fry, "An Essay in Aesthetics." 82. 
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formalism were determined by the paintings they admired rather than aesthetic 
experience or aesthetic response as such. While it may be true that meticulous, pictorial 
representation need not determine distinctly aesthetic value, it may, as Budd points out, 
be relevant to artistic value.231 There is a range of art that is representational that 
nevertheless has aesthetic value. 
 Despite this, we could insist that on Bell’s account, some representational art does not 
have aesthetic value as we need not have awareness of what the pictorial representation 
is in order for the emotion of significant form to arise. Austere formalists therefore deny 
representationally and perceptually relevant properties of the work itself the possibility 
of constituting part of the experience that is deemed to be aesthetic.  
Budd writes, therefore, that according to this kind of formalism, “attention should be 
limited to the two dimensional design of the picture surface, considered in abstraction 
from what is depicted”.232 We see the picture not as a picture, but as an abstraction and it 
is the abstraction that is of import to Bell. Just because a property is not necessary and 
sufficient such as non-formal properties, or other properties related to contextual issues, 
for the kind of theory that Bell wished to put forward does not mean that it is not 
relevant either to the representational work or to the experience. The difficulty is that 
Bell made a distinction between the scene depicted, the depiction and the way each 
ought to be experienced. The way it should be experienced is as an object that has 
significant form - lines, colours, spatial organisation that don’t relate to the artwork’s 
properties. 
 A similar issue arises where nature is concerned. How would Bell’s significant form 
apply to nature? Bell thought nature a non-aesthetic object: “Why these [natural] 
beautiful things do not move us as works of art move us is another, and not an aesthetic, 
question”.233 Still, as we will see below, contemporary ‘new formalists’ appeal to Bell’s 
version of formalism to make sense of formalism as it could apply to nature. Whether or 
not Bell thought nature could move us as works of art do, he still described nature and 
                                                
231 Malcolm Budd, "Formalism," in Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music, ed. 
Malcolm Budd (London: Penguin Books, 1995). 51. 
232 Ibid. 51. 
233 Bell, Art. 13. 
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its contents as beautiful. Significant form could apply to an agricultural landscape such 
that instead of seeing it as fields and cottages, we should see it as the “pure formal 
combination of lines and colours”. As we saw in chapter four, Bell holds the view that 
because nature is indeterminate, that is to say the product of intentional action, it is not 
the product of intentional human action; it does not hold the kind of significance we 
would otherwise attribute to art. 
 Be that as it may, the thought here is that what applied to art above also applies to 
nature, except there is no artist to interpret the scene or act as intermediary. The artist 
herself may want to interpret it according to the definition of significant form, bringing 
with her nothing but a sense of line, colour and an understanding of three-dimensional 
shape for the painting that a subject would later experience as a painting. The formal 
elements that she brings into her painting may afford it aesthetic value, but her 
experience, or anyone’s experience who has viewed the scene according to formal 
properties, would not necessarily be attending to its phenomenological detail or richness, 
but to the colours, lines and shapes it displays. This is because nature is not just a 
collection of formal properties, but a collection of properties that are relevant to being 
experienced aesthetically in a way that is more widely conceived than attending to those 
that are relevant for Bell’s significant form. The difficulty here is that Bell only thinks 
that certain specific properties are formal properties, that is to say lines, shapes and 
colours, to the exclusion of other perceptual properties and non-perceptual properties. 
His account of formalism is impoverished in relation to an object that has more than the 
formal properties he specifies, because he disallows much of what intuitively and 
importantly influences, contributes to, or thickens, our aesthetic perceptions. 
 Despite the question of whether we can access all or some of the properties that 
nature displays in-itself, we can attend to the features that we perceive and that are 
relevant to aesthetic experience without being selective about the properties that are 
supposed to figure in aesthetic experience conceived of according to significant form. 
Indeed, many aesthetic properties that nature displays relate to perspective, how we are 
oriented in relation towards it or parts of it, as well as our aural experience and our sense 
of smell of touch. Again, it is an indication that Bell’s formalism is impoverished that he 
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so narrowly wants to define formalism as applying only to visual aspects of experience, 
such as shape, line and colour and that other features relevant to the experience are 
excluded. Approaching nature with the framework of significant form denies the 
potentially broad range of nature’s aesthetic properties in our experience of nature, but 
contrasts with many aesthetic experiences of tradition forms of art, which are often 
neatly delineated and two-dimensional. 
 
Parsons and Carlson have identified a group of philosophers they call the ‘new 
formalists’; contemporary philosophers who have invoked this kind of austere formalism 
to underpin or drive their accounts of our aesthetic experiences of nature.234 Zangwill is 
the main proponent and writes, for example: 
MODERATE formalism lies between two extremes. On one extreme is extreme 
formalism, according to which the aesthetic value of something is entirely 
‘internal’ to it, in the sense that it does not at all depend on its history or context.* 
On the other extreme is anti-formalism, according to which, the aesthetic value of 
a thing always (or mostly) depends on its history or context. The extreme formalist 
position was advanced (for visual art) by Clive Bell and Roger Fry at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and (for music) by Eduard Hanslick in the 
middle of the nineteenth century,** but it has not been very popular since then. 
Anti-formalism dominates contemporary aesthetics, particularly in the United 
States. (Examples would be Arthur Danto and Kendall Walton.***) The right 
view, I think, falls between these extremes. According to moderate formalism, 
many aesthetic judgements make essential reference to history or context, and 
many do not. **** 
 Moderate formalism joins forces with extreme formalism in complaining 
vociferously that anti-formalism misses out on an important part of our aesthetic 
lives, in which our aesthetic thought and experience is independent of our 
knowledge of a thing’s history or context.235  
                                                
234 Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, "New Formalism and the Aesthetic Appreciation 
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235 Zangwill, "In Defense of Extreme Formalism About Inorganic Nature: Reply to 
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References to Danto’s The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge, MA: 
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**** “I develop  moderate formalism in chapters 4-8 of The Metaphysics of Beauty 
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We can see that Zangwill frames his approach to aesthetics by setting up a strong 
dichotomy between formalism and anti-formalism, and placing his own view somewhere 
in the middle where art and biological kinds are concerned. Even where these are 
concerned, he grounds his account in a strong formalist framework. His framework is  
stark and dichotomous, falsely attributing anti-formalism to philosophers, Walton for 
example, who provide a richer account of aesthetic experience than austere formalism 
allows by appealing to a wider range of properties to contribute to the experience, 
including its perceptual properties. Where Zangwill’s account of nature is concerned, the 
dichotomy is so strong that it goes as far as to apply “extreme” formalism to what he 
calls ‘inorganic nature’.236 Zangwill disagrees with the intellectualist approach we will 
consider in more detail below in which our aesthetic judgments of nature are dependent 
on categories of scientific knowledge that help us understand nature, as argued by 
Carlson and Parsons, but also with Budd’s view that nature should be seen and 
experienced ‘as nature’. This is because, on Zangwill’s view, nature has purposeless 
beauty, which we will look at below, and inorganic nature has aesthetic properties that 
are only formal properties.237 
 Carlson and Parsons, themselves in the intellectualist camp, define ‘classical extreme 
formalism’ as the idea, attributable to Bell, that formal properties somehow exhaust our 
aesthetic experience: the idea that classical formal properties are both necessary and 
sufficient for aesthetic experience, and include such properties as ‘harmonious’, 
‘unified’ and ‘balanced’. According to Parsons and Carlson, new formalism explicitly 
explores how formalism as a concept may be applied both to nature and to art, and 
                                                                                                                                           
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P. 2001).” Nick Zangwill, "Clouds of Illusion in the Aesthetics 
of Nature," The Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 252 (2013). 
236 Zangwill does allow for more moderate formalism in relation to organic nature, but 
his overall agenda is one that errs on the side of pared down accounts of aesthetic 
experience that conform to more austere accounts of formalism. Zangwill, "Formal 
Natural Beauty.", ———, "In Defense of Extreme Formalism About Inorganic Nature: 
Reply to Parsons.", ———, "Clouds of Illusion in the Aesthetics of Nature." 
237 Zangwill, "In Defense of Extreme Formalism About Inorganic Nature: Reply to 
Parsons." ———, "Formal Natural Beauty." In another paper, Zangwill defends a view 
of thin view of supervenience, which supports his version of formalism.  
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widens the category of formal properties to the idea that such properties are 
“metaphysically dependent only on what is often called the “sensory surface” of an 
object” and that “[t]hus, for the new formalists, an aesthetic property is formal so long as 
it is dependent only on nonaesthetic properties that are directly presented in perception, 
such as shape, color, and so forth”.238 Finally, new formalists do not take formal 
properties to be both necessary and sufficient for a moderately formal account of 
aesthetic experience, although they are necessary and sufficient for extreme formalism. 
 One clarification I wish to make before delving deeper into the issue of formalism 
relates to the second point, the point about metaphysical dependence. The definition of 
new formalism provided rests on the idea that the wider category of formal properties 
offered are based on such properties being metaphysically dependent on non-aesthetic 
properties. Parsons and Carlson cite Zangwill, for whom “formal properties are not 
thought to be restricted to those aesthetic properties that are determined solely by 
sensory properties” and Zangwill seems himself to be underpinning his formalism by 
appealing to supervenience, according to which aesthetic properties depend on non-
aesthetic properties and supervene on natural properties.239 One aspect of this relates to 
the main argument of this thesis about how aesthetic experience relates to this 
metaphysical, supervenience claim, which I will turn to in chapter six, where I use 
supervenience to support a phenomenologically rich perceptual account of formalism 
that I will call whole formalism, as per Zuckert’s characterisation.240 
I am here restricting myself to the idea that however we want to make sense of the 
metaphysical claim, it does not entail or result in the narrow formalism that Parsons and 
Carlson identify and criticise and that Zangwill espouses, unless the object is itself 
constituted by non-aesthetic properties that can only give rise to formal aesthetic 
properties, such as the Modern paintings that Bell was particularly interested in or the 
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inorganic nature that Zangwill wants to attribute his version of extreme formalism to.241 
Even though such an account of formalism may be applicable to experience of typically 
formal artworks and objects, including natural ones, it is insufficiently broad if it doesn’t 
allow for relevant, non-formal perceptual properties or non-perceptual properties. I will 
vindicate this assertion in chapter six, where I will argue for a kind of formalism that is 
more holistic, and that is not taken in isolation from relevant contextual features to 
which it non-causally relates. In both of these cases the object displays features, or the 
object is experienced as displaying features, or is abstracted from in such a way, that is 
especially conducive to formalism.  
This does not mean, however, that supervenience, according to which aesthetic 
properties depend on non-aesthetic properties and supervene on natural properties, 
entails experiences to be of a narrowly formalist kind. Nor does it mean that the 
concepts we use to pick out such experiences belong to the category of ‘formal’. Sibley 
proposed about aesthetic concepts, and Levinson proposed about aesthetic properties, 
that they belong to the wider category of the ‘aesthetic’, as we will see in chapter six.242 
For it to be the case that supervenience equates to formalism, most of our aesthetic 
experiences would have to be of the formalist kind, restricted to the imposition of a 
mode of experience, or perceptual abstraction, that isn’t quite or necessarily true of the 
object itself, as we argued above. We will return to issues related to attention, 
supervenience and perception in chapter six. I mention it here because I don’t think the 
supervenience base need be as narrow as Zangwill implies.  
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242 While Sibley resisted making metaphysical claims, but wrote of aesthetic concepts 
and terms, so did Levinson explore the idea of supervenience and aesthetic properties. 
Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts.", Levinson, "Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force, and 
Differences of Sensibility.", ———, "What Are Aesthetic Properties?.", Jerrold 
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Bearing the above in mind, we can make sense of the formalism/anti-formalism 
debate as follows. Because of their commitment to perceptual formal properties, 
formalists argue that you don’t need to bring knowledge or contextual information to 
bear on aesthetic experience, because it is formal, perceptual experience and not 
knowledge that is important to aesthetics. We saw this in Bell, in Zuckert’s initial 
definition of formalism, in Zangwill’s claims above, and in the way Parsons and Carlson 
have glossed Bell and Zangwill.243 As Zuckert’s definition states above, formalism is 
marked by what the experience leaves out rather than what it includes: considerations 
external to the object, representational content, emotional expressiveness, historical, 
institutional, social context, for example. ‘Anti-formalists’, on the other hand argue that 
more is required to account for the depth and richness of an aesthetic experience, but 
also in order to make correct judgments, which would take account of those 
considerations.244 
 
Let us look more closely at Zangwill’s claims about formalism and nature, so that we 
can set-up the reasons for revising his austere formalism for a more holistic account of 
formalism that can relate to relevant contextual knowledge, the argument presented in 
chapter six. Zangwill’s austere formalism not only relies on a narrow account of 
supervenience, but on the distinction between free and dependent beauty: natural beauty 
                                                
243 Bell, Art, Roger Fry, Transformations (London: Chatto & Windus, 1926), Hanslick, 
Vom Musikalisch-Schoenen. 
244 As I suggested earlier, Zangwill refers to them as anti-formalists, but it unclear that 
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irreconcilable views against each other. The issue should really be about how best to 
characterise our aesthetic experiences of nature. Walton and Hepburn do not make 
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Zangwill cites the following publications: Walton, "Categories of Art.", Hepburn, 
"Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty.", Carlson, Aesthetics and 
the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture, Glenn Parsons, 
"Natural Functions and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Inorganic Nature," British Journal 
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is either free (or formal), or it is dependent; nature has purposeless beauty and is 
therefore suited to a free (or formalist) account of aesthetic experience so that inorganic 
beauty can only have properties that are formal. Inorganic beauty, presumably, is 
particularly suited to extreme formalism because it looks to have purposeless beauty, in 
the same way that Modernist painting is suited to formalism in the artistic context, 
although the considerations about nature’s expressive properties discussed in chapter 
four undermine the thought that nature looks suited to extreme formalism. That is to say, 
it might be described as having easily definable shapes, such as the triangular shape of a 
mountain, lines such as geological features that show sedimentary layers in the earth or 
fault-lines and large patches and swathes of colour. 
Zangwill thinks that Kant’s judgment of free beauty necessarily gives rise to a formal 
experience of nature characterised in a narrow formalist sense, and that a dependent 
judgment of beauty, a judgment of beauty dependent on what the subject knows, on such 
concepts the formalist would rather exclude from a formalist account of aesthetic 
experience, gives rise to a formal experience. According to Zangwill, an organic thing 
should be appreciated as the particular thing it appears to be, although it can also have 
purposeless beauty. Inorganic nature, on the other hand, can only have aesthetic 
properties that are formal. Zangwill uses the following as an example of a natural entity 
having both free and dependent beauty: 
Consider the elegant and somewhat dainty beauty of a polar bear swimming 
underwater. Surely, we need not consider its beauty as the specific type of animal 
that it is. […] Need one consider the underwater-swimming polar bear as a 
beautiful living thing or a beautiful natural thing or just a beautiful thing? I think 
the last will do. It is a formally extraordinary phenomenon. It might even turn out 
to be an artfully choreographed swimmer dressed in a polar bear suit. No matter. It 
is still a beautiful spectacle. It has free, formal beauty.245 
 
Zangwill accepts that, due to its teleological nature, the polar bear can be beautiful in 
relation to the biological thing it is, as Carlson and Parsons would argue. He is also 
pleasantly surprised by the free experience of beauty that attaches to the polar bear, its 
surprising ‘incongruous’ beauty that, despite its size, the polar bear is both dainty and 
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elegant while traversing the water. But because there is a distinction between the two 
types of experience, and ‘anti-formalists’ such as Carlson and Parsons take it that all 
beauty is dependent (on biology or science in their case), Zangwill takes it that they 
cannot account for the other, free, non-rule driven kind of beauty. However, although 
Zangwill himself allows for the distinction, and despite his description of a free 
experience of beauty, Carlson and Parsons need not be compelled to deny their own 
dependent account. The formalist should require of the intellectualist that she 
acknowledges the importance of the perceptual aspect of formal aesthetic properties and 
the intellectualist would require of the formalist that she acknowledge the importance of 
an intellectual, cognitive, basis for aesthetic judgments. In either case we have 
impoverished theories for the very exclusive nature of their accounts of aesthetic 
experience. 
 One might first ask of Zangwill’s characterisation what it is about the experience he’s 
characterising that is both free and formal according to a narrow account of formalism. 
We will see below that purposelessness as written about by Kant, means ‘not rule 
driven’ in the sense that nature provides us with opportunities to experience it, not 
according to human-made or designed rules, nor according to divine rules, as we have 
already seen. While Zangwill links this aspect of Kant’s aesthetic thought to freedom as 
Kant himself does, he provides no evidence that freedom equates to the narrow kind of 
formalism he espouses. He just assumes there’s a link between that kind of formalism 
and freedom, according to which the form of an object requires a set of specific spatial 
or temporal properties that characterise the relations that hold among different parts of 
the object, which is why one might think he is begging the question. This is puzzling 
because austere formalism is rule driven in the sense that it actively prescribes the 
inclusion of what are thought to be formal properties and the exclusion of contextual 
factors.  
According to Zuckert, and as we will explore more fully in chapter six, Kant was not 
a austere formalist, but a whole formalist, according to whom an object is beautiful if it 
is ordered or unified, or if its parts harmonise to form a whole. Where austere formalism 
(what Zuckert calls property formalism) implies a list of criteria the object needs to have 
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in order to be considered aesthetically, the latter requires consideration of the object 
itself, and how its properties come together to form a whole. As we will see, this idea is 
not prescriptive in the same way, but takes account of the object as it appears as a 
unified structure regardless of what properties seemingly constitute it. While they may 
include classical formal properties, they may also include others. Furthermore, as 
Zuckert argues, Kant’s whole formalism is nestled within the threefold disjunctive 
argument that Kant presents, which brings together the object’s form, our sensual 
experience of it which brings us into contact with the object thereby providing our 
experience of it, and our concepts which may also come into play. Just because such 
concepts are neither necessary nor sufficient for our distinctly perceptual aesthetic 
experience of an object’s form does not mean that they are not relevant to the 
experience.  
This brings me to a point where Kant’s own thoughts about free and dependent 
beauty can be appealed to in order to show that the distinction isn’t as straightforward as 
Zangwill makes out. It is worth doing this to remind ourselves of the richness of Kant’s 
account that Kant’s accounts of free and dependent beauty range over many objects and 
sometimes overlap, as we saw in chapter two. Furthermore, Kant does not favour free 
over dependent beauty. According to Kant: 
There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) or merely adherent 
beauty (pulchritudo adherens). The first presupposes no concept of what the object 
ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the 
object in accordance with it. The first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or 
that thing; the latter, as adhering to a concept (conditioned beauty), are ascribed to 
objects that stand under the concepts of a particular end.246 
 
Kant later provides examples of free natural beauties that are free “according to mere 
form” which include flowers, many birds, crustaceans.247 These engage the imagination 
in such a way that it contemplates the object’s appearance without appealing to a 
definitive concept. Such objects do not require the presupposition, or the concept of 
                                                
246 Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment. §16, 5:229, 114. 
247 Ibid. §16, 5: 230, 114. We might contrast these with what he calls free artificial 
beauties: designs à la grèque, foliage on borders or wallpaper, purely instrumental 
music. 
 146 
what the object’s purpose is. In contrast, Kant includes the beauty of human beings, 
horses, or buildings as dependent natural beauties. Objects of dependent beauty can be 
judged according to their function, or purpose, and can be based on the concept of the 
object’s perfection. While it may seem, according to Kant, that we can’t judge flowers, 
many birds and crustaceans according to their purpose, what he is really saying is that 
we can have two types of experience, free and dependent, that range and overlap across 
many objects, judging by the range and variety of examples he cites. 
The faculty of taste is required for free beauties because we are free to make a 
judgment of beauty independent of concepts (relating to the agreeable or the good, for 
example):  
In the judging of a free beauty (according to mere form) the judgment of taste is 
pure. No concept of any end for which the manifold should serve the given object 
and thus which the latter should represent is presupposed, by which the 
imagination, which is as it were at play in the observation of the shape, would 
merely be restricted.248  
 
On the other hand, where dependent beauty is concerned, the faculty of taste is not 
required because we have some notion according to which the object is being or should 
be judged: 
Now the satisfaction in the manifold in a thing in relation to the internal purpose 
that determines its possibility is a satisfaction grounded on a concept; the 
satisfaction in beauty, however, is one that presupposes no concept, but is 
immediately combined with the representation through which the object is given 
(not through which it is thought). Now if the judgment of taste in regard to the 
latter is made dependent on the purpose in the former, as a judgment of reason, 




A judgment of taste in regard to an object with a determinate internal end would 
thus be pure only if the person making the judgment either had no concept of this 
end or abstracted from it in his judgment. But in that case, although this person 
would have made a correct judgment of taste, in that he would have judged the 
object as a free beauty, he would nevertheless be criticized and accused of a false 
taste by someone else, who considered beauty in the object only as an adherent 
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property (who looked to the end of the object), even though both judge correctly in 
their way: the one on the basis of what he has before his sense, the other on the 
basis of what he has in his thoughts. By means of this distinction one can settle 
many disputes about beauty between judges of taste, by showing them that the one 
is concerned with free beauty, the other with adherent beauty, the first making a 
pure, the second an applied judgment of taste.250 
 
From these extracts we can note that whether our judgment is free or dependent is 
related to the subject’s response rather than to the object concerned, and that these are 
different approaches that can help explain different ways we experience nature. 
Zangwill’s distinction, however, is unclear in the sense that, on the one hand, he accepts 
that certain objects can be seen as both free and dependent (organic nature, such as the 
polar bear) while other objects can only be seen as free (inorganic nature). It is difficult 
to make sense of the examples that Kant gives for free and dependent beauty. Because 
the examples for one category, such as free beauty, seem to fit into the category of 
adherent beauty, we are led to thinking that both free and dependent beauty can apply to 
most objects.  
It may be that a mountain range can less easily be brought under the category of 
dependent beauty because there are fewer mountain ranges, than, for example, 
subcategories for types of horses or butterflies. We nevertheless experience the horse or 
butterfly as free from whatever category we might otherwise want to put it in. On the 
other hand, we might want to compare our experience of the Alps with the Himalayas, 
the Appalachians, the Andes, the Atlas, and even the Highlands of Scotland. We can 
have both free and dependent experiences of many objects of both art and nature. We are 
not, according to Kant, restricted to one or the other as long as we attend to the object 
perceptually and are aware of different possible approaches.   
Zangwill’s own preference is for judging the polar bear as a free, formal beauty 
which again makes it look like he is clinging to theoretical principles that could mean 
ignoring relevant features that one might otherwise intuitively include. While it may 
seem the preferred option according to Kant that a pure judgment of taste is better than 
an adherent judgment of taste, neither one nor the other is correct, as can be read in the 
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third extract: they are just different approaches we can take to judging an object 
aesthetically.  
 
Let us now consider the second claim that I attributed to Zangwill above, that 
according to him nature has purposeless beauty and is therefore suited to a formalist 
account of aesthetic experience. For Zangwill, because inorganic nature is free from pre-
determining concepts, it is purposeless, has no function, and instantiates properties that 
are formal. He therefore has difficulties accommodating Hepburn’s analysis of an 
experience of walking on a beach: 
Suppose I am walking over a wide expanse of sand and mud. The quality of the 
scene is perhaps that of wild, glad emptiness. But suppose I bring to bear upon the 
scene my knowledge that this is a tidal basin, the tide being out. The realization is 
not aesthetically irrelevant. I see myself now as walking on what is for half the day 
sea-bed. The wild, glad emptiness may be tempered by a disturbing weirdness.251 
  
Zangwill considers both of the responses, that of “wild, glad emptiness” and that of “a 
disturbing weirdness” as part of a wider whole, concluding that the initial judgment need 
not be replaced by the second. They can co-exist and this co-existence issues in a 
weirdness not dissimilar from the way that “a brief jolly passage sounds strange in a 
funeral march” or “a delicate ornament can be out of place in a triumphal arch”.252 
 Hepburn is not making claims about formalism or free and dependent beauty, he is 
describing what he would have called a movement of the mind that begins in the 
experience of wild, glad emptiness and through reflection and imagination ends in 
considering the beach’s existence as the sea-bed of a tidal basin and how it changes 
according to the tide. This is in keeping with the idea that although nature is purposeless 
or indeterminate, we experience it perceptually and bring to it knowledge or imaginative 
processes that have not been prescribed, but that nevertheless “feed into” that perceptual 
experience, as Brady writes.  
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This does not entail the kind of dissonance Zangwill assumes between two different 
experiences occurring at once, such as those of the funeral march or triumphal arch 
above, but the sudden recognition that the object perceived has a dimension not 
previously considered, in this case an imagined underwater scene. The imagined 
properties are of the tidal basin complement the actual experience of walking on the 
muddy beach that currently displays wild, glad, emptiness. The imagination brings in 
features rich in meaning about nature itself, and how we relate to it. Our experiences of 
nature occasion “a delight in the fact that the forms of the natural world offer scope for 
the exercise of the imagination, that leaf pattern chimes with vein pattern, cloud form 
with mountain form and mountain form with human form”.253  
Where this example is concerned, I’ve just considered an intuitive response of a 
whole-formalist kind, which will be discussed below, but which makes a perceptual 
account of aesthetic experience central to aesthetic experience. I will now consider 
another, similar, kind of response that does not appeal to scientific knowledge. For 
example, Stecker gives compelling reasons for why we should not be compelled into 
thinking that our aesthetic experiences of nature can be inappropriate or illegitimate if 
they are not based on scientific knowledge as Carlson argues (as we will see below), and 
without making claims related to the debate about formalism and anti-formalism. 
Specifically with reference to the tidal basin example provided by Hepburn, he writes 
the following: 
The shore of a tidal basin is sometimes above water and is then (part of) a beach, 
and is sometimes below water and is then (part of) a sea-bed. Here are (initially) 
three ways one can appreciate this bit of land: as beach, as sea-bed, as sometimes 
beach-sometimes sea-bed. None of these ways is malfounded.254  
 
According to Stecker, knowledge can supplement our aesthetic experiences of nature, 
and there are many and infinite amounts and varieties of knowledge that can be brought 
to bear on them. However, other examples he uses indicate that he does not simply take 
a formal view of our experiences of nature. For example, he writes about a “cluster of 
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lady’s slippers” and “their unusual, bulbous shape, their brilliant yellow”. He also writes 
that “[o]ne can enjoy a flower simply for its surface qualities, but can ‘thicken this 
enjoyment by knowing that it indicates a certain stage of the spring when one can find 
other things one likes, and one now knows to look for them, or that it indicates things to 
come, as blossoms indicate fruit, or that it stand (sic.) in some intricate relation to other 
things in the environment”.255 Here, Stecker refers to the surface quality of things, which 
are perceptual features. The idea of the surface quality, or ‘sensuous surface’ of objects 
is important because these are the very features of the object that we perceive that need 
not be equated in terms of formal properties.256 This does not require appealing to a 
formalist account of aesthetic experience it requires the identification of certain, formal, 
properties that would entail the imposition of a formalist structure on the object in 
question. The idea is that many forms of knowledge can come to bear on genuine 
perceptual experience by attending to an object’s surface qualities without being 
restricted to formal properties. 
 
As we have already seen from my discussion on disinterest, nature’s expressive 
properties, and material considered from Brady, Hepburn and Stecker, that nature is 
purposeless does not entail that we experience it formally in the narrow sense Zangwill, 
Bell or property-formalism hold. That nature is purposeless means that there is no 
“artist” whose thought processes we must appeal to, no divine entity that we must appeal 
to or whose rules we must appeal to in order to make sense of the qualities we see in 
nature. However, austere formalism (which I have also referred to as narrow formalism, 
and will be referred to as property formalism in chapter six) according to Bell and 
Zangwill entail the prescription of rules that leave out some perceptual and non-
perceptual features that are nevertheless relevant, such as the imagination or knowledge 
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(where knowledge is not stipulative for aesthetic experience) or other non-formal 
features. 
Zangwill’s attempt to extend Bell’s formalism to account for our experiences of 
nature is regrettable not only because formalism has difficulties accounting for the 
phenomenology of our experiences of nature, by imposing a structure on those 
experiences rather than attending to the objects of those experiences, but because it 
disallows, or minimises the importance of, other features that are highly relevant to the 
experience. This does not mean that the formal perceptual features of the experience do 
not matter, as long as they are correctly attributed, but that our experiences would 
necessarily be distorted by a formalist account, unless the object is predisposed to a 
formalist experience, which is rather unlikely, especially where the aesthetics of nature 
is concerned. We can look both to an object’s surface qualities or appearance qualities 
and to whatever knowledge we have in the moment of experience to fully characterise it. 
 
§ Scientific Cognitivism and the Rejection of Formalism 
 
 A narrow, austere, formalist account is one way of experiencing nature aesthetically 
that does not entirely seem to capture many aspects of aesthetic experience that are often 
relevant. Unlike austere formalism, cognitivism focuses on how knowledge can 
appropriately justify our aesthetic experiences of nature, rather than focusing on a 
perceptual account of aesthetic experience that primarily allows for detailed attention to 
the object itself, our perceptual response to it, and other, secondary (but not irrelevant) 
imaginative and cognitive features, that come to bear on the perceptual experience. This 
is because the cognitivist thinks that in order for our interaction with nature to be 
appropriate, our judgment also needs to be. The cognitivist thus brings in an ethical 
dimension that applies to nature in a distinct way from that in which it applies to art 
because we interact with nature, use it as a resource and change it for our own 
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purposes.257 In what follows I will provide an account of Carlson’s view that will show 
that his appeal to scientific cognitivism for justifying our aesthetic experiences and 
judgments of nature necessarily entails denying many valid features of such experiences 
and judgments. I do this by briefly exploring the disparate approaches that he explicitly 
rejects. His view therefore leads to the similar kind of narrow aesthetic experience that 
austere formalism does, only it relies on science rather than formal properties. 
 Carlson is the main advocate for a cognitive approach to the aesthetics of nature.258 
He rejects Kantian approaches to the aesthetics of nature, including the idea that nature 
has purpose without purpose, free beauty, or seems designed according to a narrowly 
formalist account. He rejects many other models of nature appreciation, favouring a 
natural environmental model that he claims essentially connects the aesthetics of nature 
with scientific knowledge. That idea is analogous to the one presented by Walton, who 
argues that our judgments of art are dependent on and essentially connected with, 
correctly categorising art.259 The aesthetic appreciation of nature according to Carlson 
involves scientific knowledge of different environments and ecological systems within 
them, just as the aesthetic appreciation of art requires knowledge of artistic traditions 
and styles. Nature is thus to be appreciated as it is, both as being natural and in light of 
our scientific knowledge of what it is. Furthermore, because nature sustains itself and 
because its aesthetic appearance is not down to human intentionality, there is no need for 
us to be critical of it in the same way that we are critical of art, which is a product of 
human intentionality. This gives us reason for thinking that nature’s aesthetics is 
essentially positive, that a negative experience of nature is never warranted, that we have 
no basis on which to be critical of it. This scientific, epistemic, approach to aesthetic 
experience gives it the substantive underpinnings that austere formalism does not allow. 
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This approach also gives us guidance on how we should experience nature and what an 
aesthetic judgment of nature entails.  
 For the scientific cognitivist, the concept of formalism is taken to be a direct 
descendent from eighteenth century aesthetic theories and supervenience, but I have 
already argued that this is a misattribution and that formalism was not intended to entail 
the definition of property formalism, or narrow formalism it has been glossed with. In 
the previous section, we saw that Zangwill provides a staunch defence of what I have 
called austere formalism (or ‘property formalism’, as per Zuckert’s characterisation) that 
“vociferously” contests the kind of anti-formalism that Carlson and Walton offer. 
However, just as Zangwill mischaracterizes Walton’s position as anti-formalist, I will 
argue that Carlson, explicitly claiming an anti-formalist position, places too much 
emphasis on using categories of knowledge to ensure the appropriateness of aesthetic 
judgments as they relate to nature.  
 Walton does not position his view as being anti-formalist as such. Rather, Walton 
does acknowledge a work’s distinctly aesthetic features and makes sense of their 
application relative to various standards or frameworks. These standards and 
frameworks are otherwise understood as being non-aesthetic (and therefore non-
formalist according to Zangwill) in the sense that they are dependent on categories of art 
that include “media, genre, styles, forms” etcetera. It is just that, according to Walton, 
the aesthetic properties an artwork appears to have relate to the categories under which 
we subsume it during the experience. On the other hand, the aesthetic properties an 
artwork actually does have are determined by the category to which it belongs.260 
Walton does allow for perceivable aesthetic properties because he draws the distinction 
between aesthetic properties (those perceptual properties that are an aesthetic Gestalt, 
based on non-aesthetic perceptual properties) and non-aesthetic properties (perceptual 
properties that are not aesthetic), and does not speak of formal properties as such.  
 Carlson, on the other hand, does explicitly argue against formalism. He identifies 
formalism, as Zangwill himself does, with the austere, Bellian, kind of formalism that 
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we have also termed austere formalism.261 Here, he attributes the concept to Bell, relates 
it with the development of art and landscape art and the “cult of nature”, which 
according to him has permeated discourse in geography and forestry management, 
where the overall impression of landscape should be one of “form, line, color and 
texture”.262 
 Again, this kind of formalism is not true to Kant’s whole formalism, as we will see in 
further detail below, in whose thought the austere account is supposed to have 
originated. In any case, Carlson does not articulate how an object is constituted in 
perception and our subjective, perceptual experience of it. There is a way of 
understanding formalism more holistically, a way that takes account of the object’s 
perceivable and perceptual form, rather than having a specific set of formal properties to 
focus on or impose on an object (as in the case of property formalism). This does not 
entail that we bring no other relevant, or possibly relevant features to bear on it, but that 
we do account for the object as it appears in its objectivity. I will return to this idea in 
chapter six. 
 Another relevant issue that is not as straightforward as Carlson presents it is the 
automatic link he makes between narrow accounts of formalism and the development of 
landscape painting. For if we accept that formalism can be traced back to Kant and that 
Kant was primarily concerned with nature rather than art, as I proposed in section two of 
chapter three, there is no reason to assume that formalism (again, I would say ‘whole’ 
rather than austere formalism) did not previously apply to nature as nature. For example, 
in the context of his discussion on austere formalism, Carlson mentions the use of the 
‘Claude-glass’, “a small, tinted, convex mirror named after the artist” that was used by 
tourists in order to view the landscape in such a way that its formal properties (of 
“color” and “perspective”) are emphasised.  
 However, just because the Claude-glass was an instrument with which people 
observed the landscape, and that such properties as colour and perspective were 
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emphasised by eighteenth century travel writers, this does not mean that that this was the 
only way of appreciating the landscape, or that it was appreciated under the rubric of 
formalism. Formalism, particularly whole formalism, is a concept that is distinct both 
from nature and from art and applicable to both. There is no doubt that nature viewing 
and landscape viewing are, and have always been, important in mutually significant 
ways, but formalism did not really become important in painting until an argument was 
required to justify certain kinds of art in the early twentieth century, as we saw earlier in 
this chapter. Bell’s version of formalism was significant because he was interested in 
justifying and promoting non-representational paintings as distinct from nature’s 
presentation. Furthermore, we can interpret Kant’s formalism in a way that does allow 
for perceptually rich, aesthetic accounts of nature as perceptually presented to us. Unlike 
the challenges of non-representational twentieth century art, the eighteenth century “cult 
of nature” is likely to have had less to do with landscape painting than it did with a 
genuine interest in nature, seeing the world and being genuinely astonished by 
conquered mountains and awe-inspiring vistas. 
 Carlson’s approach is necessarily a dependent account of aesthetic appreciation, 
appealing to Kant’s distinction, as we saw above, according to which an object is 
dependent on its natural kind. Such judgments exist, and compare the object’s de facto 
appearance with the ideal of its kind. This kind of judgment brings in the kind of 
categorical approach to aesthetic appreciation that Carlson advocates, whereby 
knowledge is a stipulative requirement, necessary for judgment. The difficulty with such 
dependent judgments is an emphasis on how we ought to aesthetically experience 
something rather than how we often do experience it as free from such dependence. 
 Yet Carlson ignores, or thinks irrelevant that other, non-dependent, forms of 
judgment also exist, such as free accounts of beauty, for which there are no stipulative 
rules or criteria for the content of aesthetic experience, but for which a kind of attention 
to the object best brings out its aesthetic features. We have already considered the kind 
of attention required, it is of the kind that is disinterested, or non-self interested, and 
completely focused on the object’s perceptual features and our sensual response to it. 
 156 
This ties into the idea that we are fit for phenomenally experiencing aesthetic qualities 
that both relate to the object and the perceptual effects of those qualities. 
 This kind of account can bring out a multitude of possible aesthetic experiences 
because we not only carefully attend to the features of the experience itself, but to the 
infinite multitude of ways we might respond to and conceptualise them. Because 
Carlson’s account focuses so narrowly on how we should experience nature, reducing 
such experiences to scientific knowledge, however that might further be specified, he 
denies the very possibility for the freedom of aesthetic response, which is rooted in a 
subject perceptually engaged by, sensually responding to, and freely trying to 
conceptualise the experience. It detracts from Carlson’s theory that it does not allow for 
the seriousness and importance of non-scientific accounts of aesthetic response.  
 Carlson rejects various aesthetic models that have been applied to environmental 
aesthetics: the object model, the landscape model, the engagement model263, the arousal 
model264 that we’ve already discussed in chapter four, the mystery model265, the 
                                                
263 Arnold Berleant, Art and Engagement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 
Berleant, The Aesthetics of Environment. Carlson writes that the engagement model, a 
theory that characterises aesthetic experience as completely immersive. According to 
Carlson, because the subject is completely immersed in a multi-sensory experience of 
nature, and lacks the kind of distance that is provided by objective reason, the 
engagement model cannot account for a distinction to be made between superficial and 
serious accounts of our aesthetic experiences of nature. Although Carlson rejects 
accounts of Kantian disinterest, which he links with formalism, he seems to think that a 
scientific form of distance, or disinterest, can provide objective truths about the 
environment, for science is what provides knowledge and understanding about the 
world. A serious form of aesthetic response would entail a cognitively rich account 
whose content is provided by science. Without scientific distance, we would not know 
how to distinguish between overly subjective aesthetic experience that is trivial, and 
implicitly less desirable, than serious, objective, cognitive aesthetic experience. 
264 Carroll, "On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History." The 
arousal model brings to the fore commonplace, everyday experiences of being 
emotionally moved by nature. It is premised on the idea that Carlson’s cognitive account 
does not take into account certain emotional responses to nature that don’t draw on 
scientific knowledge but are just as legitimate. According to Carlson, however, the 
exclusion of scientific knowledge and understanding, make our experiences of nature 
less cognitively rich and are therefore, presumably, of less value. Like the engagement 
model, the arousal model is criticized as less serious because it is overly focused on 
subjective experience rather than the object of that experience. 
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postmodern model266, the pluralist model267 and the metaphysical imagination model268. 
I will begin with Carlson’s rejection of models that I do not have space to defend here, 
but that are noteworthy for their richness.  All of these models fail in one way or another 
(but not all of them completely), according to Carlson, because they are overly 
subjective and/or do not engage intellectually with the object in a way that allows for 
properly understanding it and therefore having its aesthetic properties revealed. One 
does not accommodate a distance theory and absorbs the object into subjective 
experience, another because it is overly visceral, another because it takes nature to be 
essentially unknowable because of its indeterminacy and others because they do not 
provide the kind of content for experience that is necessarily and appropriately 
experienced aesthetically. The rejection of all of these models relies on the fact that none 
of them can reveal what nature, in fact, is. Knowing what nature is according to science 
and appreciating and responding to it aesthetically are different endeavours. Moreover, 
one might think of science in its various forms as itself subjective to human experience 
in the sense that it can only tell us about nature what makes sense to us or what is 
                                                                                                                                           
265 Carlson cites: Stan Godlovitch, "Icebreakers: Environmentalism and Natural 
Aesthetics," Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1994). The mystery model is a model 
where our experience of nature is appropriate only when it is accompanied by a sense of 
incomprehension, where nature is unknowable to us and beyond our capability to 
understand it, which seems to have or might justify, religious dimension. 
266 Carlson cites: George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (New York: Collier, 1961). 
The postmodern model is a constructivist model, one that constructs our experiences of 
nature through our musings and writings about it. It compares nature to a text, where an 
author may be attributed to its appearance. According to Carlson, no one such attribution 
is more valuable than another, and all dimensions of art literature, folklore, religion and 
myth are acceptable dimensions of the appreciation of nature.  
267 Carlson cites: Yrjo Sepanmaa, The Beauty of Environment (Denton, TX: 
Environmental Ethics Books, 1993). Similarly to the postmodern model, the pluralist 
model accepts cultural diversity and richness, but only a small part of those Carlson 
assumes are postmodern are relevant to the serious appropriate appreciation of nature. 
268 Carlson cites: Ronald Hepburn, "Landscape and the Metaphysical Imagination," 
Environmental Values 5 (1996). The metaphysical imagination model interprets nature 
as revealing metaphysical insights about experience, the meaning of life, the human 
condition. According to this account, formally appreciating nature would require 
resolving metaphysical issues and how we humans fit into that. 
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meaningful to us. There are possibly aspects about nature that science cannot reach and 
that we therefore cannot know. 
 Another issue of relevance is that Carlson’s identification of some of the models he 
presents is ambiguous and somewhat vague. This is perhaps not so much the case with 
the engagement, arousal, mystery or metaphysical models, each of which he seems to 
dismiss as trivial accounts of nature appreciation, as we saw above.269 It is not clear what 
the origins of the postmodern and pluralist models are supposed to be. For example, in 
support of the postmodern model, Carlson cites an excerpt from Santayana in which the 
latter takes a particularly poetic approach to appreciating a landscape, and constructing it 
in the imagination. Santayana did not explicitly or implicitly develop a postmodern 
theory of nature appreciation, but pursued a naturalistic approach to beauty, making it 
central to his aesthetics. There may be postmodern approaches to nature appreciation in 
cultural and literary theory, but Carlson does not cite them. 
 Carlson rejects two other models that merit attention: the object model and the 
landscape model. The object model is a model according to which nature is a collection 
of objects of which we have discrete experiences. Our experience of nature according to 
this model is characterised mainly by the enjoyment we take from an individual object’s 
sensuous properties as we traverse a landscape. According to Carlson, we have 
historically been encouraged to traverse natural landscapes as though traversing a gallery 
or museum, attending to objects as distinct from their contextual environments, as if they 
were sculptural, autonomous objects. He suggests that seeing the object as, or removing 
it from, its environment distorts its meaning, since it should be seen as part of the 
environmental context to which it belongs or as belonging to a scientific category.  
 The object model resembles the idea that when we experience art aesthetically, we 
tend to focus on a discrete object, as Carlson seems to have it, one that is placed on a 
plinth as if it were in a gallery. This is carried over to our experience of nature and we 
aesthetically experience an object without considering its corresponding cognitive 
content, or the context to which it concretely belongs. However, our aesthetic 
                                                
269 Although each of these presents its own mode of nature appreciation and experience 
that have not been dislodged by Carlson’s argument, but trivialised.  
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experiences of nature are, according to Carlson, typically of wider environments, 
landscapes, or objects that are inter-connected. 
 Carlson similarly sees the landscape model as distorting our view of the natural world 
because of its basis in using our experiences of representational landscape painting to 
make sense of our experiences of the natural landscape as it is presented to us. 
According to him, the landscape model flattens the presentational, natural, landscape, 
and focuses attention on a distanced, visual account of nature appreciation such as might 
be found in a landscape painting. Because of this, the landscape model neglects how we 
ordinarily experience or understand nature, and we do not attend to features that reveal 
to us what nature is, just as the models discussed above don’t. According to Carlson, 
these models neglect the normal experience or understanding of nature. 
 Are Carlson’s objections to the object and landscape models valid? Carlson makes 
the point that nature is frameless and that nature’s objects belong to environments and 
are interdependent. That interdependence entails that nature is not just a collection of 
objects and should therefore encourage an appreciation of nature that takes account of 
the complex biological processes that make it up and make up its environment. This 
means that we should experience whole environments, in “larger chunks”, as 
“interrelated objects, vistas, environments”, as Stecker characterises the object view.270 
Yet we are not forced to look at a discrete object as if it were artificial, without links to 
its environment. We often do appreciate single, discrete objects in nature as nature, 
rather than as artificial, sculptural or artistic objects. Attending to its objective features 
does not distort understanding of it or how it is related to its environment. By attending 
to its individual features, we can come to appreciate the object for what it is, a natural 
object in itself.  
 We can also come to understand how it relates to other elements in its environment. 
Take a chestnut, for example. In autumn, we can pick up a shiny new chestnut, 
appreciate its sleek, shiny surface, its size, compare it with an acorn or a hazelnut. Upon 
investigating it further, we can also see how its shiny sleek surface fitted into the husk, 
spiky on the outside and soft and protective on the inside, that it has since separated 
                                                
270 Stecker, "The Correct and the Appropriate in the Appreciation of Nature." 395. 
 160 
from, and that was lying next to it on the ground underneath the chestnut tree. In fact, we 
also notice that the leaves have begun to fall from the trees, have turned rusty and have 
begun to smell musty and, well, autumnal. We have gone from having noticed, attended 
to, and appreciated a discrete object in itself to appreciating the environment from which 
it came. Our traversing nature’s landscape is not like a walk through the gallery, where 
we attend to one object and then the next. Rather, we attend to our aesthetic experiences 
of nature as nature, through all or some of our senses, from the perspective of sitting on 
a mountaintop to being embedded in a forest. Our aesthetic experience might incorporate 
a mountain vista or focus on a fluttering hummingbird, darting around the crimson 
hibiscus. 
 The landscape model is slightly more complex, in that it also refers to the picturesque 
movement that occurred in the eighteenth century. The landscape model refers to 
appreciating nature as though it were a landscape painting. This is not an unusual 
occurrence, such as when my neighbour referred to the wintry scene of the Meadows 
park, viewed from her first floor window, as a beautiful Breughel. This, in itself, is not 
really problematic, for the view before her reminded her of a Breughel scene and does 
not impact the scene itself. What is potentially problematic is the imposition on the 
natural landscape that it should, or ought to be picturesque, in the sense that our mode of 
attention to the natural world should be altered to look like a painting, rather than look as 
it does naturally. This too, is a moot point, for we sometimes need or want to design 
natural landscapes such that they fit in with our perceived needs and goals, and in such 
cases we take account of the ethical dimensions of such aspects.  
 Carlson brings into question the notion that viewing a natural landscape as an 
‘artificial’ landscape means that our immediate experience of the natural landscape is 
treated as though it were artificial, or a flat, two-dimensional painting, hung on a wall, in 
a gallery. However, Carlson’s approach negates the potential importance that looking at 
landscape painting can have on looking at nature. Our experiences of landscape painting 
can sometimes characterise our experiences of nature, allow us to see or interpret 
landscapes as artists have either historically (which can tell us something about their 
interests) or contemporarily. This does not make such experiences trivial or mean that 
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we need to have aesthetic experiences of landscape paintings before having aesthetic 
experiences of nature, it just means that our previous experiences of landscape paintings 
can contribute to or thicken our own experiences of nature in significant ways. Examples 
of this include being able to see a landscape through the artist’s own perceptual 
experience.  
 As Stecker writes, “Carlson’s rejection of the landscape model is that it nullifies the 
extremely fruitful interaction (for the appreciation of both nature and art) between seeing 
views in which certain visible features become salient and seeing paintings of (usually 
different) views that make some visible features salient which one an then bring to bear 
on views (different ones) that one sees”. One is thereby enabled to see the surrounding 
environment through a different set of eyes.271  
 Carlson’s account of landscape painting is also reductive, denying the importance of 
the imagination and its engagement both with painting, on the one hand and with nature, 
on the other. The imagination can help us immerse ourselves in paintings, help us create 
a framework for imaginative, three-dimensional exploration the space depicted. This 
might be illustrated by the moment that Julie Andrews and Dick Van Dyke jump into the 
latter’s pastel paintings on a sidewalk in Mary Poppins, and become immersed in a 
highly idealised natural world of horse-racing. Conversely, the Arboretum Walk on the 
Applecross Estate in the North of Scotland offers many opportunities for children and 
adults alike to learn about trees. This particular walk is partly made of a tunnel formed 
of the trees’ root system, that are both covered in both moss and flowers at the right time 
of year. This offers children in particular the opportunity to mythologise their 
surroundings by thinking the root system a home to a community of fairies, for example. 
Through that process of mythological imagination that engages with the space’s 
perceivable features, they might also learn to value that environment as a habitable 
space.  
 A more formidable approach would show how examples of landscape painting in the 
Western tradition, or botanical drawings, can bring us closer to learning about nature, 
the history of natural sciences or aesthetically appreciating nature through time. This 
                                                
271 Ibid. 396. 
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does not mean that the landscape, or indeed the object, models are the only ways that we 
can aesthetically appreciate the environment, or that scientific approaches, such as an 
understanding of evolution, don’t sometimes contribute to our aesthetic appreciation of 
nature and its landscapes. Central to this is the thought that the aesthetic is located in 
perceptually experiencing both natural, and non-natural, objects. 
 As already suggested, Carlson rejects each of these models in preference for the 
natural environmental model according to which nature is to be appreciated as what it is, 
in light of knowledge provided by the natural sciences: it is both natural and provides an 
environment with which we can have cognitive engagement. For Carlson, this model 
provides an objective starting point due to its reliance on a scientific view of nature that 
is not overly dependent on subjective flight of fancy and that can account for the 
correctness of nature appreciation. Not only that, it assumes a positive view of 
aesthetics, the view that the natural world is essentially beautiful and aesthetically good, 
that the correct appreciation of the natural world is positive. 
 There is some question as to whether the idea of categories can really be transferred 
from art to nature. Carlson rejects the models listed at the beginning of the section, but 
he also rejects the idea of Kant’s free beauty that we saw above, as well as formalist 
arguments that emphasise the importance of the perceptual features of experience, but 
also many non-scientific aspects that are often contributory elements to the types of 
experiences we have of nature. This is because an appropriate response to nature is 
dependent on scientific knowledge, according to him.  
 Aesthetic experience is not reducible to scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge 
may be relevant, or play an important role in aesthetic experience, just as historical 
knowledge or mythical knowledge might, but it cannot determine whether the 
experience will be aesthetic. Alternatively, we can think of scientific theories as elegant, 
or beautiful, according to an ‘internal sense’, but this is not the same as experiencing a 
natural object, or the landscape, as beautiful, to which a scientific theory is applied. 
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What is necessary to aesthetically experiencing an object is experiencing it perceptually, 
being acquainted with it, not how much we know about it.272  
 One idea that undergirds each of the models Carlson rejects, as well as his own 
natural-environmental model, but that does not play an explicit role in them (except for 
Berleant’s engagement model), is that aesthetically experiencing nature requires a 
perceptual engagement with the object to which other features, though not necessary for 
a distinctly aesthetic experience, are often nevertheless relevant to it. The perceptual 
engagement is thus of the object, to which we pay careful attention, our sensual 
experience of it and the concepts that may apply. 
 One might think that the natural environmental model’s ethical basis and its positive 
aesthetic dimension speak powerfully to how we should treat the natural environment, 
despite Carlson’s rejection of many aspects of aesthetic experience that one might think 
of as desirable, as we saw above. According to Carlson, science provides a plausible 
justification for a positively valenced account of aesthetics in the sense that it can enable 
the preservation of species and wild lands because it provides knowledge about nature 
and the role it plays in nature appreciation. That knowledge is of what aesthetic qualities 
and values nature has. These qualities and values, according to Carlson, can be identified 
and organised according to different viewing categories, this classification being 
analogous to those developed in Walton’s “Categories of Art”: correctly appreciating a 
cubist painting means viewing it as a cubist painting. Accordingly, in nature, there are 
different ways of perceiving natural objects and landscapes. They can be seen as 
different categories where some categories are correct and others are not. For example, a 
whale might be perceived as a fish or a mammal. If perceived as a fish, it may look 
differently than if we perceive it as a mammal. The account of an appropriate aesthetic 
appreciation of nature rests on the idea that the aesthetic qualities of natural objects and 
landscapes depend on how they are perceived and on knowledge according to which 
their aesthetic properties are to be categorised.  
                                                
272 See Budd and Hopkins on the ‘acquaintance principle’. My arguments here do not 
requires me to take a stand on aesthetic testimony; whether we can ‘transmit’ our 
aesthetic experiences is another matter. 
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 Carlson takes up Walton’s idea that correct aesthetic appreciation is derived from 
perceiving an object in its correct category. For Walton, a correct judgment about art 
requires knowledge of art criticism and art history. For Carlson, the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature is analogous to the aesthetic appreciation of art, but is distinct 
simply in virtue of the kind of knowledge they appeal to. Where nature is concerned, 
certain facts about natural objects, landscapes and their origins determine the correct 
category for them. Scientific knowledge is essential to the appropriate aesthetic 
appreciation of nature and suggests a means by which to justify positive aesthetics. 
Unlike Zangwill, Carlson relies heavily on categories of knowledge that constrain 
aesthetic judgments when those judgments are correct. 
 One question to ask is whether the categories model transfers easily from the art case 
to the nature case. According to Carlson, it does: whether we classify a rorqual whale as 
a fish or a mammal seems to matter for the application of a correct aesthetic term to it. 
For if it is classified as a fish, the whale may seem oafish and overgrown but if classified 
as a whale, it is sleek and hydrodynamic. However, an immediately observable 
difference between art and nature is that perceptual art is often intentional and 
representational whereas nature is presentational. That is to say, art is often created 
according to human rules, guidelines or conventions whereas nature is just created. We 
may therefore be better able to categorise objects that have been created by humans, 
whereas nature’s indeterminacy would require the conceptual tools of science, according 
to Carlson, to correctly categorise our appreciation of nature.  
 However, even though we are able to use scientific tools to access particular aspects 
of nature, these scientific theoretical and experimental tools are themselves essentially 
human constructs. We are only guaranteed knowledge about nature in itself relative to 
what we are interested in and the extent to which our theoretical and experimental tools 
can reveal data or information we can understand. It does not guarantee access to nature 
independent of those constructs, nature in-itself, or what Kant calls the noumenal realm.  
Furthermore, there are a multitude of scientific categories to which we might appeal in 
order to ascertain correctness of judgment. It is unclear which is the correct scientific 
model, for it could be the biologist’s, the physicist’s or the chemist’s, all of which fall 
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under the remit of ‘science’ but have divergent theoretical approaches to nature. This 
does not seem to be an issue where art is concerned, for we can in many cases look to 
authorial intention, cultural, political and other contexts that have been or are relevant to 
an artwork, although these by no means necessarily exhaust the artwork’s aesthetic 
offerings.  
 Not only that, we have no measure or definitional criteria according to which correct 
scientific categories for the appreciation of nature can be established, as Budd has 
argued.273 Which concepts, he asks, does the natural item have to fall under for it to be 
perceived from the ‘aesthetic point of view’, where the “perception under those concepts 
discloses the real aesthetic properties it possesses and allows for a proper assessment of 
value?”274 Nature’s indeterminacy is exactly what resists the kind of analysis that 
Carlson puts forward, for in the art case, we have some recourse to authorial, artistic, 
cultural and political context and these are essentially human constructs that apply to 
objects created by humans.  
 Scientific ontology differs from art historical or cultural ontology in that many of its 
objects are not human made and therefore cannot be guided by corresponding criteria 
held by the equivalent of an artist, the artworld, or history books. However, even in the 
case of art, it could be argued that correctness of aesthetic judgment is secondary to the 
having of the experience, to focusing on the object’s perceptual features rather than 
being overly concerned about correctly categorising or judging it. We can regard art as 
though it belonged to its appropriate style, but nothing prevents us from bringing it 
under other concepts or styles. We can similarly look at nature as though it belongs to 
certain scientific categories, but that does not mean that we should always be compelled 
to or that we are wrong when we bring it under some scientific or non-scientific concept 
that may be thought to be inappropriate in that instance. We can thicken the perceptual, 
aesthetic experience in ways other than those offered by scientific practice. This brings 
us back to the Kantian distinction between free and dependent beauty that we saw above.  
                                                
273 Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature. 122-124. 
274 Ibid. 124. 
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 Dependent beauty would seem to require that our judgment be based on concepts and 
kinds whereas free beauty is based on the free play between what we perceive and the 
concepts that potentially apply. Carlson’s is a dependent account because aesthetically 
experiencing nature is dependent on knowledge, so he makes no allowance for the value 
of free, immediate, perceptual occurrence of beautiful scenes or objects in nature that 
have not had knowledge brought to bear on them. This does not mean that we should 
therefore defend the kind of formalism or extreme formalism that Zangwill applies to 
nature, or that knowledge is irrelevant. My considerations of Carlson and Zangwill have 
been leading up to the thought that attending to the natural scene’s perceivable features 
is what matters in an experience deemed to be distinctly aesthetic. 
 There are other issues related to Carlson’s account of scientific knowledge that are of 
import. For example, Stecker points out, as I already have above, that while knowledge 
often serves a function in our aesthetic experiences, Carlson’s scientific categories are 
unclear about what kind of knowledge is required.275 Even Carlson’s stipulation of three 
kinds of knowledge - common sense, scientific and the naturalist’s knowledge - does not 
provide guidance that is specific enough to tell us which judgments of nature are the 
correct ones to hold. What kind of knowledge would apply and how do we delineate the 
amount of knowledge required? It does not seem to matter as long as it is scientific 
knowledge that follows ordered, scientific appreciation.276 Even if we were able to list a 
set of epistemic criteria, it is optimistic to think that there is a way of approaching an 
object that will reveal all of its aesthetic properties whole and undistorted.277 
 Conversely, not everything that can be known about an object is relevant to 
appreciating it. For example, I do not need to know how many people owned the 
Edinburgh Crystal champagne flutes I bought at the second hand shop to find them 
aesthetically pleasing. That knowledge is irrelevant to my aesthetic appreciation of the 
flutes in a way that knowing that they are Scottish might be. Furthermore, the range of 
                                                
275 Stecker, "The Correct and the Appropriate in the Appreciation of Nature." 
276 Allen Carlson, "Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature," in Landscape, Natural 
Beauty and the Arts, ed. Salim and Simon Gaskell Kemal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 217-223. 
277 Stecker, "The Correct and the Appropriate in the Appreciation of Nature." 395. 
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possible knowledge is infinitely large and can provide justification for many sorts of 
aesthetic appreciation. This is not to say that knowledge can’t be helpful in preventing 
malfounded appreciation, as Stecker writes, or that it can enhance or thicken our 
aesthetic appreciation both of art and of nature. It is likewise true that we can acquire 
different species of knowledge from nature. The principal type of knowledge is that 
which is distinctly aesthetic and appreciated for its aesthetic appearance and through the 
various senses. Other, non-perceptual, knowledge is often relevant, but it is not thereby 
necessary. Finally, it is not clear that scientific knowledge about nature is itself untinged 





 Hinging the debate on the kind of formalism advanced by Bell or Zangwill is a red 
herring, for it gets us no closer to characterising our aesthetic experiences of nature. The 
problem with the formalism/anti-formalism debate is that it seeks the truth of the matter 
either at the expense of formal or perceptual properties or at the expense of non-
perceptual features that are relevant to experiencing objects aesthetically. The 
framework the debate is based on itself obfuscates the importance of the desirable 
elements that both formalism and cognitivism or contextualism bring to aesthetic 
experience. One the one hand, we are being told by the formalist that it is only formal 
properties that matter fundamentally; on the other hand we are being told by the 
scientific cognitivist that only science can justify our aesthetic experiences and 
judgments of nature. Both seem to obfuscate the possible richness of perceptual 
experience as well as how that relates to a wide variety of non-perceptual or non-
scientific features, such as expressive properties or non-scientific knowledge about the 
object. We will see in chapter six how the perceptual, aesthetic features of an object - 
natural or artificial - can function within a wider framework that incorporates cognitive, 
contextual and emotive elements without reducing aesthetic experience either to formal 
properties or to non-perceptual properties. 
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The aim of this chapter is to carve out the logical space for a distinctly perceptual 
account of aesthetic experience that is not reductive to form or scientific knowledge, 
which can ground subjective and inter-subjective response according to the object’s 
perceivable, aesthetic features. The idea is to not reduce the richness of aesthetic 
experience to the physical, or natural, but to show that the physical is central to the 
richness of aesthetic experience. One might think that at the heart of aesthetics, when 
considered a distinctly philosophical discipline, lies the question of whether or not, and 
to what extent, potential situations, experiences, experiences that involve reflection or 
the imagination, concrete objects, art objects, natural objects, conceptual objects, literary 
objects, colours, can have aesthetic properties. One might also think that our daily 
experiences are not and should probably not be conceived, at every moment, as being 
aesthetic in a rapturous sense, involving us being taken to the heights of aesthetic 
fulfilment, as evidenced in the writings of Schopenhauer, for example, or Bell’s 
writings.278 In what follows, I touch on a few aspects of what it could mean to perceive 
aesthetically, and therefore evaluatively, what the conditions might be for a perceptual 
experience to be characterised as aesthetic and how evaluation fits into the idea of 
aesthetic perception.  
These aspects include what kind of attention would be required for a distinctly 
aesthetic experience, the ideas of privacy and the communicability of such experiences, 
and the issue of whether or how non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties constitute or 
structure perceptual experience. I will unpack the perceptual issue as far as it will go, but 
I hope that the issues that I don’t fully explore, and also take to be important to the 
argument, will be addressed in sufficient detail to be able to bring out the idea of 
aesthetic properties being perceptual properties, discernible and communicable by us. I 
will take the view that this kind of discernment may be of nature, certain everyday 
                                                
278 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Bell, Art. 
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objects and situations. This kind of discernment need not be the expression of fully-
fledged, rapturous, aesthetic experiences. By ‘aesthetic’, I will mean a perceptual 
property to which aesthetic concepts apply, properties that are describable in aesthetic 
terms and properties which relate to cognitive and emotive properties. By experience, I 
mean phenomenal experience as articulated by Siegel: “It is definitional of experience, 
that it has a phenomenal character, some phenomenology. The phenomenology of the 
experience is what it is like for a subject to have it.”279 
What’s at stake here is what we mean by aesthetic experience: is it perceptual, or 
does it depend on what we know, the assumption being that perceptual experience does 
not depend on what we know?280 In the previous chapter we saw that some aestheticians 
take an approach that grounds aesthetic experience in perception and, where formalism 
is assumed the logical upshot of disinterest and the best way to account for a distinctly 
perceptual theory of aesthetic experience.281 On the other hand, other aestheticians rely 
principally on knowledge; that it is categories of knowledge that dictate aesthetic 
experience.282 As we also saw in the above chapter, the former is unconvincing because 
it is overly reductive, while the latter is unconvincing because it fails to emphasise 
sufficiently the very appearance of the object in question, which should be at the heart of 
experiences thought to be distinctly aesthetic, or at least does not emphasise it enough. 
The difficulty is in finding the logical space in which description, in particular, aesthetic 
description, can anchor our aesthetic attributions, which we might otherwise think of as 
evaluative concepts. This framework will allow me to position an account relative to a 
particular view of aesthetic, evaluative, perception. This is where work by Sibley and 
                                                
279 Susanna Siegel, "The Contents of Perception," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2013 edition)  (2013). 
280 Some philosophers of perception have worked on the idea of cognitive penetration, 
how it is that perception, assumed to be impenetrable, may be affected by mental states 
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Levinson can help, as we will see below, in addition to the Kantian thought of 
‘intermingling’ between the objects of perception and thought. I will, however, begin 
with the importance of attention in an account of aesthetic perception, because this is 
where aesthetic perception really begins. I’ve thus illustrated that my view sits between 
austere formalism and scientific cognitivism, whereby the account of disinterest I have 
provided captures the idea that when we aesthetically experience an object, we are 
immediately captivated by it, how it appears to us either as a natural object or as an art 
object. Although these objects may provide experiences of different kinds, those 
experiences are first and foremost perceptual and engage our moods, emotions 
knowledge. This chapter will elaborate on how this works by appealing to the idea of 
whole formalism, which captures the idea that our perceptual, aesthetic experiences 
often have rich perceptual content. That rich perceptual content is non-causally, I argue, 
is non-causally related to the intellectual content it might occasion. 
 
§ Aesthetic Attention 
 
 On one view of attention, the singling out of an object in perception, how we attend 
to things is key to how we experience them perceptually, for example:  
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear 
and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought. 283 
 
Following on from the idea that attention helps mark out an object perceptually, I want 
to suggest here that there’s a distinctive mode of attention that makes the object of 
experience an aesthetic object. This will bring us back to the idea of disinterest as the 
distinguishing experiential feature, as will follow below. The idea is that the mode of 
attention I identify with disinterest enables us to perceive objects aesthetically, that is to 
say, by being open to the object and its constitutive non-aesthetic and aesthetic features. 
In line with my criticisms of austere formalism above, this need not entail disallowing or 
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ignoring other contextual elements. Consciousness of the aesthetic in the experience of 
objects requires attention, for without that attention there can be no awareness of the 
aesthetic in experiencing an object, nor of the perceptual object of which it is 
representative. This is because in order for the aesthetic to be manifest, occasioned, or to 
emerge in an experience fixed by our attention, some amount of discernment is required. 
It would be odd to think that we can discern anything about an object without attending 
to it in some way.284 An at least thin notion of attention is required to explain how we 
end up fixating our attention on an object and it is preferable to account for attention as 
having been drawn to an object for reasons to do with how it appears to us, as opposed, 
for example, to those situations where another person has pointed it out.  
 My eye may be drawn across the station to the man whose scarf is scarlet red. I might 
be struck by the sight of Durham Cathedral as the train pulls into the station and 
therefore attend to it for its dramatic grace and majesty. These things have caught my 
attention perhaps because I have a previously stored memory of them, for some 
evolutionary reason (where the red is concerned) or for reasons to do with their striking 
features - scarlet redness on the one hand, the impression left by sheer magnitude of 
physical presence on the other. And that attention may intensify as I choose to dwell on 
the object or it may not. That dwelling on the object may result in attending to its 
objective features, or to its objective features mixed in with the emotive or cognitive 
stock that I bring to it. For example, I might know that the man in the red scarf is the 
philosophy professor who spoke at the workshop I attended, or that the cathedral brings 
with it memories, knowledge of its history, comparisons with York Minster or any 
number of thoughts related to it. Central to the experience if I want to call it an aesthetic 
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experience, however, is not the cognitive or emotive stock I might bring to it, but that I 
apply distinctly aesthetic concepts to its objective features, or describe it in aesthetic 
terms. 
 I am getting ahead of myself here, and will return to the issue of discernment 
momentarily, in the next section, where I bring in linguistic and metaphysical elements 
to further back up my claims. The issue of perceptual attention is important to aesthetics, 
especially because ‘disinterest’, the term used to make sense of distinctly aesthetic 
attention, has been controversial in the discipline, as we have seen. Even the richer 
conception of formalism that we will turn to in the final section is not reducible to 
disinterest. This is because ‘disinterest’ is a term that relates to how the subject attends 
to the object aesthetically and ‘formalism’ relates to the object’s perceivable properties. 
My account of the link between formalism and disinterest is influenced by the traditional 
view, and is one in which the subject is engaged by the object’s perceptual and formal 
features without self-interest or practical aims. This does not entail that the subject 
empty any thought in her head that relates to the object (such as contextual features), or 
suppress any emotion as it relates to the object, it just means that her focus is primarily 
on the object and its features, her sensual experience of them, and the possibility that 
concepts will be applied to those features and experiences.  
 This is what allows a wider, non-judgmental, aesthetic experience of the object’s 
form and may anchor concepts that may be applicable to the object. A rich account of 
formalism thus the direct result of disinterest. If formalism is conceived of in the right 
way, that is to say according to a richer account than that of austere formalism, which 
takes into consideration the perceptual properties that form the object in experience, 
such as we will see in the final section of the chapter, it may well be the logical 
consequence of disinterest, bringing it to aesthetic fruition. 
 I have already addressed why the negative connotations associated with disinterest 
have led to arguments against it, arguments that see it either as a hindrance to rich, thick 
accounts of aesthetic experience285 or see it as equating to the suppression of subjective 
elements, such as a person’s cognitive or emotive stock, where the subject gawks, not a 
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thought in her head. We saw that there is a way of interpreting disinterest that bypasses 
the negative connotation the term has. In its historical- philosophical context286, the term 
meant something like the opposite: a description of the kind of attention that enables one 
to focus on the object’s features, in order that its phenomenal, objective, beauty is 
experienced. This would not entail the suppression of subjectivity, for the experience 
would at least require sensual engagement with the object, if not more. Nor does it deny 
cognitive or emotive stock. Rather, attention is focused, however intensely, on the object 
of aesthetic interest. One might add to this the more recent developments that have 
expanded the category of aesthetic concepts beyond ‘beauty’, ‘ugliness’, ‘sublimity’.287 
Following Sibley’s interest in expanding our aesthetic vocabulary, we need not restrict 
ourselves to eighteenth century aesthetic concepts, even though we are influenced by 
eighteenth century ideas. This mode of aesthetic attention enables a phenomenology of 
the experience, the ‘what it is like’ for a subject to have it.  
 So, attention is important in aesthetic perception and is of the same kind of 
disinterested contemplation that I gave in earlier chapters. It is important to perceptual, 
aesthetic, experience that we attend to the object in question such that its aesthetic 
features become salient in the moment of experience. Now that we have established this 
condition, I will turn to what might be the accuracy conditions for a perceptual 
experience deemed to be aesthetic, to avoid idiosyncrasy on the one hand, and relativism 
in aesthetic judgment on the other. That we can attend to, and discuss, the features of 
experience that I think can be explained by appealing to Zuckert’s Kantian definition of 
whole formalism, can help ensure that we accurately describe the object of such 
experience. 
 As we will see later in this chapter, Zuckert gives an account of Kant’s formalism that 
makes it more palatable as a description of aesthetic experience than it has often come to 
be understood. This is because her account of what she calls whole formalism allows for 
our judgments to be based on the integrated perceptual properties of the object in 
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question, once disinterested attention, as laid out above, has taken hold. These integrated 
properties are at the core of what perceptual, aesthetic, experience is. We will see how 
some of these properties are  
 
 
§ Privacy, Communicability and Realism about Secondary Aesthetic and Colour 
Qualities 
 
 Now that we have established the need for a distinctly aesthetic form of attention, 
how can we seek objectivity in aesthetic experience? This question is relevant, and 
significant, because it is important to be clear on what it is we are referring to when we 
use aesthetic terms. This is because aesthetic terms and concepts often have multiple 
applications, and because we might think of aesthetic terms and concepts picking out 
aesthetic properties, themselves secondary properties, akin to colour properties. I will 
consider how we should think about aesthetic properties by comparison with colour 
properties. How might aesthetic properties differ from colour properties if they are 
viewed in this way? This strategy can hopefully bring us closer to objectivity about 
aesthetically experiencing objects and the features that constitute them in experience, 
both by attending to those features and ascertaining their public discernibility. 
 One way of seeking objectivity is through intersubjective agreement, as I argue 
below. I mentioned that concept application and aesthetic description are required for the 
discernment of an object or situation to be an aesthetic experience. The reasons for this 
are numerous, but first and foremost that we need to be able to distinguish between what 
is aesthetic and what is non-aesthetic. One way to do this is explicitly is by analysing 
which concepts or terms apply and whether these can be thought of as aesthetic or non-
aesthetic. In either case the concept or term used is likely to be descriptive in some way. 
This, of course, does not mean that children do not have experiences that are aesthetic. 
One hopes that children learn from their context, parents, community, as they experience 
objects and have their qualities, aesthetic or otherwise, pointed out to them, acquiring 
concepts and terminology along the way. This is true for both those aesthetic properties 
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that are culturally determined, universal aesthetic properties, such as symmetry and 
proportion, as well as those applied by others that we might come to disagree with.  
 It is difficult to get traction on the idea of private aesthetic experience, because 
however much we might want to answer the question of whether the qualitative content 
of a concept is the same for everyone, this question is unlikely to be resolved in a 
meaningful way. The very process of trying to get traction on private aesthetic 
experience would require conceptualisation or the application of at least descriptive 
terms.288 Being able to conceptualise such experiences and describe them would require 
that the objects of experiences are not private, but public, potentially accessible by 
everyone. There is an ambiguity between the aesthetic concept or term and the content 
or sensation to which the term applies. We could think of aesthetic experience as being 
private in the sense that Locke thought colour properties were, where ‘blue’ may mean 
something different to different people in the application of the concept, or the term. On 
this kind of view, so long as we have a distinguishing factor, it doesn’t matter whether 
the experience behind people’s sensation reports differ systematically. However, despite 
the possibility, or likelihood, that our organs differ in the way they produce different 
reports of colour, what matters is the correlation between the quality, concept and term, 
or the conditions for the concept or term to be veridical when applied, which would 
entail that the sensation of ‘blue’ should be characterised in terms of intentional content 
- the object to which it directs the subject - which in turn entails attention to and 
phenomenological engagement with, an object. We may have private experiences that 
we can’t conceptualise (which is not fruitful for discussion), or put into words and we 
may have experiences that we can conceptualise and put into words. While there might 
be variation in the phenomenology behind conceptualisation and the application of 
terms, we can only begin to be clear on these through shared language and 
intersubjective discourse.  
 One might speculate that this is particularly true in the case of aesthetic concepts or 
terms for them to be veridical. While it might not matter to discourse a person 
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systematically phenomenally experiences red as green or green as red, this would seem 
problematic for aesthetic properties that are culturally determined, because these are 
particular experiences (but which would unlikely be the case for more universal 
properties like ‘symmetry’ as these are seemingly a priori). What I mean by this is that 
colour properties are simple compared with many aesthetic properties that involve more 
than the application of formal properties. While there are aesthetic objects and aesthetic 
experiences to which formal properties are apt, there are many aesthetic experiences of 
objects that incorporate other features into the experience including mood, emotion, 
thought, and knowledge. We will see how this works in the following section below, but 
we can begin to see that aesthetic experiences differ from colour experiences.  
 Culturally determined aesthetic properties would have had to be learned and would 
require a different kind of discriminatory capacity. Not having the ‘correct content’ 
would entail making a mistake vis à vis that experience for a culture. So, a concept or 
term is often applied according to a community of judgment. That community of 
judgment has by and large agreed on both universal and cultural properties, which are 
central to it. This, however, is a tendency, and does not mean that we are necessarily 
wrong in applying a concept or term when they are not in keeping with the community. 
We will see in a moment that Sibley’s account allows for an amount of slippage, that 
although certain types of content may tend to have certain concepts and terms applied to 
them, we should be prepared for the same content to have other concepts or terms 
applied to them or for the same concepts or terms to have different content.289  
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 The problem with aesthetic properties, like moral properties, is that one might think 
them to be essentially evaluative and mind-dependent290, so that a Lockean position 
seems to be more tenable in that an aesthetic predicate would be less suggestive of a 
veridical visual experience then of personal, subjective response. McDowell for 
example, is one philosopher who has taken an intellectualist, rather than sensualist 
approach to value properties, because sensual, or perceptual approaches lack 
representation. For something to be red just is to see it as red (rather than represent it as 
red). This kind of view of aesthetic properties is essentially evaluative, mind-dependent. 
This is because agreement is thought of in terms of common taste or in terms of 
common sensibility. Disagreement is accounted for too, because disagreement amongst 
experts making aesthetic judgments is accounted for in terms of irreconcilable 
differences in their evaluative sensibilities between variously and heterogeneously 
informed expert critics. “Aesthetic properties simply are certain ways that objects appear 
to perceivers with different aesthetic sensibilities,” as parenthetically remarked by one 
anti-realist.291  
 This view is compelling because it speaks to the uncomfortable and unhappy, but 
seemingly intractable issue of disagreement, when such disagreement arises. It also 
speaks to the thought that when we experience an object aesthetically, we each bring 
different cognitive and emotive stock, which according to some philosophers seems to 
override the actual perceptual element of aesthetic experience.292 However, there is 
another way to account for aesthetic properties that has been well discussed and that can 
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help with the issue of disagreement. We will turn to this account now, before dealing 
with the seeming difficulty of accommodating non-artistic objects. 
 What should be taken from this view is the thought that aesthetic properties are like 
colour properties in the sense that they are perceptual. They differ because they are more 
complex gestalts that involve more than colour. Aesthetic properties are also public in 
the sense that they can be picked out by concepts and terms that we use in 
intersubjective discourse about aesthetic objects. 
 
 The question is, though, what would primary qualities have to be for an account of 
aesthetic properties to be non-reductive, emergentist? Rather than assume, as anti-
realists do, that disagreement is the norm in aesthetic discourse, we will turn to the 
compelling reasons for thinking that agreement is. We will proceed as follows. First, we 
will begin by briefly considering the historical, traditional conception of aesthetic 
properties, or properties more generally, so that we can see how the historical framework 
set out in the early chapters illuminate the current debate, the clarity of which is set out 
in Levinson’s realist and Matravers’ anti-realist accounts of aesthetic properties. Realism 
about aesthetic properties has it that aesthetic properties belong to, or are a part of, a 
mind-independent world; that aesthetic properties belong to the objects that we 
appreciate aesthetically. Anti-realism about aesthetic properties has it that aesthetic 
properties belong to, or are essentially of the human mind, the conceptual framework it 
uses to make sense of and value the world.  
 In contrast to these positions, mine is one that takes it that some aesthetic properties 
are at least representative of external objects in a way that they are presented to the mind 
and in a way that does not rely on fictionalism or make-believe or does not rely on non-
perceptual content. That is to say, not in a way that they are used as props for human 
artifice or purpose, but in a way that genuinely and uncomplicatedly relates to the 
objects concerned. If the objects concerned are not themselves a result of fictional make-
believe, the possibility then arises for genuine, non-fictional, perceptual access, at least 
in those cases. The object I have in mind is the object of nature that does not have the 
same intentionality or cognitive constraints that art does. Its very perceptual and 
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aesthetic simplicity invites agreement among aesthetic observers in a way art seems not 
to. The properties that we ascribe to the natural object, that at least in part tell us 
something about how the object seems to us, structure the distinctly perceptual and 
aesthetic part of the experience.  
 Historical precedence on the matter, at least historical precedence set by the Ancient 
Greeks, assumed a realist ontology. This was originally formulated by Plato, whose 
account, as we have seen, held that beauty, in its fullest and truest manifestation, was an 
abstract universal form outside the realm of real, concrete, physical objects. Objects 
instantiating beauty shared beauty with other beautiful objects and with beauty as an 
abstract, universal form. Ordinary, real, concrete, physical objects could not display 
beauty in its fullest, abstract, universal, perfect sense. They were imperfect instances 
thereof.  
 We found another kind of universalism in Aristotle’s approach to metaphysics, which 
set itself against Platonic metaphysics, and which inspires my view of aesthetic 
properties, is the existence of object qua their physical manifestation. According to 
Aristotle, the idea was to try to identify the structure of what there is, identify and 
characterise the categories under which things fall as well as their specific properties or 
features. The Aristotelian approach allowed for concrete, physical objects to share 
attributes, such as beauty, but unlike Plato, Aristotle did not take them to be derived 
from abstract universals but from real universals. 
 With Locke we have a discussion according to which colour, as we have seen, is of 
particular interest because it pertains to the senses. According to Locke, our ideas come 
from sense experience and reflection thereon, that the mind combines these simple based 
in sense-experience to form new, complex ideas. The ontology of sense experience, 
experiences such as colour and odour, which he thought of as secondary qualities were 
part of the subject, rather than the object, but an object’s extension, form, solidity were 
of the object, its primary qualities. He argued against innate ideas and the thought that 
the universal agreement of mankind regarding certain principles showed that these ideas 
were innate to the human mind. As a child develops and grows she gains insight into the 
objects of the world, according to how we experience objects via the senses. External 
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objects that are conveyed through the senses, are simple and provide the building blocks 
for more complex ideas that we reflect on. Secondary qualities, such as colour, are 
caused by a perceived object’s primary qualities. Primary qualities are those physically 
present in the object and secondary qualities are perceived sensations and without 
perceivers, aesthetic qualities would not exit.  
 Returning to the question above, and bearing these historical arguments in mind, how 
can an understanding of aesthetic qualities being like secondary qualities, based on 
primary qualities, be non-reductive or emergentist? Many, but not all, aesthetic qualities 
are like colour properties in that they are at least partially descriptive, are intended as 
property attributions, that pertain to how an object appears to a subject. The idea is that 
the object appears as a whole, unified, object, to which we often can and do apply 
aesthetic qualities that do not pertain to what we know about the object, but to the object 
itself. At the core of aesthetic experience lies our perceiving of an object, how we sense 
its presence. What would the primary qualities have to be in order for this account to 
make sense?  As we will now see, they are those qualities that physically constitute the 
object.  
 Levinson’s criteria for aesthetic properties are threefold, and present a quasi-realist 
approach to aesthetic properties: 1. Aesthetic properties are a description of how things 
appear, 2. They are intended as property attributions, 3. Their attribution depends on 
how things are with the object.293 The attribution of aesthetic properties, which have 
substantial descriptive content, is based on appearances, the ‘look’, ‘impression’ of 
aesthetic phenomena, and describes them. How we attribute aesthetic properties is 
dependent not only on how things are with the object, but how things are with the 
subject, how well informed the subject it about aesthetic properties and their application.  
 If this kind of realism about aesthetic properties implies correctness conditions, as 
Levinson espouses, it also implies that an object may or not have a particular aesthetic 
property. Therefore, a judgment to the effect that an object has or lacks an aesthetic 
property will be correct or incorrect according to how things are with the object. On this 
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account, aesthetic properties of the object exist independently of the mind, If they exist 
independently of the mind, they provide the independent content for a judgment for the 
correct property attribution. If they instantiate an aesthetic property and provide the 
content for a judgment, the attribution being made in the judgment is either correct or 
incorrect. The realist, therefore, thinks it possible to correctly describe an object’s 
aesthetic properties. 
 What’s problematic for the realist, however, is that it is unclear that we can make 
sense of the correctness conditions as they relate to aesthetic properties. If we can’t 
make sense of the correctness of aesthetic judgments, then realism is false. It might be, 
for example, that correctness conditions imply universal judgment: if the object and its 
aesthetic properties exist independently of mind, everyone should perceive the same 
property without disagreement or controversy with the tendency being for convergence. 
Furthermore, if an object instantiates an aesthetic property, an attribution being applied 
to it will either be true, false, or somewhere in between.  If the attribution is true, it is 
knowable universally, if it is false, it is contingent, dependent on some non-objective 
feature, where ‘objective’ means of the object (rather than inter-subjective agreement for 
example). Aesthetic evaluations would also be universal to the extent that everyone 
should be able to appeal to the same property to justify both their aesthetic judgment 
and, pro tanto, the aesthetic evaluation based on that judgment. 
 This, anti-realists like Matravers argue, is simply not true: people disagree about 
aesthetic attributions and judgments, and the Humean criteria deployed for the 
correctness of judgments as articulated by Levinson, Miller, Railton and many others do 
not provide an explicit argument for the mind-independent existence of aesthetic 
properties as we will see below. Aesthetic judgments vary not only across people and 
cultures, but within a lifetime. If there is variation in judgment, either many mistakes in 
property attributions are made or people can disagree without being wrong. The latter 
suggests that realism about aesthetic properties fails. However, let’s look at this claim 
more closely. 
 If many mistakes are being made, some might be better at discerning than others, and 
therefore more apt at applying attributions. We might explain this by the accuracy and 
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functioning of perceptual systems, or lack thereof (e.g. colour blindness, or 
inexperience). It may additionally be explained on the Humean model, that having the 
appropriate contextual knowledge related to the object, and how the object is to be 
categorised, can provide criteria for the correctness of property application. Or that the 
sophistication of the conceptual framework used to judge and attribute properties is 
more refined. 
 For his part, Levinson gives Humean, contextualist, arguments for the correctness 
conditions where aesthetic properties are concerned. The true critic, or ideal judge, who 
knows how to view an artwork correctly and is best placed to “properly situate a work 
with respect to its context of origin” is the arbiter of aesthetic objectivity. Levinson 
supports that view by appealing to arguments presented in papers by Miller and Railton, 
who provide lengthy discussions about the nature of aesthetic judgment.294 Miller 
provides an account of judgment (whether aesthetic, moral or scientific) that is objective 
but avoids the pitfall of aesthetic and moral judgment resembling scientific judgment. 
Aesthetic judgment is objective in the sense that we can judge objects and attribute 
properties to them, but aesthetic judgments do not achieve universality as in scientific 
judgment, because some inevitably have blindspots (they might not have the right 
cultural or contextual reference points, for example). Railton, for his part, argues that if 
an object has the right configuration of features, it will correspond in the right way to the 
senses and cognitive capacities for an experience of it to be considered aesthetic. As 
Matravers points out, however, though these papers by Miller and Railton refer to the 
features an object has, what Railton calls “beauty -making” characteristics, that may be 
tracked by human cognitive and sensory structures, or that may occasion aesthetic 
appreciation, neither Miller nor Railton explicitly provide arguments for the existence of 
aesthetic properties. They provide arguments for the normativity of aesthetic judgments. 
This Humean aspect of Levinson’s argument does not get us where we want to be, 
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which is whether it may be possible to think of aesthetic properties, or a group of 
aesthetic properties, as belonging or pertaining to a physical object. 
 The realist, however, need not appeal to universalism of the scientific sort, as argued 
by Miller, nor need she appeal to content, context or inter-subjective agreement. If 
universalism entails that attributions refer to abstract entities, anyone should be able to 
experience them, and provide a straightforward analysis or definition of of the 
attribution that applies to it. On the other hand, if we accept that people have perceptual 
systems that differ, say in the colour-blindness case, or with varying degrees of 
sensitivity and sophistications, we might also argue that varying attributions might 
correctly be applied according to those sensitivities. This allows for differing aesthetic 
property attributions, perhaps not as extreme as is the case with colour blindness, or 
colour experiences in which red is identified rather than green or vice versa. The subject 
in this case experiences that colour, red, irrespective of what might be tracked by 
someone who does not confuse colours in a purely objective sense. Difference in 
perception need not entail difference in properties. Or, put more precisely, difference in 
a subject sensually feeling, representing, or coming into contact with an object’s 
property need not entail difference in that property. If we look to historical precedence, 
this is a point made by Locke. How a person experiences a property, or represents it, is 
irrelevant to how she then applies an concept to it in the sense that whatever it is the 
attribute picks out, she alone experiences the corresponding as being as it is. 
Before moving onto a discussion of aesthetic ontology and perception, there is 
another argument against realism put forward by Matravers: that the realist model does 
not allow for autonomy of aesthetic judgment as put forward by Robert Hopkins. The 
argument goes that, although it is reasonable to change one’s mind in relation to colour 
attributions in the face of a group of people who think that the colour identified is 
different, this is not the case for aesthetic attributions. I might reconsider the view that 
the film was good if my friends think it wasn’t, but that, in itself, is no justification for 
me to change my mind about it. The realist, according to Matravers, would be forced to 
change her mind because she cannot accommodate the intuition that her original 
judgment is the correct one when faced by a majority, inter-subjective judgment to the 
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contrary. She would have to change her mind about the film, because it does not 
coincide with what appears to be a universal judgment. 
This is prima facie plausible, but there’s no reason to think that a group of similarly 
sensible people have got it right and she, the realist, has it wrong. The majority of people 
within a sensibility group have made a judgment, and are in agreement about that 
judgment, but we have no reason to therefore conclude that they have made the correct, 
objective one, if we understand objectivity in terms of being derived from the object 
(rather than objectivity through inter-subjective agreement)? You might think, for 
example, that a group of like-minded people would look at a four-sided shape and 
conclude that it is a square, but another may judge it to be a diamond. Or one might 
conceive of a group of colour blind people with the same colour-vision deficiency, who 
mistaken red for green and green for red, all making the same judgment that the clown’s 
costume is green when it is red, without thereby being inclined, if you have no such 
colour-vision deficiency, to change your judgment that the clown’s costume is in fact 
red. Although there seems to be a difference between a colour judgment and aesthetic 
judgment, on this score, there need not be. The realist would no more be tempted to 
change her mind about the film than she would about colour, based on the argument 
from autonomy, than she would in the reverse case.  
We might, at this stage, introduce the distinction between an aesthetic judgment and 
an aesthetic evaluation, according to which a judgment entails judging an object to have 
such or such a property and an evaluation entails engaging with normativity and 
evaluation. Many, such as Goldman, do not endorse such a distinction, but instead think 
of aesthetic properties as essentially evaluative, mind-dependent.295 I will, as follows, 
explore how aesthetic judgment might be possible irrespective of aesthetic evaluation.  
I will argue, following Levinson, that there is a class of aesthetic properties, to my 
mind akin to colour properties, in that they are immediately perceivable and are 
grounded in the object. That discussion will focus on the ontology of aesthetic properties 
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and the perceptual, experiential dimension of those properties that need not require 
expertise and sophistication where aesthetic judgment is concerned. I am arguing for a 
sui generis, basic, class of aesthetic properties that is both immediately perceivable, and 
as I will further argue (probably in chapter nine), that this is particularly applicable to 
nature. 
Let us remind ourselves of what Levinson argues. He argues that an aesthetic 
attribution is intended as a property attribution; that the attribution is based on reports of 
certain looks, feels, appearances; that the subject matter, how things are with the object, 
allows us to distinguish between correct and incorrect attributions. I will proceed by 
assessing how it might be that aesthetic concepts map onto aesthetic properties, which, 
despite the differences that might hold between aesthetic and colour properties, might be 
conceived of as analogous with colour properties. The differences between aesthetic and 
colour properties have been mentioned by Matravers. One of those, as seen, and 
rejected, in the discussion on aesthetic autonomy above, is that one might change one’s 
mind more easily about colour properties than aesthetic properties when faced an 
apparently universal judgment. Others differences between aesthetic and colour 
properties, as Matravers enumerates, are that aesthetic properties are often thought of as 
evaluative and colour properties are not, and that aesthetic properties are often said to 
depend on non-aesthetic properties, which may include colour properties.  
While it is true that aesthetic properties are often properties that demarcate 
preference, dislike or revulsion (in the latter cases accepting that there are such things as 
negative aesthetic properties), we also ordinarily speak of colour preferences and 
dislikes (although colour-revulsion may take things a bit far). My daughter’s current 
enthusiasm for blue or my partner’s disdain for pastel colours are both obvious in their 
attribution of them to objects. Blue and pastel pink are attributed ‘evaluatively’ in those 
cases. It was also thought that avocado green was nausea-inducing, before it came into 
vogue in the 1970s. When avocado green bathroom suites came into vogue in the 1970s, 
no ensuing nausea epidemic has been recorded in the history books, suggesting that we 
do, although in this case wrongly sometimes associate value with colour. This is not an 
argument for aesthetic and colour properties to be considered irreducibly evaluative or 
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normative, but points out why we might think of aesthetic properties and colour 
properties as more similar than one might want to assume. Our affective responses to 
aesthetic properties are not essential to them being the properties they are. It is also at 
least plausible that aesthetic attributions describe the objects they apply to, rather than 
evaluation of their goodness or badness according to subjective preference or inter-
subjective agreement. It would seem rather odd for a person to refer to describe either of 
the two Ming vases housed at the Museum of Scotland as “unwieldy”, the suggestion 
being that “delicate” describes it more appropriately - quite apart from any evaluation 
we might make of it. 
In what follows, I want to assume that both colour and aesthetic attributes are non-
evaluative, and to see whether aesthetic properties are more like colour properties than 
we might think and to potentially ground them in an object-oriented, rather than 
subjective or inter-subjective, objectivity. The idea is to appeal to the philosophy of 
colour to see if there are insights to be gained from the philosophy of colour. While it is 
true that there’s no settled ontology of colour properties, and that this unsettledness 
would therefore likely extend to aesthetic properties, it may help us ground some 
aesthetic attributes in their correlative aesthetic properties. We are here trying to make 
sense of the relation between how things are with the object and the correct attribution of 
a property. The competing theories here include eliminativism, physicalism, 
dispositionalism and primitivism about colour, which I will turn to after summarising 
Levinson’s theory of aesthetic emergence.  
These competing theories, and Levinson’s own theory of aesthetic emergence, 
attempt to answer the question about whether or not physical objects are coloured, or, in 
the aesthetic case, if such categories are to be used in the aesthetic case, whether 
physical objects are themselves aesthetic. Can we make sense of colour realism or 
aesthetic realism? I begin with Levinson’s analysis, as this is the one at stake, the one I 
wish, ultimately, to defend and build on, although I have some concerns about his 
contextualism. 
Levinson illuminates how, exactly, “the aesthetic face is erected upon the structural 
skeleton which supports it”, and what the logical connection between the two is. To do 
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this, he marries supervenience with emergentism. By supervenience, Levinson means 
that aesthetic properties are dependent on both an object’s structural, non-aesthetic 
properties and on its substructural, microphysical, material ones. If two aesthetic objects 
differ aesthetically, they necessarily differ structurally, if not substructurally. If two 
aesthetic objects are contextually, structurally and substrcuturally identical, they cannot 
differ aesthetically. Emergentism here is the view that an aesthetic property arises from 
its simpler, non-aesthetic constituents, but is not reducible to them. So the experience of 
an aesthetic property is the phenomenal result of a sensible quality or perceptible 
property, and the combination of non-aesthetic properties that cause it. The view might 
be related to non-reductive physicalism, according to which psychological or 
phenomenal qualities are distinct from material, biological processes, but this is not 
Levinson’s point. Aesthetic properties are the way things appear and the way things 
appear, although constituted by their underlying structure, are irreducible to them. So in 
a short discussion on colour, Levinson writes: “For example, it is readily imaginable that 
reflecting wavelengths of alpha microns would have sufficed to make an object yellow, 
even holding our physiologies and neurochemistries fixed, and that reflecting 
wavelengths of ypsilon microns would not have sufficed to make an object visible at all. 
And this is because the attribute of yellowness is essentially tied to the appearance 
yellow, while the latter is only contingently related to any conditions physically 
specifiable.”296 
Let us look at physicalism a little more closely, in particular, colour physicalism, 
which holds a competing, but similar, view to Levinsons’s supervenient emergentism. 
Colour physicalism is the view that colour properties are identical with physical 
properties. Jackson and Pargetter write, for instance, that colours are non-dispostional 
(crudely, non-subjective) properties of objects as ‘primary’ in their nature as shape and 
motion. “Indeed, in the case of opaque objects, they are probably complexes of such 
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properties of the object’s surface and immediate surroundings […].”297 Colours in this 
case are disjunctions of microphysical properties and there are many ways for 
microphysical properties to appear the same colour.  
 
Levinson distinguishes his emergentism from the sort of physicalism defined above, 
or disjunctivism, denying that attributes can be reduced to, made identifiable with, the 
nature of the corresponding, primary property: “[…] that coolness is just equivalent to 
the disjunctive attribute: deep-blueness or dark-greeness or …, and airiness to the 
disjunctive attribute: light-greyness or light-blueness or hazy-yellowness […].298 The 
physicalist, or disjunctivist, cannot give an account of which colour property either 
coolness or airiness amount to. It seems arbitrary to him which attribute should 
correspond to which property. What seems for Levinson is the sensual aspect, the 
sensible quality or perceptible property that allows for the object to appear in a certain 
way. Levinson writes that the most compelling explanation, or inference to the best 
explanation is the “simple admission of distinct, emergent, higher-order perceptual 
features”.299 (105-6) 
Matravers goes some way to agreeing with Levinson’s assessment of reductivism and 
disjunctivism. However, he probes the issue of what the relationship is between the 
primary, physical, non-aesthetic property, and its emergent, phenomenal characteristic. 
What is it, he wonders, that causes the appearance property? So, in the case of the above 
example, what is it that causes phenomenal ‘airiness’ or phenomenal ‘coolness’ 
(although Matravers uses the example of phenomenal ‘grace’ as related to a dancer)? Is 
Levinson’s emergence thesis a form of dispositionalism? Let us remind ourselves of 
what colour dispositionalism is: a colour property is the disposition to cause in 
perceivers visual experiences of a certain kind under particular circumstances. Carried 
over to the aesthetic case: an aesthetic property is the disposition to cause in perceivers 
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perceptual (if we accept that perceptual, aesthetic experiences can be non-visual) 
experiences of a certain kind under particular circumstances. So, in the case of 
Levinson’s example, airiness is an aesthetic property that is the disposition to cause in 
perceivers the perceptual experience of airiness under particular circumstances. Or, 
using Matravers’ example, “grace is whatever property is that makes the following 
conditional true: if qualified observer Q views O in circumstances C, then Q will 
experience P as graceful.” Matravers goes onto suggest that “[t]he property that makes 
that conditional true will be whatever conjunction of non-aesthetic properties that cause 
phenomenal grace in the particular case.”300 Or, deep-blueness or deep-greenness are the 
non-aesthetic properties that cause phenomenal coolness in the particular case; light-
blueness or hazy-yellowness are the non-aesthetic properties that cause phenomenal 
airiness.  
At this point Matravers argues that if Levinson’s proposal is supposed to resemble a 
dispositionalist approach to aesthetic properties, it is not altogether clear how it differs 
from the physicalist, or disjunctive, approach. Matravers’ claim seems to be that since 
non-aesthetic properties do not always entail the emergence of aesthetic properties such 
grace, coolness and airiness, or that grace, coolness or airiness do not necessarily entail 
the same non-aesthetic properties in each of their instantiations, we are no further 
forward. We might just as well claim that phenomenal grace is reducible to whatever the 
conjunction of non-aesthetic properties is or that coolness is either deep-blue or deep-
green (one would presumably have to choose) or that airiness is either light-blueness or 
hazy-yellowness. 
Levinson’s argument for the emergence thesis is an inference to the best explanation. 
Because no connection between emerged aesthetic properties and the non-aesthetic 
properties that constitute them is articulated, he gets into trouble. And yet, he insists that 
aesthetic properties are manifest properties that we directly perceive, rather than 
dispositions, arguing that dispositions are not perceivable, but aesthetic properties are. 
Levinson is just not worried about the disjunctive rejection of the common kind claim, 
as is entailed by disjunctivism, that the nature of illusory properties is different from 
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veridical ones. Directly perceiving aesthetic properties need not entail awareness of the 
non-aesthetic properties that constitute it, although it may. 
This is, as Levinson argues, and Matravers points out, not altogether different for 
colour primitivism, in which colours are taken to be like primary qualities, such as 
shapes. The idea is that colours are not reducible to abstract properties, just like the 
veridical experience of a shape is not reducible to an abstract shape. A triangle just 
appears as a triangle and our experiences of them are likely to be veridical. Here, despite 
the lack of explanation due to the logical hiatus between non-aesthetic properties and 
emergent aesthetic properties, Matravers accepts the possibility of a supervenient 
connection between aesthetic property and non-aesthetic property, and points to the very 
difficulty I will go onto argue below: how such properties are correctly contextualized 
and relativised to ‘sensibility groups’.   
In any case, assuming that Levinson’s theory of aesthetic supervenience and aesthetic 
emergence is true, how might aesthetic properties be relativised to sensibility groups? 
For Levinson seems to be arguing for an object-oriented approach. If his is an object-
oriented approach, how could relativising to sensibility groups help his case? There’s the 
issue, as Matravers points out, that sui generis aesthetic properties, according to 
Levinson, are determined by the experiencing subject. What is the link between the 
objective property and the phenomenal property experienced by the subject? How can 
the sui generis, phenomenal, property be explained by the object’s own non-aesthetic 
properties? How can sui generis phenomenal properties experienced by subjects in 
different sensibility groups be applied to the same object? The answer to these questions, 
Levinson writes, is that he provides an ordinary causal explanation, that aesthetic 
properties are ways that objects appear to us. The onus, therefore, is on the anti-realist to 
provide an explanation for the specific nature of aesthetic properties. 
To bring things back to the original question, primary qualities would have to be 
those properties that we can describe and to which we may apply certain aesthetic 
properties. Discussions about aesthetic properties most often appeal to examples of art. 
There are many good reasons why this should be the case: our experiences of art are to 
be valued, just as the artworks themselves are to be valued, art is most likely best 
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understood according to the Zeitgeist it was created in, and this requires perceiving and 
contextualising it correctly, as Levinson, Walton and many other philosophers argue.  
It is unclear that this is true of nature, or natural objects, for these do elicit universal 
and immediate responses for which contextual knowledge or intentionality is of less 
import. Furthermore, as the appeal to colour shows, we can make sense of aesthetic 
properties as being part of natural objects that our ordinary, everyday experience. We 
experience colour as such, and we experience nature’s aesthetics as such. We don’t 
intuitively need refer to complex biographical narratives about the mind behind its 
creation, nor do we need to appeal to complex economic or historical events to 
appreciate it the majesty of the highlands, the grace of the gazelle, or awe at the Milky 
Way. 
 
§ Aesthetic Perception 
 
 The idea I wish to convey in this section is that we ought to consider the idea of 
unmediated aesthetic perception to be significant, despite the correlative importance of 
cognitive processes and substantive cultural meaning. While it is likely to be true that 
such processes and meaning enrich our aesthetic experiences, contribute to them in 
meaningful ways, we also have the capacity to be open to the object for guidance on 
how best to characterize it aesthetically, attend to it such that we allow its features to 
guide our attention, so that we may discern its features, both its non-aesthetic and its 
aesthetic features, as Sibley argued. Sibley put forward an argument for a sui generis 
class of aesthetic concepts.301 This seems right, for if we say that an object is aesthetic, 
we are saying that it has a property or properties that is or are distinct from other 
properties, such as epistemic or moral or economic properties.302 What was important 
was the having of aesthetic experiences, that is to say, perceptual experiences, and how 
those could be distinguished from non-aesthetic experiences. It is worth remembering 
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that Sibley was interested in accounting for the aesthetic experiences of non-art as well 
as art, which makes his claims all the more necessary and salient. 
 Of course, the deployment of concepts can itself involve a cognitive process of some 
order lower than the deployment of an epistemically intricate or grand theoretical 
framework. Sibley’s category of descriptive-aesthetic concepts and terms is interesting 
for my purposes, because I take him to mean that the origins of aesthetic discernment 
begin with the ability to make the experience intelligible, at least by describing those 
qualities we take to be aesthetic or non-aesthetic, as the case may be.303 Crucial to his 
argument was precisely the idea that experiencing aesthetic objects perceptually is 
pivotal; it is what aesthetics is about. This is true not in the sense that the object’s non-
aesthetic features will provide conditions for the application of an aesthetic concept, but 
in the sense that through perceptual attention and discernment they provide the aesthetic 
qualities that give their correlating concepts structure and terms their meaning. Rather 
than projecting aesthetic constructs onto the objects of aesthetic interest, the thought was 
that we attend to the object’s features, scrutinize them. 
 While Sibley steered clear of metaphysical language, I will not. I take Sibley’s 
thought to be that there is something to which we refer when we judge an object 
aesthetically, discern its features, that something being an ‘appearance property’ as 
notably argued by Levinson.304 To perceive aesthetically, according to Sibley, is to 
perceive the richness of aesthetic features that are (probably) afforded by the manifold 
properties of the object. There’s no mysterious leap from the non-aesthetic to the 
aesthetic, you either see the object’s aesthetic features or you don’t. This seems to 
appeal to realism. Whatever cultural difference there might be in how we discern those 
properties is borne out in the importance Sibley places on aesthetic discourse, 
normativity, the community who participate in aesthetic discourse. Aesthetic discourse 
can help us see and understand differences in how aesthetic properties are attributed and 
why. It may even help lay to rest disagreement about aesthetic attributions. 
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 The cultural, epistemic, moral, economic properties and considerations, or cognitive 
stock, that we bring to aesthetic situations may be thought of as tendencies towards 
experiencing certain aesthetic objects in ways that have been familiar to us, in ways that 
we have been taught, such that those ways of perceiving have become tendencies. For 
example, one might have learned to associate, or have repeatedly experienced, the 
‘slowness of tempo’ in music with ‘sadness’. This seems relatively uncontroversial and 
was a thought, and example, put forward by Beardsley. Sibley’s thought about this was 
that, while it seems plausible to generalise in this way, one could only do so with care, 
because ‘slowness of tempo’ in music might apply to other concepts, such as ‘majestic’ 
or ‘solemn’. In other words, while we may each bring different cognitive stock to an 
aesthetic concept that we have discerned from the object, there may be other, multiple, 
ways of ‘filling in’ the concept; or there may be multiple aesthetic concepts applicable to 
the same aesthetic content. The seeking out of objectivity through aesthetic discourse, 
through ‘public language’, through characterising an object’s features as precisely as 
possible, whilst being open to, mindful of, the possibility that the same concept may 
apply to different content or different content may apply to the same concept, 
encouraged openness of discussion without doing away with perceptual acuteness.  
 Of what could Sibley be saying we are having perceptually acute experiences? Again, 
Levinson’s appeal to what I think of as quasi-realism about aesthetic properties can help 
us here. For him, criteria for aesthetic properties are threefold: (1) Aesthetic properties 
are a description of how things appear (2) they are intended as property attributions and 
(3) their attribution depends on how things are with the object. The attribution of 
aesthetic properties is based on appearances, the ‘look’, ‘impression’ of aesthetic 
phenomena, and describes them. How we attribute aesthetic properties is dependent not 
only on how things are with the object in terms of how we might describe them, but how 
things are with the subject, how they are experienced. To make sense of how things are 
with the subject, Levinson relies on Humean, contextualist, arguments, that having the 
appropriate contextual knowledge related to the object’s appearance and how it is to be 
categorized can provide criteria for the correctness of attribute application. Or that the 
sophistication of the conceptual framework used to judge and attribute properties is 
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more refined. But, as Matravers points out, although ‘beauty-making’ characteristics 
may be ranked by human cognitive and sensory structures, occasioning aesthetic 
appreciation, they do not provide arguments for the existence of mind-independent 
aesthetic properties.305  
 Despite this, however, we can argue that the attribution is intended as a property 
attribution and describes how things are with the object. Since we have no better way of 
accounting for the experience of an aesthetic property than to articulate it, it would seem 
that the best explanation is to think of aesthetic concepts or terms as corresponding to 
aesthetic, perceptual properties in a meaningful way. As Levinson seems to suggest, 
many aesthetic properties are of the object and describable as such and most evaluative 
aesthetic attributions are based on aesthetic phenomena and have a “substantial 
descriptive content”.  
 The problem is that it is unclear that we can make sense of the conditions under 
which aesthetic properties can be real. People tend to converge on properties that are 
thought to be objective and correctness conditions imply universal judgment. If an 
attribution is accurate, it is knowable universally, if it is inaccurate, it is contingent, 
dependent on some non-objective, distinctly subjective, feature. Aesthetic evaluations 
would also be universal to the extent that everyone should be able to appeal to the same 
property to justify both their aesthetic judgment and, pro tanto, the aesthetic evaluation 
based on that judgment. It is argued that this is simply not true, that people disagree 
about aesthetic attributions and judgments and, furthermore, that people can disagree 
without being wrong.  
 Still, universalism of the sort presented by scientific practice need not be the solution 
for, as we have seen ‘slowness of tempo’ in music may correspond to ‘majestic’, 
‘solemn’ or ‘funereal’. On the other hand ‘majestic’, ‘solemn’ or ‘funereal’ may refer to 
some other content. Difference in perception need not entail difference in properties. Or, 
put more precisely, difference in a subject sensually feeling, representing, or coming into 
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contact with an object’s property need not entail difference in that property. This is why 
aesthetic discourse is so important: the requirement to be clear about to what it is we are 
referring when we are making statements like ‘the music is majestic’ or ‘solemn’ or 
funereal’, just like a four-sided shape might be thought to be a diamond or a square.  
 This, you might think, gets us no further into discovering whether our aesthetic 
perceptions are of objective properties. How a person conceptualizes or describes her 
experience of a property may simply be how she alone would do so, but we have already 
seen that we have difficulty getting traction on the idea of private experience, and that 
language at least provides means by which inter-subjective agreement can be achieved. 
If disagreement were warranted in every case, it would mean we would disagree about 
how we conceptualise and describe such experiences than we in fact observe. 
Disagreement with regard to aesthetic properties might be more true of human-made 
objects, which are culturally determined, but we find wide-ranging consensus even here. 
Natural objects, which don’t have the same kind of cultural determinacy, likely occasion 
more agreement. Be that as it may, there are reasons for thinking that aesthetic 
properties may be like colour properties, and may form a class of their own. As 
Levinson writes, property attribution is based on reports of looks, feels and appearances 
and the subject matter, how things are with the object, and allow us to distinguish 
between correctness and incorrectness when they are applied. There’s less disagreement 
than we might think. 
 How then is the “aesthetic fact erected upon the structural skeleton which supports 
it”?306 To answer this question, Levinson brings together the ideas of supervenience and 
emergentism. We saw earlier that by supervenience, Levinson means that aesthetic 
properties are dependent on an object’s structural, non-aesthetic properties and on its 
substructural, microphysical, material ones. If two aesthetic objects differ aesthetically, 
they necessarily differ structurally, if not substructurally. This just means that the way 
the object presents itself to experience will differ if the experience of it differs. If two 
aesthetic objects are contextually, structurally and substructurally identical, they cannot 
differ aesthetically. Emergentism here is the view that an aesthetic property arises from 
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its simpler, non-aesthetic constituents, but is not reducible to them. So the experience of 
an aesthetic property is the phenomenal result of a sensible quality or perceptible 
property, and the combination of non-aesthetic properties that cause it. 
 Aesthetic properties are the way things appear and, although constituted by their 
underlying structure, are irreducible to them. So in a short discussion on colour, 
Levinson writes: “For example, it is readily imaginable that reflecting wavelengths of 
alpha microns would have sufficed to make an object yellow, even holding our 
physiologies and neurochemistries fixed, and that reflecting wavelengths of ypsilon 
microns would not have sufficed to make an object visible at all. And this is because the 
attribute of yellowness is essentially tied to the appearance yellow, while the latter is 
only contingently related to any conditions physically specifiable.”307 Levinson does not 
mean that aesthetic properties are like colour properties in the sense that they are 
identical to physical properties.308 Levinson denies that attributes can be reduced to, 
made identifiable with, the nature of the corresponding, primary property: “[…] that 
coolness is just equivalent to the disjunctive attribute: deep-blueness or dark-greenness 
or …, and airiness to the disjunctive attribute: light-greyness or light-blueness or hazy-
yellowness […].309  
 This is because it is arbitrary which colour should correspond to ‘airiness’ or 
‘haziness’, and it looks like an evaluative dimension here is resisting a physicalist 
analysis. For Levinson, the sensual aspect, the sensible quality or perceptible property 
allows for the object to appear in a certain way. Levinson writes that the most 
compelling explanation for these phenomena is the “simple admission of distinct, 
emergent, higher-order perceptual features”.310 However, because no connection 
between emerged aesthetic properties and the non-aesthetic properties that constitute 
them is articulated, he gets into trouble. Matravers, for example, tries to show that 
Levinson’s is a dispositionalist view about aesthetic properties, according to which an 
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aesthetic property is the disposition to cause in perceiver’s visual experiences of a 
certain kind under particular circumstances.311 Levinson nevertheless insists that 
aesthetic properties are manifest properties that we directly perceive, rather than 
dispositions, arguing that dispositions are not perceivable, but aesthetic properties are. 
Directly perceiving aesthetic properties need not entail awareness of the non-aesthetic 
properties that constitute it, although it may. For Levinson, what he provides is an 
ordinary causal explanation that aesthetic properties are ways that objects appear to us. 
The onus, therefore, is on the anti-realist to provide an explanation for the specific 
nature of aesthetic properties. 
 This discussion on aesthetic perception, which has a rich supervenience base, and to 
which rich aesthetic terminology can be applied, delves deep into the origins of the 
aesthetic as an unmediated enterprise. Aesthetic experience is the result of being 
attentive to the object’s features and the terms that we apply to them, and being guided 
by them. That there is a sui generis class of aesthetic properties that are dependent on 
non-aesthetic properties (which include non-perceptual properties) underpins and gives 
gravitas to the idea of whole formalism, the idea that we’ve touched on before. An 
instance of whole formalism is Zuckert’s analysis of Kant’s account of aesthetic 
experience, according to which in aesthetic experience “we appreciate the object as an 
individual, as comprising all (or indeterminately many) of its sensible properties as 
inextricably interrelated or unified to make the object what it is; in other words, we 
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presumably have to choose) or that airiness is either light-blueness or hazy-yellowness. 
———, "Aesthetic Properties.", Mark Johnston, "How to Speak of the Colours," in 
Readings on Color, the Philosophy of Color, ed. Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). 
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appreciate what has been called an object’s ‘individual form’”.312 It is to this concept of 
whole formalism, and its role in my account of aesthetic perception, that we now turn. 
 
§ Whole Formalism 
 
 We can see from what I have argued that, to be described as aesthetic, an experience 
requires attention to an object. In order for it to be both intelligible to the subject, and 
made intelligible to a wider community, it also requires discernment, that is to say, 
looking and seeking to correctly characterise how the experience is structured. No better 
solution has been provided than the kind of inference to the best explanation that Sibley 
and Levinson have both offered, one on the linguistic plane, the other on the 
metaphysical plane: where aesthetic terminology was central to Sibley’s philosophical 
framework, aesthetic properties are to Levinson’s. Levinson’s metaphysical argument 
for the supervenience of aesthetic properties on non-aesthetic properties that was 
articulated in the previous section can be seen as an explanatory framework for the 
formal unity of the aesthetic object that is presented in Zuckert’s characterisation of 
whole formalism. This provides a rich understanding of aesthetic experience as it is of a 
unified object, rather than one that displays austere formal properties. 
 Though this is problematic for some, it seems a virtue of this approach to broach the 
issue that aesthetic contents are not always fixed by the same aesthetic concepts and 
terms. On the one hand, the difficulty lies with being too constraining in our approach, 
or being too lax with it. This kind of explanatory framework can at least get us closer to 
an understanding of the aesthetic that puts perception at the heart of the issue, but can be 
explanatory of both non-art and art. 
  Before moving onto the issue of what sorts of objects can be aesthetic objects, 
which I will address in the final section of the chapter, let us pause in order to give an 
account of aesthetic experience that speaks both to the perceptual experience and those 
non-perceptual features that in many cases contribute to it. In the above discussion, we 
                                                
312 Zuckert, "The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant's Aesthetic Formalism." 
599-600. 
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arrived at the idea that if aesthetic experience is anything at all, it is at least perceptual 
and descriptive. The contents of perceptual experience structure the concepts and terms 
that we apply to them. The question is, does such an account have to be formalist in the 
sense derived from Bell, Hanslick and Zangwill and resembling what Zuckert defines as 
austere formalism? Austere formalism was the idea that specific properties are held to be 
responsible for the object’s aesthetic appearance at the expense of its representational 
content, emotional expressiveness, and historical, institutional or social context.313 The 
specific properties I have in mind are lines, shapes and colour.  
 These, however, seem prima facie to be non-aesthetic properties: just because an 
object has lines, shapes and colour does not thereby mean we will experience it 
aesthetically. Rather, the sense in which Zuckert defines whole formalism is more 
fruitful, where, as we saw in chapter five, whole formalism captures the ideas of order, 
unity, harmony, diversity that integrate to form a whole object that is experienced. In the 
eighteenth century, this may have equated to an experience of beauty, but there is no 
reason to think that how an object integrates such features (or leaves some of them out) 
might not also constitute other aesthetic concepts or terms. Such an account takes the 
object’s features to be integrated and thereby constituting an object’s perceivable 
features. That is to say, they form a Gestalt, an organised whole that is perceived as 
more than the sum of its parts. This kind of perceptual, formalist account thus appeals to 
more than an object’s shape, line(s) or colour(s). It appeals to how these (and in some 
cases other) features come together to structure the concepts and terms that we come to 
apply to them.  
 Attending to and perceptually experiencing the object allows for its manifold features 
to become salient such that we can apply concepts and terms. The distinction between its 
features being non-aesthetic or aesthetic is one related to the disinterested mode of 
attention, where non-aesthetic features, although describable, only give rise to aesthetic 
experience when the Gestalt is formed in perceptual experience and distinctly aesthetic 
concepts and terms are applied to it. Aesthetic properties thus emerge, as Levinson 
argued, from non-aesthetic properties, and legitimate the aesthetic concepts and terms 
                                                
313 Ibid. 
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we use to identify them. Whereas austere formalism relies on the identification of 
specific properties, whole formalism tells us that the object manifests itself perceptually 
as an integrated whole, rich in features both aesthetic and non-aesthetic.   
I will momentarily turn to Kant, and Zuckert’s interpretation of him because we can 
interpret Kant’s aesthetics, and in particular his formalism, without reducing his account 
to the kind of austere formalism that is often attributed to him, or that defines the 
subsequent philosophical theories based on austere formalism. This provides historical 
precedence for the idea of whole formalism, but it also helps to synthesise the seemingly 
intractable issue that separates the formalists from the anti-formalists (in Zangwill’s 
language) or the cognitivists from the non-cognitivists. Furthermore, whole formalism, 
as a perceptual account, combines disjunctively with thought in the sense that there’s no 
necessary causal link between the perceived Gestalt and deeper knowledge, which isn’t 
to say that theoretical and/or other contextual elements might not also feed into the 
perceptual experience in important and meaningful ways.  
Formalism is said to have originated in Kant’s third Critique and grew out of the idea 
of ‘purposiveness without purpose’.  This idea was developed in Kant’s Critique of the 
Power Judgment. We briefly touched on it in chapter three, where we saw how Savile 
uses it as a reason for supporting the ‘art-first’ view, suggesting that the best way to 
experience nature would be by experiencing it ‘as if’ it were designed or created by an 
artist. While we may not be certain about the origins of nature’s aesthetic appearance, 
our subjective experience of it need not entail a pared-down, property formalist account 
of what is perceived, or negate the importance of features we take to be important to 
aesthetic experience, such as emotion, historical, institutional, cultural context, or other 
forms of knowledge. The object’s purposive appearance may be woven into, or 
integrated with, these other elements, which can help explain the importance we attach 
to the aesthetic experience of nature. Zuckert writes that purposiveness, for Kant, 
involves intention: “A purpose is an agent’s aim (described by a concept) or an object 
created by such an agent, in accord with the agent’s intention”. The agent’s intentions 
are purposeful in the sense that she produces an object that accords with her 
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intentions.314 This makes sense in relation to the creative endeavours behind the 
production of art, and can justify reasons for discovering the artist’s intentions behind an 
artwork’s appearance if one is so inclined. There are, however, other ways one might 
come to look to other reasons for an object’s appearance: how its appearance compares 
with artworks that came before and after; how its appearance relates to the social and 
political issues of the time; how it relates to the subject’s own experience, or to the 
subject’s community’s own experience. There are a myriad of possibilities. 
As we also saw briefly earlier, ‘purposiveness without purpose’ is, according to Kant, 
what accounts for beautiful form. Where a thing is purposive because we can conceive 
of it and explain it in terms of its having been created according to rules and with a 
particular end in mind, purposiveness without end can exist such that the explanation for 
how an object’s form has come to be can only be intelligible to and explainable by us if 
it is attributed to a creative force (a will) and can be experienced without necessarily 
appealing to reason315: 
Purposiveness can thus exist without an end, insofar as we not place the causes of 
this form in a will, but can still make the explanation of its possibility conceivable 
to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. Now we do not always necessarily 
need to have insight through reason (concerning its possibility) into what we 
observe. Thus we can at least observe a purposiveness concerning form, even 
without basing it in an end (as the matter of the nexus finalis), and notice it in 
objects, although in no other way than by reflection.316 
 
Kant is saying that whatever the reasons are for an object’s appearing a certain way, or 
however it compares with what it may have been intended to be, we experience it 
aesthetically when we attend to its form (rather than whether is comprised of only 
formal properties).   
                                                
314 Ibid. 605. 
315 The idea that we need not necessarily appeal to reason is important because Kant is 
saying that what is special about an object’s form seems to be grounded in intention 
(when in fact it may not have been) and because it may not be grounded in intentions (or 
rules for creation), reason (which itself presupposes rules) is not necessary for 
appreciating an object’s form. Here we have a precursor for the view that science does 
not underpin our aesthetic judgments of nature. 
316 Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment. §10, 5:220, 105. 
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Kant is not ruling out certain elements that might feature in aesthetic experience, as 
Zuckert’s more general definition of formalism holds. As we saw in chapter five, 
Zangwill explicitly situates himself as a formalist and thinks that non-formal features 
ought not to be taken account of in certain aesthetic situations (such as his account of the 
application of extreme formalism to inorganic nature). In other situations, he steers clear 
of epistemic justifications for aesthetic experience. Carlson is in even more peril 
according to Kant for although Kant does not rule out the possibility for reason to have a 
role in judging the form of an object, it is the lack of purpose behind an object’s 
purposeful-looking appearance that grants freedom from the application of rules in our 
appreciation of the object, and thus makes it an object of aesthetic experience. So, 
whatever results science presents us with, it may present one way of experiencing 
nature, but it cannot be the only way. This is because the way the object appears is not 
necessarily related to what we know about it, but to the way it appears to us.  
Furthermore, as I also suggest above, a cognitivist, scientific approach would require 
a complex deployment of concepts that is not necessarily required for a distinctly 
aesthetic experience. This is why turning to the analysis of concepts and terms rather 
than a grand scientific theory, and identifying whether they are indicative of the 
aesthetic, rather than whether they accord with some scientific theory or other, is a more 
fruitful endeavour. The object’s appearance is important for a distinctly aesthetic 
experience of it, the reason for which Kant draws attention to features such as colour and 
tone, which he thinks “already concern form”.317 Colour and tone help structure the 
object’s form, but can only contribute to the overall beauty of the form if they are not 
merely experienced as a preference by the subject, but as purely representing the object 
in experience. If the subject’s attention is on the application of a scientific theory, rather 
than a feature of the object, her attention is being drawn away from the object. Kant then 
further states that if the object’s aesthetic features are also experienced relating to the 
good, as the scientific cognitivist wishes, subjective attention is drawn away from the 
object’s representation and towards another end, that of a “determinate end”. This is 
                                                
317 Ibid. §14, 5:224, 109. 
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problematic because, again, attention is drawn away from the object as such, and judged 
in terms of some external, moral, purpose. 
Let us return to the issue of formalism. Zuckert shows that Kant’s aesthetics provide a 
“richer, more plausible, description of our aesthetic engagement with an object, as less 
narrowly subjectivist than frequently believed”.318 When we attend to the object 
disinterestedly, our experience of it gives the object “individual form”, which comprises 
of “its sensible properties as inextricably interrelated or unified to make the object what 
it is”.319 According to Zuckert, there are three types of formalism: ‘property formalism’, 
according to which “the form of an object is described as a set of specific or temporal 
properties that characterise the relations that hold among different parts of the object and 
that these are responsible for the object”; ‘kind formalism’, “which identifies the form of 
an object as that which makes it a good example of its kind”; and ‘whole formalism’, 
where an “object is beautiful if it is ordered or unified, if its parts harmonize to form a 
whole-or more specifically, that beauty is a unity of diversity or of variety”.320 Zuckert 
argues that Kant is often taken to be a property formalist, in the sense that specific 
properties are held to be responsible for the object’s aesthetic appearance - the idea that 
colour, lines and shapes are responsible for the object’s appearance. Bell’s formalism is 
a kind of property formalism, because his definition of ‘significant form’ is the inter-
relationship between lines, shapes, and colour. These properties are prerequisites for 
how we should experience objects aesthetically.  
 Kant’s take on formalism is best understood in terms of ‘whole formalism’ in that the 
object as a whole figured in experience rather than a list of properties we take to be 
formal properties, for his exposition of form requires that there be a difference between 
form or representation and sensation on the one hand (which is a matter of experience) 
and concepts on the other hand (which are a matter of the intellect and, therefore, 
judgment). Kant’s formalism is, as Zuckert writes, a “disjunctive argument” for a three-
                                                
318 Zuckert, "The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant's Aesthetic Formalism." 
600. 
319 Ibid. 600. 
320 Ibid. 600-601. 
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fold distinction between types of representation: sensation, form and concepts.321 We 
experience an object’s form sensually and apply appropriate concepts. This process may 
take concepts related to the object, our sensual experience and concepts related to what 
we know, as long as the object is made central to the experience (rather than subjective 
preference or the good). One possible result of experiencing the object might be an 
experience of an austere formalist kind, but this need not constrain our experiences to 
austere formalism for an object may be beautiful as a result of order, diversity, variety, 
harmony of the object’s constitutive properties, that is to say, a wider range of properties 
than narrow formalism allows. While the experience is focused on the object’s 
perceivable features, it need not ignore or negate its non-formal perceptual or non-
perceptual features, as narrow formalism requires. 
We can bring in the idea, implied in the above, that our aesthetic experience of 
objects in not governed by reason or by rules. That there are no rules for beauty entails 
purposiveness without purpose whether in relation to nature or art because if the 
judgment of beauty is based on purpose it would be judged according to its having 
fulfilled that purpose. Purposiveness characterises the form of beautiful objects as both 
describing the object and as occasioning subjective response, leading to the claim that 
objects are beautiful not in terms of which properties they instantiate, but “in virtue of 
everything about them”, including how they relate to one another and in virtue of their 
overall design.322 Kant’s engagement with the object therefore not only requires we take 
it as an object for its own sake, but that we attend to its form, however many kinds of 
properties are instantiated. 
As we have seen above and in previous chapters, disinterest is the concept that 
enables judging an object for its own sake and does not denote lack of interest in the 
sense that we are not interested in the aesthetic object, the obliteration of thought or 
feeling or the denial of the existence of certain non-formal, perceptual properties that 
help constitute an object’s form, and formalism does not merely pertain to “lines and 
forms combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of forms”. Nor do we 
                                                
321 Ibid. 604. 
322 Ibid. 612. 
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need to “bring with us nothing but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-
dimensional space”, as Bell argued.323 Disinterest is the locus for attending to the object 
in such a way that its individuality as an object is of import rather than our individual 
self-interest, and the object is constituted by an indeterminate amount of properties, not 
just shape, line or colour properties, that enable us to experience it as an aesthetic object 
in the first place.  
In the next section, I consider the issue of formalism, representation and mimesis as 
they have been taken to be applied to art and nature for a deeper analysis of why Bell’s 
account would not function either in relation to art or nature. Zuckert’s initial definition 
of formalism is that it entails looking only at the object’s form at the expense of 
representational content, emotional expressiveness, historical, institutional or social 
context.324 For Zuckert, Kant’s formalism is not what characterises property formalism, 
defined in terms of the set of spatial or temporal properties and their relations that are 
responsible for the object. Instead she characterises Kant’s formalism as whole 
formalism, the thought that an object is beautiful if it is ordered or unified, if its parts 
harmonise to form a whole, rather than requiring specific properties such as lines, 
shapes, colour, size, depth and spatial relations, that Bell advocated. Furthermore, she 
sees Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment as a disjunctive argument in terms of a three-
fold distinction between types of representation, representations that are grounded in 
sensation, those that are grounded in form and those that are grounded in concepts. In 
other words, the three-foldness consists in sense experience; the object’s seemingly 
purposive form; and cognition, the concepts we use to make sense of our experience.325 
So, while Kant’s whole formalism speaks of order, harmony and unity, and is led by the 
object’s features, other contextual features we often take to be relevant to aesthetic 
experience can be accounted for in other elements that gradually supplement aesthetic 
experience. 
                                                
323 Bell, Art. 8, 27. 
324 Zuckert, "The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant's Aesthetic Formalism." 
600. 
325 Ibid. 604. 
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 How this account of formalism plays out in relation to artworks is more promising 
than how Bell’s account did. The aesthetic value of an object is derived from its parts, its 
sensible properties, being ordered or unified and their harmonisation to form a whole. 
Whether or not an artwork is a representation need not matter, what matters is that all the 
parts form a whole such that in our sensual experience of it we may apply concepts to 
make sense of it. In order to do so we attend to the object’s features, rather than the 
abstract features derived from it that allow it to fit into an aesthetic theory. We are 
compelled, according to the Kantian/Zuckertian account, to experience the 
representational features of a work of art as representational features and we are 
compelled to apply concepts to it. Central to the view, however, is that we attend to the 
work’s sensible properties.  
 We thus have a situation where much art, both representational and non-
representational, can be of interest and, where representational art is concerned, we need 
not see it as structurally abstract. What a picture is or represents can feature as part of 
our experience of it. It thus seems that a property may be relevant to an aesthetic 
experience even though it is not necessary and sufficient for the experience to be had in 
the first place. 
 Some of the properties that relate to art, such as the artist’s intentions, may come into 
play where the artwork is concerned. However, where nature is concerned, Kant 
provides an understanding for the purposes of my argument here:  
The reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a 
transcendental principle as a law [that orders empirical principles], and cannot 
derive it from anywhere else (for then it would be the determining power of 
judgment) nor can it prescribe it to nature: for reflection on the laws of nature is 
directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the conditions in terms of which 
we attempt to develop a concept of it that is in this regard entirely contingent.326 
 
On the one hand, our reflective judgment orders our experiences, but on the other, our 
reflections and the way we order our experiences should not be seen as nature itself. 
Furthermore, as Zuckert writes, “[w]e cannot judge that nature was designed by an 
intentional agent (i.e. God) […], we must think of empirical laws only as if they were 
                                                
326 Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment. 5: 180. 69. 
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legislated or designed by an understanding “not ours””.327 We look to nature to direct 
our reflective judgment, even though we see it as if it were designed (neither by us, nor 
by God) and as an object, or a collection of objects, in themselves.  
 What this means for our aesthetic experience of nature is richer than the Bellian 
account affords: we are no longer restricted to the abstractions that Bell’s formalism 
entails. Rather, we can experience each of the properties the object displays, if ordered 
and unified, and harmonised to form a whole via all of our senses. This is important for 
nature because we not only see it as we do a framed painting, we are often in motion 
when we engage with it, we hear bird song, the wind through the trees, or smell the 
damp, mugginess of the lagoon on a hot summer’s day. Kant may not have explicitly 
endorsed my particular application of his view to the experience of nature, but it 
contributes to how we might represent or constitute a natural object in aesthetic 
experience, that in tandem with the concepts we use to make sense of our aesthetic 
experiences.  
 Lastly, it seems that being guided by nature in our experiences of it intimates a 
closeness to nature, whereas following the criteria that Bell advances in his formalist 
aesthetic theory suggests that we would have to abstract from it. Even if we can not 
know nature in itself on Kant’s terms, Kantian formalism can give us “a surprising 
intimation of what it would be to transcend human cognitive limitations, to have an 
intuitive understanding of a (sic.) individual being as a whole, in all its particularity; it 
suggests that individual things-even the world as a whole-are, in their contingent 
character, meaningful, intelligible, ordered for us; it gives us a sense of what it would be 
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 It is not the kind of object of an experience that determines whether the experience 
is aesthetic, but the kind of attention that is afforded it and the properties that it displays. 
Aesthetic attention, which can partly be characterised in terms of disinterest, as I wrote 
in the second section of the chapter, is required for an aesthetic experience. This kind of 
attention entails concentrating both on the object of experience and how we sensually 
experience, describe and talk about it. Attending to the object does not mean focusing 
either on stipulative properties (such as the formal properties), at the expense of 
everything else, nor does it mean focusing on what we know, or theoretical frameworks. 
It involves focusing on the object’s appearance, how we conceptualise and describe it. 
This kind of perceptual account grounds, structures how we experience and 
conceptualise aesthetic objects and then allows us to better understand how it relates to 
other elements, such as emotive ones or epistemic ones. These latter features thus 
contribute to an experience of objects that is already perceptually rich (depending on the 
object’s features) in a way that is true to its phenomenology. 
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General Conclusion: Perceiving Nature Aesthetically 
 
 I have argued for two inter-related strands of argument: one strand that takes 
account of perceiving aesthetically, which has been formulated in terms of ‘whole 
formalism’, that allows for the idea that an object’s aesthetic properties are non-causally 
related to its non-aesthetic concepts; the second strand capturing what it is that is 
important about our aesthetic experiences of nature. A historical dimension to the thesis 
has been provided in order to establish historical, philosophical, precedence for 
ascertaining what has historically been thought in relation both to aesthetic perception 
and and nature as a subject matter for perceptual, aesthetic experience. To that end I 
addressed Plato’s skepticism about aesthetic, mimetic properties in artworks, Aristotle’s 
teleology about them and Aquinas’ realism about aesthetic properties in chapter one, 
where in the end I agreed with Aristotle and Aquinas’ non-skeptical views. Chapter two 
allowed me to introduce concepts, such as immediacy, disinterest and aesthetic 
perception that established a basis for my own conclusions about perceptual, aesthetic, 
experience and the importance of nature as a subject matter for aesthetic experience. 
Chapter three addressed the issue of priority being given to either to art or nature in the 
aesthetic realm, but showed that concerns about not allowing art conceptual priority in 
aesthetic realm, primarily linked to the idea that nature is not intentionally created, are 
ill-founded and that nature is at least as important as art as has been suggested by 
contemporary approaches to the aesthetics of nature. To provide further support for the 
importance of nature to aesthetics, despite its lack of intentionality, chapter four 
confirmed nature’s importance as a paradigm of aesthetic experience and concentrated 
on nature’s expressive properties in order to reveal the richness of nature as an object of 
aesthetic appreciation and with which we have emotive affinity. Chapter five layed out 
the respective arguments put forward by contemporary, non-cognitive formalists about 
the aesthetics of nature and their opposing scientific cognitivists. This was important 
because both sides of the debate dig their heels in at the expense of the richness provided 
by the other. I laid out why one side insisting on an austere formalism that dispenses 
with, or at least minimizes valuable, contextual aspects of aesthetic experience, and the 
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other side insisting on the necessity of context or frameworks of scientific knowledge as 
it relates to nature in particular. One possible resolution was articulated in chapter six, 
where the idea of ‘whole formalism’ took a different approach from many austere 
formalists and is arguably the best interpretation of Kant’s formalism. Here, a 
perceptually rich account of aesthetics that does not deny the possibility for non-formal, 
or non-perceptual elements of objects to figure in aesthetic experience and does not 
assume that the non-determinism, or lack of intentionality in nature means it should 
relate to an austere account of formalism. 
Attending aesthetically to nature, then, brings with it experiences of an external world 
from which we stem and on which we depend not merely for our existence, but for our 
capacity to experience it in a range of ways: from the striking presence of a heron, 
elegant in disposition and demeanour as I run past the lake to the ugliness of a hawk 
capturing a baby rabbit for its dinner. It reminds us that we are thinking, reflecting 
creatures, able to use our capacity for thought to avoid ugliness in our engagement with 
the world. Rooting the aesthetic in perception allows us to understand that it has an 
impact on our daily activities and routines, rather than being restricted either to a 
particular kind of object or to the knowledge we might have about it. If aesthetic 
experience is anything, it is at least perceptual, which means that it is not restricted 
either to art or to nature. It may be different in either case, different depending on how 
the aesthetic, perceptual, experience attaches to affective properties and cognitive 
approaches. What’s distinctive about nature is that it is the external we inhabit, rather 
than a product of human intentionality. This does not minimise its aesthetic appeal, but 
heightens if for that very reason.  
Whole formalism, unlike austere formalism, articulates how non-formal, aesthetic 
features figure in experience, because the object is unified in perceptual experience and 
integrates its various features into that uniform object. This describes perceptual 
experience and how it combines with other features of aesthetic experience: what we 
might know about the object, intellectual, creative, imaginative or affective responses to 
it. This is important for both art and nature, but resists the scientific cognitive approach 
to aesthetics simply because nature is not like art where the aesthetic is concerned, 
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because no such discipline as the history of nature exists in the way it does for the 
history of art. The idea of whole formalism rests on an interpretation of Kant that is 
generous to his account of how form fits into aesthetic experience than austere formalists 
allow. This, combined with the acknowledgment that nature is at least as rewarding an 
aesthetic subject as art allows us to explore its significance for us. This is not just for 
ethical reasons, but for reasons that we may, as a consequence, attend to it carefully, care 
about it, and acknowledge its importance to how our moods and emotions correlate with 
its expressive qualities. By tracing the idea of aesthetic perception, I have shown the role 
of nature as a paradigm of aesthetic experience through history, not only that perception 
is crucial to aesthetic experience and that nature is a repository for rich aesthetic 
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